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Abstract  
 
 Recent years have seen a renewed focus within animation studies regarding women 
in animation, particularly in terms of their histories and representations. However, despite 
various examples of scholarship that take up a feminist position or engage in feminist critique 
and analysis in their examinations of animated film, animation studies has been slow to 
engage with feminist philosophical frameworks in a rigorous manner. This is particularly 
evidenced by the lack of engagement with feminist theories of corporeality and materiality. 
In their re-examination of the mind/body dualism—which nevertheless continues to reassert 
itself—feminist theorists have long sought to displace and refigure this dichotomy and its 
associated pairings. This theoretical grappling with corporeality has led to deeper 
considerations regarding the ontologies of life, of difference, and of becomings, as the 
complexities of bodies as material entities, the interactions between body and mind, and the 
interactions between different bodies are revealed and delineated. The focus of this thesis is 
the ways in which feminist conceptions of the body, materiality, and becoming can work 
through animation, and in turn, suggest ways in which animation may open up and 
reinvigorate feminist understandings of the body and modes of materiality. 
 
 The thesis posits that animation is a site through which such complexities can be 
productively explored and argues that animation and materialist feminism provide mutually 
generative ways of thinking the material nature of embodiment as necessarily animated. The 
thesis illustrates this claim with a specific focus on the animated films of Michèle Cournoyer, 
who takes the body as a central focus in her work to show how animation may actualise the 
lived experience of, particularly, women’s embodiment. The thesis also argues for a 
genealogical continuity between the ink-on-paper animations of Cournoyer with her female 
colleagues in the animation industry where the embodied practices of early women (as well 
as contemporary) animators has enabled this medium’s genesis and development 
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Introduction 
 
 
Bodies proliferate in cinema. Living bodies to be sure, but also dead bodies, and transitional bodies, 
suspended between the being of a subject and objecthood … The body is constant, qualified only by an 
adjective—‘living’ or ‘dead’. 
—Lesley Stern, Dead and Alive: The Body as Cinematic Thing 
 
Human bodies, indeed all animate bodies, stretch and extend the notion of physicality that dominates the 
physical sciences, for animate bodies are objects necessarily different from other objects; they are materialities 
uncontainable in physicalist terms alone. 
— Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies 
 
 As bodies proliferate in cinema, so too do they proliferate in animation. In her 2012 
monograph, Dead and Alive: The Body as Cinematic Thing, Lesley Stern investigates the 
‘thingness’ of cinematic bodies—living bodies and dead bodies, ordinary bodies, and the 
corporeal materiality of bodies. Stern examines the ways dead bodies persist in cinema, their 
quality of physical and temporal presence, and their potential for conjuring a quality of 
cinematic thingness” (4). She is interested in the different ways bodies in cinema perform 
their thingness, in particular how cinematic corpses blur the lines between “animate and 
inanimate things, between persons and things” and how these bodies may be haunted by “the 
question of what constitutes ‘aliveness’” (5). Although Stern mostly confines herself to a 
discussion of bodies in live action cinema, in one instance she makes brief reference to the 
anthropomorphic Disney character, Donald Duck. Whilst considering the conception of 
objects as media, she notes that such objects “may have some physical reality or not: Donald 
Duck is no less an object than a pillar of granite” (13). In a text where Stern is primarily 
interested in the “liveliness of corpses,” and not “bodies that may in fact be composited, or 
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even digitally constructed” (4), this reference to the drawn, inked, and painted body of Donald 
Duck (or even, in his more recent animated appearances, his digitally composited body) is 
curious. If the body is a “constant, qualified only by an adjective—‘living’ or ‘dead’” (3), then 
surely ‘animated’ is also a qualifying adjective?  What is the state of the body in animation? 
What is its ‘thingness’? Is the animated body also, as Stern writes of cinematic bodies, 
“suspended between the being of a subject and objecthood?” (3). How is the body in 
animation to be defined? Surely bodies in animation film—that is, bodies which are animated 
through the various techniques available to animation practices—also complicate any clear 
distinctions between subject and objecthood, between living and dead, the material and 
immaterial, corporeal and incorporeal? Stern’s examination of the body as a cinematic thing 
does not quite imply a disinterest in the body in animation (as her brief reference to Donald 
Duck would also attest), although her lack of examination of the body in animated film 
suggests she finds her analysis here does not apply to animation film. However the question 
of the “blurred line between animate and inanimate things” (5) is one to which she constantly 
returns, and the blurring of lines between the animate and the inanimate is a question 
implicit to the study of animation (as a form of film, as a principle of film, and as a concept). 
      
 Animation scholar Alan Cholodenko writes in his 1991 anthology The Illusion of Life, 
that “two major definitions bedevil animation: endowing with life (be the enlivening agency, 
substance and that which is enlivened material or immaterial) and endowing with movement” 
(15). For Cholodenko, animation “poses the very questions of life itself, movement itself and 
their relation” (15). It is imperative, however, that the notions of ‘life’ and ‘movement’ in 
animation are not conceived of through any kind of dichotomised oppositional relationship, 
but that they are “thought through each other” (16). For Cholodenko animation is not only a 
co-implication and complication of life and movement, but of the animate and inanimate: 
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“animation is itself of the order of the ‘in between’, that it cannot be thought without 
thinking the nature of the ‘in between’ (the ‘meeting ground’), whether it is the relation 
between the idea of animation and animation film, the relation between the idea of animation 
and live action film” (14).  
      
 This notion of animation as already of the order of the in-between refers to more than 
the space ‘between the frames’ (the so-called absence where movement and meaning is 
generated), and more than the materiality of ‘in-betweens’ (frames between key frames), but 
a commingling, a meeting ground between animate and inanimate, life and death, presence 
and absence, movement and stasis: “animation always has something of the inanimate about 
it, that it is a certain inanimateness that both allows and disallows animation” (28). I contend 
that this notion of the in-between in animation has further implications for the nature of 
animated bodies, their materialities (and immaterialities), and for animation’s co-
implication and complication of mind/body dualism. If animation is the order of the in-
between, then animation may allow us to transform this mind/body dualism (that which has 
positioned women as lesser and as other), refiguring the interrelation between body and 
mind, and opening up our understanding of the materiality of bodies. Likewise, feminist 
theory of the body and of nature may open up new ways to conceive of the body in animation.  
      
 Thinking through the tangled materialities of animated bodies requires a significant 
ontological examination of not only the ‘nature’ of animation, but the corporeality of human 
bodies too. Feminist scholar Elizabeth Grosz writes that, “[t]he body is a most peculiar 
“thing,” for it is never quite reducible to being merely a thing; nor does it ever quite manage 
to rise above the status of a thing” (1994 xi). For Grosz, human bodies (and non-human 
bodies) are animate bodies. They are neither inert nor inactive: “They act and react. They 
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generate what is new, surprising, unpredictable” (xi). As quoted above, animate human 
bodies are bodies whose materialities are “uncontainable in physicalist terms alone “(xi). 
What does this imply for bodies in animation? ‘Animate’ here implies both movement and a 
sense of liveliness, which, as already noted, cannot be separated. What might the medium of 
animation reveal to us about this surprising, unpredictable nature of the animate human 
body? How might animation allow us to rethink (or reanimate) an understanding of nature 
that is more than something essential and immutable? 
      
 Feminist theorists who work to advance feminist perspectives on embodiment and 
corporeality, including Luce Irigaray (1985), Elizabeth Grosz (1994; 2008; 2011), and Rosi 
Braidotti (1991; 2013), have consistently encountered, and necessarily reconsidered, the 
mind/body opposition that has underpinned much of the history of Western thought. Taking 
up these theorists in the examination of animated bodies on screen may allow us to rethink 
the ways the conceptual category of Woman, that which precedes and exceeds any 
representation of women, and the feminine becomes animated. The conceptualisation of 
Woman is deeply implicated in the psycho-social, political and cultural experiences of and 
knowledges about women. The dichotomous opposition of mind and body carries with it a 
series of parallel binary associations, such as masculine/feminine, reason/passion, 
male/female; within this hierarchy, the latter term becomes devalued, the negative 
counterpart to the first, privileged term. The body thus becomes subordinate and secondary 
to mind, that which is unruly, that which must be controlled, and a ‘thing’ to be transcended. 
The association of the mind/body opposition with the dichotomous pairing of male and 
female has left women excluded from the order of the conceptual, of the mind, aligned with 
the corporeal and disavowed as the negated counterpart to men. The task has fallen to 
feminist scholars to not only undo these dualisms but to seek new accounts of corporeality 
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for feminist thought; such feminist accounts of the body must be non-reductionist, avoiding 
essentialist, ahistorical understandings whilst at the time resisting a purely social 
constructionist approach. Through feminist and anti-cartesian approaches, the mind/body 
hierarchy is refigured, the body no longer only considered in opposition to mind, and at the 
same time “extricated from biological and pseudo-naturalist appropriations from which it 
has historically suffered” (Grosz 1994 20). It is also imperative to recognise that any 
understandings of the body necessarily shift and are dependent on the various intersections 
of race, gender, and sexuality. There is no singular conception of a body, only bodies, which 
must be thought in their specificity and multiplicity. How then might animation, and the 
depiction of animated bodies on screen, articulate a corporeal and material feminist approach 
to embodiment?  
      
 Animation “is never only a benign activity. It troubles, and its troubling includes 
troubling thought” (Cholodenko 1991 10). In the spirit of troubling, this thesis asks the 
further question, how may we understand the body in animation through feminist 
perspectives on corporeality and materiality, and, through these understandings, how may 
the body in animation disrupt and transform the mind/body dualism that pervades and 
persists in Western discourse? Animation can articulate a mode of thought and a practice that 
enables us to see and feel these deeply ingrained dualisms in their social, political, economic 
and artistic dimensions. Thinking the ontology of animated bodies may provide openings for 
further feminist reflection on the nature of corporeality. In order to explore these questions, 
the writings of Grosz will provide a framework in this study as a great deal of her writing, 
particularly since the publication of Volatile Bodies (1994), has not only been to rethink and 
refigure the body for feminist purposes, but more broadly to explore ontologies of difference, 
art, life, and becomings. Grosz’s writings on art and becomings allow for a productive and 
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generative means of thinking through the connections between animation, the body, and 
feminist philosophy. In Becoming Undone (2011), she explores the becomings and processes 
“that make and unmake objects, whether these are natural objects, manufactured objects or 
those objects that live and experience” (1). Animation too, can perhaps be considered a 
process of making and unmaking objects through metamorphosis, an act through which “One 
substance transmutes into another, from line to protoplasm and back again” (Klein 2000 21). 
The work of Grosz prompts a thinking of the body in animation beyond representation.  
      
 This PhD inquiry was initially sparked by a fascination with animated metamorphosis, 
and in particular the metamorphic lines of the animation films of Canadian animator, 
filmmaker and artist, Michèle Cournoyer. Cournoyer’s films have often taken the female body 
as their central focus, with the body in her films becoming the site for exploring women’s 
lived experience, the tensions between pleasure and pain, the public and private, the physical 
and psychical, and the various connections forged between people, place, technologies and 
objects. Her films take as their themes female sexuality, desire, trauma, memory, violence, 
and addiction. Her ink-on-paper animation technique, the lines of her animated figures 
constantly trembling, collapsing and reforming, evokes the visceral, embodied, material 
nature of the experiences she depicts. Cournoyer has described the metamorphoses in her 
films as ‘ellipses’: “the art of shortcuts…a simple editing transition” (Cournoyer 2014). It is 
within these ellipses however, that something about the potential nature of animated bodies 
is revealed; never static or simply holding their form, these animated bodies are constantly 
unfolding, passing in between what they were and what they are becoming. There is no simple 
state of ‘being-ness’ for these animated bodies as their constant becoming is inherently tied 
up in Cournoyer’s animation process, which is rarely planned or traditionally story-boarded, 
as the animator continually draws and re-draws frames and sequences, letting the images 
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flow in the most organic and spontaneous way possible. This process would seem to reflect 
Cournoyer’s own fascination with the connections between the unconscious mind and the 
female body. Inside and outside are never separate, and everything is connected.  
      
Chapter Overview  
      
 Undertaking a thorough examination of the current literature, chapter one will 
explore questions around the nature or ontology of animation by examining the problem of 
definitions, genealogies of animation and cinema, and the relationship between cinema and 
animation. As noted above, the dichotomised pairing of mind and body carries a number of 
lateral associations, and perhaps explicitly in relation to this inquiry an extension of these 
pairings can be seen in the so-called oppositional relationship between live action cinema 
and animation. According to Cholodenko, film theory has long regarded animation “as either 
the ‘step-child’ of cinema or as not belonging to cinema at all, rather belonging to the graphic 
arts” (1991 9). Although animation’s relation to the graphic arts is not disputed, animation 
scholars have long argued against the conception of animation as a lesser or negated mode 
of live action cinema. The perceived disconnect between ‘animation’ and ‘cinema’ continues 
to be broken down, as any clear distinction between the two becomes ever more destabilised 
thanks to the continuing prevalence and ubiquitousness of computer-generated imagery and 
digital technologies. Even the ‘beginnings’ of cinema and animation share common ground, 
as Cholodenko notes, “the development of all those nineteenth century technologies—
optical toys, studies in persistence of vision, the projector, the celluloid strip, etc.—but for 
photography was to result in the combination/synthesizing in the animatic apparatus of 
Emile Reynaud’s Théâtre Optique of 1892” (9-10, original emphasis). Here the relationship 
between cinema and animation is inverted, and animation becomes the ground on which 
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cinema is based; however, just as feminist theorists do not seek a simple hierarchical reversal 
of the mind/body dichotomy, animation theorists and scholars, including Maureen Furniss 
(2007, 2016) and Suzanne Buchan (2006, 2013), seek to bridge the gap between animation 
studies and film studies, complicating the relationship between animation and live action 
cinema. These theorists propose that animation studies should commit itself not only to the 
theorising of animation, but of animating film theory—“not only addressing what animation 
adds to the theorising of film” but of film to animation (Cholodenko 2014 98). Seeking a 
transformation of the mind/body binary through animation necessitates a thinking of 
animation that is non-reductive, and that also displaces such binaries as stillness and 
movement, life and death(non-life), animate and inanimate, and cinema  and animation. If 
animation is always already of the nature of the in-between, then we must consider the ways 
live action cinema and animation film continue to intersect.  
      
 Thinking through both women in animation and the body in animation has in the past 
been largely confined to discussions regarding representation (Pilling 1992; Bell et.al 1995; 
Wells 1998; Davis 2007). The majority of the interdisciplinary work around feminism and 
animation, or gender studies and animation, has been in the way of feminist critiques of 
various animated texts (King et.al. 2010; Pilling 2012; Perea 2015). Significantly, recent years 
have seen a renewed focus in scholarship around women in animation (women as animators, 
directors, artists, and in various other behind the scenes roles, in the commercial industry 
and as independent filmmakers). Jayne Pilling’s Women and Animation – A Compendium 
(1992) was the first key English language text devoted exclusively to female animators and 
artists; Marion Quigley’s Women Do Animate (2005) similarly offers profiles of ten Australian 
women animators. More recently, Mindy Johnson’s Ink & Paint: The Women of Walt Disney’s 
Animation (2017) details the immense (and often unacknowledged) labor of the hundreds of 
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women inkers and painters (and beyond) who worked behind the scenes not only at the 
Disney Animation studios, but throughout the history of the Western animation industry. 
Understandably, a great deal of this recent scholarship around women in animation has 
focused on undoing misconceptions around their contribution to the medium, a feminist 
revision that reclaims women’s rightful place within historical texts, and making visible those 
who have been invisible. Beyond these re-examinations of animation practitioners and 
women in the industry, there are also texts which examine the intersections of animation, 
gender, sexuality and desire. These texts include Pilling’s anthology, Animating the 
Unconscious: Desire, Sexuality and Animation (2012); Animating Difference: Race, Gender 
and Sexuality in Contemporary Films for Children (King, Lugo-Lugo, and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 
2010) explores the ways animated films made primarily for children and family audiences 
(specifically those from the Disney, Pixar, DreamWorks and Twentieth Century Fox studios) 
address questions of racial, cultural, gender, and sexual difference. The animated short films 
of directors and animation collectives including Joanna Quinn, Alison de Vere, Marjut 
Rimminen, the Leeds Animation Workshop, Monique Renault, and Vera Neubauer, to name 
but a few, have been consistently upheld as expressing feminist sensibilities and politics. 
Therefore, chapter two of this thesis will provide an overview of current literature regarding 
women, animation and feminism, building upon the latest feminist reclamations of 
animation history, and picking up on the material traces women have left throughout this 
history. Following Luce Irigaray (1985), who asks, “how can women analyse their own 
exploitation, inscribe their own demands, within an order prescribed by the masculine?” (81), 
this chapter will explore the possibility of feminist animation. How can women in animation 
challenge the patriarchal and phallocentric conventions of a male-dominated industry? It will 
provide an overview of the ways in which feminism has previously been taken up by 
animation studies, exploring both historical and contemporary contexts. In doing so it will 
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highlight several key figures in the history of women in animation to consider how this 
history has fallen prey (like other cultural and artistic practices) to ahistorical accounts and 
perspectives. 
      
 Although there has been renewed interest in women in animation, there is yet to have 
been a thorough critical inquiry into the animated body through feminist frameworks of 
corporeality or materiality. This inquiry becomes necessary if we are to thoroughly 
investigate the ways animation may operate to refigure and transform the mind/body 
dualism, at the same time allowing us to reconsider the material and ontological conditions 
of the medium itself. Chapters three and four will set up the frameworks through which a 
feminist refiguration of animated bodies can be undertaken. Where chapter two will focus on 
issues of representation, chapters three and four will lay the groundwork for how the body in 
animation may be materially conceived within feminist theory. They will trace the ways in 
which the body has been reclaimed for feminist purposes, examining the work of Elizabeth 
Grosz specifically, but also drawing from the writings of Irigaray, Braidotti and other feminist 
scholars of the body and the corporeal. As Mary Bloodsworth-Lugo writes, “If bodies are 
rendered as subject to interpretation, as these scholars suggest, rather than as given, static, 
neutral things, then the traditional relation between subject and object, and between mind 
and body—as well as our very formulations of identity and subjectivity—are recast” (2007 xii). 
Grosz in particular seeks an understanding of the body that does not rely on either dualistic 
or monistic modes of being, one which neither privileges the mind at the expense of the body, 
nor falls prey to essentialist accounts which privileges any particular kind of female or 
feminine essence. As Grosz writes:  
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The narrow constraints our culture has imposed upon on the ways in which our 
materiality can be thought means that altogether new conceptions of corporeality—
those, perhaps, which use the hints and suggestions of others but which move beyond 
the overall context and horizon governed by dualism—need to be developed, notions 
which see human materiality in continuity with organic and inorganic matter but also 
at odds with other forms of matter, which see animate materiality and the materiality 
of language in interaction, which make possible a materialism beyond physicalism 
(i.e., the belief that reality can be explained in terms of the laws, principles and terms 
of physics), a materialism that questions physicalism, that reorients physics itself. 
(1994 22) 
      
Animation may provide a new way to conceive of the corporeality of female bodies, allowing 
us to conceive of a “materialism beyond physicalism,” as the nature of animation may provide 
a way to question that physicalism, reorienting and playing with our understanding of 
physics, as well as that which is natural about nature.  
      
 In order to think feminist perspectives of the body through and alongside animation, 
rather than simply inscribing or projecting these concerns onto animation, chapter five will 
examine the ways in which animation and feminism can articulate and address the same 
concerns, without leaving one as simply a means to reflect upon the other.  This chapter will 
outline how feminist philosophies of the body, of materiality, and becomings may be taken 
up by animation in a meaningful way, by analysing the intimate and implicit connections 
shared by philosophy and art. Becomings are here defined as those subtle and “imperceptible” 
movements that “constitute material and living things” and that elaborate difference and 
sensation (Grosz 2011 1). I will here examine the ways animation is specifically understood 
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as artistic, and its inherent connections to the artistic. Understanding animation as a form of 
art allows us to understand the ways in which bodies in animation may be transformed by art, 
and how art in turn may transform living bodies. This chapter will take up the work of Grosz 
in Chaos, Territory, Art (2008), where she draws from the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, Charles Darwin, and Luce Irigaray. There, Grosz constructs a framework of thinkers 
for examining the conditions that make possible art’s emergence, the material and 
evolutionary forces that are linked to art, and the ways in which art and philosophy, while 
different, both address “the same provocations or incitements to creation” (2). This 
conceptual approach outlined by Grosz allows this thesis to consider not only how both 
animation and feminism address these provocations, but how animation and feminist 
philosophy may address the body in productive and generative mutual encounter. While 
animation and feminism may not find themselves twins or siblings, they may both find ways 
to address and overcome the question of the various dualisms that pervade Western thought 
and haunt the body, working through these provocations alongside and through one another.  
      
 Implicit in any discussion of animation as art (or art as animation) and its connection 
to philosophy is the field of aesthetics. Chapter six will further interrogate the ways in which 
the forms and materialities of art can contribute to feminist animation, by transforming and 
moving beyond the notion of animation’s feminine aesthetic. As defined by Paul Wells (1998), 
animation’s feminine aesthetic allows female animators to resist the masculine language and 
dominant codes of live action filmmaking that also dominate animation. The notion of the 
feminine aesthetic of animation is contested, as it is considered to be reductive and 
essentialist (Furniss 2007; Roe 2017). A feminine aesthetic implies a narrow 
conceptualisation of animation made by women, limiting the ways female subjectivity can be 
expressed through animated forms. However, as it is conceived of as a mode of creativity 
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which allows women in animation to resist patriarchal and phallocentric codes and 
conventions of representation, it is necessary to consider the ways the feminine aesthetic 
intersects with the concerns of this thesis. That is, does the feminine aesthetic help us 
reconceive of the body in animation in a way that does not adhere to pervasive dualisms? 
While the feminine aesthetic is a notion of considerable debate within animation studies, I 
propose to transform the notion and instead think animation through the possibility of 
feminist aesthetics. Drawing on the writings of Ewa Ziarek (2012), I will move beyond a 
critique of this singular feminine aesthetic, to focus on how Ziarek’s notion of a feminist 
aesthetics of potentiality can work through the potentialities inherent in animated forms, 
particularly through the metamorphic qualities of the animated line and animated materials. 
Ziarek elaborates on the interaction between the revolutionary and the melancholic, as well 
as the interaction between form, materiality, and embodiment. While philosophies of art and 
aesthetics are traditionally focused on notions of truth, beauty, and ideality, the question of 
animation and aesthetics here is not concerned with these aspects of aesthetic theory. 
Instead, animation opens up the question of the artistic to matters of creativity, 
inventiveness, and experimentation with form and materiality.    
      
 Although animated bodies (and bodies that are animated) and their materialities are 
a constant presence throughout this thesis, the final chapters will turn to an examination of 
the body in animation in thorough and explicit detail. Although necessarily beginning with a 
brief discussion of issues in representation, as well as the ways in which the body in animation 
has previously been addressed, these chapters will draw on the feminist frameworks of 
corporeality and materiality laid out in chapters three and four in order to understand how 
this feminist thought may operate through and alongside animation. These chapters will 
examine the capabilities inherent to the animated body—its malleability, its fragmentary 
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nature, its ability to squash and stretch, its metamorphic qualities—and how these 
capabilities evoke feminist refigurations of the body, and of nature. As I have briefly discussed 
above, I will focus in particular on animation filmmaker Michèle Cournoyer, who has stated 
“I am interested in the female body, women’s innermost selves” (2014). I argue that 
Cournoyer’s films demonstrate animation’s ability to portray the interrelation between mind 
and body, inside and outside, a relationship which is evoked through Cournoyer’s process, 
and the connection between the animator and her materials.  
      
 Cournoyer’s animation enables us to think through what Grosz has come to describe 
as an ontoethics: “a way of thinking about not just how the world is but how it could be, how 
it is open to change, and, above all, the becomings it may undergo” (2017 1). This latest 
project of Grosz, while shifting her focus towards the incorporeal, continues to refigure 
dualisms as she explores “the incorporeal conditions of corporeality, the excesses beyond and 
within corporeality that frame, orient, and direct material things and processes” (5). Grosz’s 
recent writing has a great deal of potential for future explorations alongside and through 
animation, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will be confining myself primarily to three of 
her key texts—Volatile Bodies, Chaos, Territory, Art, and Becoming Undone. Just as Grosz 
first approaches the question of the corporeal for feminist theory, I will also be focusing 
primarily in this thesis on questions of the body and becoming in animation: how can we 
understand the corporeality (or incorporeality) of the animated body? What are the ways in 
which animation can open up new understandings of the corporeality of bodies, and 
specifically of female bodies? Just as thinking of animation necessitates a thinking of the 
nature of the in between, of the ‘meeting ground’ between animation and film, the animate 
and the inanimate (Cholodenko 1991), this thesis understands that mind and body also 
cannot be thought without thinking their interaction and interrelation. As such, the research 
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itself is necessarily interdisciplinary and, in this sense, can also be understood as something 
of a meeting ground between different theorists and different disciplines, as different 
dichotomies and hierarchies collide and are broken down in the process. Turning now to 
chapter one, I will explore the call for interdisciplinary scholarship within animation studies 
as I undertake a literature review, examining the histories and definitions of animation, and 
its marginalisation within the broader realm of film (and media) studies. Questions regarding 
the body in animation require situating within broader theorising around the nature or 
ontology of animated forms.  
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Chapter One – Animation-Cinema 
      
      
Film theory and history both frequently rely on a series of binary terms, including continuous versus non-
continuous, narrative versus experimental, indexical versus handmade, and animated versus live action. 
—Karen Beckman, Animating Film Theory  
      
 Miyazaki Hayao, co-founder of Studio Ghibli, and one of the worlds most renowned 
animators and directors, states, “If I were asked to give my view, in a nutshell, of what 
animation is, I would say it is “whatever I want to create” … if it isn’t something that I really 
want to work on, it isn’t animation to me” (1997 17). For Miyazaki, animation is the ideal 
medium through which to create unique imaginary worlds, and to represent things that are 
not possible in manga magazines or live action films. This definition speaks less to the 
variable material properties of the medium but rather to animation’s ability to express 
various thematic concerns. Implicit in this conception of animation, which Miyazaki admits 
is an entirely personal view, is an understanding that any definition of animation, for an 
animator at least, may be entirely subjective. Also implied is an understanding of animation 
as a medium that is necessarily open-ended, characterised by possibility and potentiality, and 
almost endlessly diverse with regards to the styles, forms, materials, and techniques that may 
be taken up in its creation. The term animation may be used to refer to films that are created 
using stop-motion techniques, drawing or painting, computer generated imagery, cut-out or 
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collage, or even films that are created by drawing, scratching, or manipulating a film strip 
directly.  
      
 Animation, Suzanne Buchan reminds us, is “pervasive in contemporary moving image 
culture” (2013 1). For many the term may first bring to mind the many popular animated 
feature films produced by major studios including Walt Disney Animation Studios, Pixar 
Animation Studios, and DreamWorks Animation; animated television series are common 
across both broadcast television and online streaming services such as Netflix; animated 
web-series are consistently popular, and animation finds itself an integral component of 
gaming (including console, online, and mobile gaming), advertising, and installation and 
projection art. Digital animation and digital effects are an almost ubiquitous (and often 
unseen) presence in many so-called live action feature films; these effects may feature 
predominantly in an expansive science-fiction or fantasy genre film such as Valerian and the 
City of a Thousand Planets (Luc Besson, 2017), or they may remain hidden and unnoticed in 
photo-indexical films, such as The Mountain Between Us (Hany Abu-Assad, 2017), a film with 
no fewer than sixty-three credited visual effects artists. Within animation studies it is thus 
understood that animation (both as a term, mode of practice, and concept) is broadly 
encompassing and carries with it a certain sense of ambiguity. This means that “determining 
a unifying feature” that can be applied to all forms of animation is difficult at best (Buchan 
2013 3).  
      
 As Karen Beckman describes above in the introduction to her anthology Animating 
Film Theory (2014), film theory and history has been founded upon a series of oppositional 
terms, including experimental/narrative, indexical/handmade, and animation/live action. 
Although Beckman admits that such oppositions can sometimes be useful, they unfortunately 
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often lead to “inaccurate presumptions in that they do not always accurately reflect the 
differences contained within any one of these terms, such as experimental or narrative” (2). 
Such binary pairings also imply a hierarchical organisation, leading to one term becoming 
privileged in its relation to the other. It is in this sense that animation has often found itself 
defined only as it relates to live action cinema—by what it is not, or what it lacks. However, 
as briefly explored in the introduction to this thesis, not only is the boundary between live 
action film and animation becoming ever more indistinct with the prevalence of digital 
technologies, the ways in which we understand the perceived hierarchical relationship 
between cinema and animation are being rethought as well. The animation/cinema 
relationship is neither static nor ahistorical. If we are to understand how animation may be 
used to displace and rethink mind/body dualism, then we must necessarily reconsider the 
cinema/animation dualism as well. As will be shown in this chapter, the relationship between 
live action cinema and animation is complex, with the genealogies and histories of the 
mediums long intertwined. The relationship between film theory and animation must also be 
rethought; although animation has often been considered a neglected and under-theorised 
area of film, it has nonetheless maintained a “persistent yet elusive presence within film 
theory’s key writings” (Beckman 2). Rethinking the relationship between cinema and 
animation entails a consideration of what the theorising of animation potentially offers to 
film studies. As Alan Cholodenko (1991) has described it, an understanding of the 
relationship between live action cinema and animation presumes that “animation theory is 
also and inevitably film theory, animation/film theory endeavouring to reanimate not only 
animation theory and animation studies but film theory, Film Studies and the very idea of 
film” (14-15).  
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 In order to begin to untangle and make sense of the complex relationship between 
animation and live action cinema, it first becomes necessary to consider animation’s 
beginnings—beginnings, rather than the singular beginning, as the history of animation is 
one of multiple beginnings; animation is “always already itself a rebeginning of the beginning 
… a beginning of necessity redrawing and reanimating other redrawings and reanimatings” 
(Cholodenko 2000 9). This includes a consideration of the question of how to define 
animation; a thorough examination of the literature addressing this question will be 
undertaken, paying particular attention to the ways animation has been positioned in its 
relation to cinema. Finally, I turn to what Buchan (2014) describes as the necessary encounter 
between animation and film studies, and the ongoing debates around how animation is 
situated in and around the broader context of film theory and film studies. Although I do not 
propose to resolve this problem, considering the encounter between cinema and animation 
may also suggest a way to think through the equally mutually productive encounter between 
animation and feminist theory, opening up the body in animation to corporeal and material 
feminist perspectives. For purposes of clarity, the term animation will be used throughout 
this thesis to refer to any media which is generally understood to be encompassed under that 
particular term; this includes media which are drawn, sculpted, digitally rendered or in other 
ways materially constructed. The terms cinema and live action will refer to media that has a 
basis in indexical filmic techniques; the term film will be used interchangeably (after 
qualification) to refer to both animated and live action media. These classifications are broad, 
but will suffice for now, as the purpose of this chapter is not to seek a concise definition of 
animated film, but to consider the multiplicities and open-ended nature of the medium, and 
the possibilities inherent therein.  
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On definitions  
      
 Although there has been an increasingly rich and diverse body of animation 
scholarship within recent years, the perception has remained that this scholarship is 
somewhat niche, disconnected and self-contained, only a small aspect of the broader fields 
of film, media, and screen studies. Beckman (2014) argues that although animation and film 
theory can be considered two of cinema and media studies most “unwieldy and unstable 
organising concepts” the increasingly digital nature of cinema means that a better 
understanding of these concepts and their interrelation is necessary in the early twenty-first 
century (1). Beckman uses the term ‘marginalise’ rather than ‘neglect’ to describe film 
theorists engagement with animation, reflecting that even though the medium has not been 
completely ignored by film theory, this engagement has been, until recently, rather 
fragmentary and disjointed. She posits that part of the reason for this reluctance, or 
uncertainty, with regards to taking up animation may have to do with the fact that the term 
animation “signifies in so many different ways”:  
      
At different moments, it becomes synonymous with a whole range of much more 
specific terms and concepts, including movement, life itself, a quality of liveliness 
(that doesn’t necessarily involve movement), spirit, nonwhiteness, frame-by-frame 
filmmaking process, variable frame filmmaking processes, and digital cinema, as well 
as a range of mobilized media that appear within animated films, including sculpture, 
drawing, collage, painting, and puppetry. (1, emphasis in original) 
      
Animation has also often been associated with ‘family entertainment’ or films intended 
primarily for children. Animation scholar Paul Wells (1998) argues that this conception of 
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animation as an “innocent medium, ostensibly for children, and largely dismissed in film 
histories, has done much to inhibit the proper discussion of issues concerning 
representation” (187, emphasis in original). More than inhibiting discourse regarding issues 
of representation, the notion of animation as an innocent medium may also have done much 
to exclude it, or push it to the peripheries, of film studies. I will return to this perception of 
the innocence of animation in chapter six in order to discuss how it has also led to the under-
theorisation of animated bodies.  
      
 In the introduction to the anthology Animated ‘Worlds’ (2006), Buchan asks, “What 
do we mean by the term ‘animation’ when we are discussing film? Is it a technique? – A style? 
–A way of seeing or experiencing a ‘world’ that has little relation to our own lived experience, 
or to other cinematic experience, for that matter?” (vii). The term ‘worlds’ here refers to the 
specific realms of experience only available to an audience through the various techniques of 
animation (Buchan vii). These are questions that remain relevant today, for when viewing 
(and experiencing) animation, one may encounter any number of worlds. These worlds may 
find their basis in a variety of fine-arts techniques (including but not limited to painting, 
sculpture, and photography) but also digitally rendered worlds that can be experienced not 
only via the screen, but through virtual and augmented reality devices (VR and AR). In asking 
these questions, Buchan highlights the difficulties scholars face when discussing animation 
not only as film, but as concept. She suggests that animation studies requires a language “that 
can be specifically used in critical and theoretical writings on animation film” (vii). Due to 
the broad and diverse range of media and materials available to animation practice, the 
‘worlds’ explored in the Animated ‘Worlds’ anthology are equally diverse, the essays collected 
addressing the puppet animation films of the Brothers Quay (including their iconic 1986 
animated film, Street of Crocodiles), American animated sitcoms The Simpsons and King of 
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the Hill, and the hyperreal digital world of Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Sakaguchi 
Hironobu, 2001).  
      
 The question of the relation between ‘animated worlds’ and our own material, 
phenomenal reality is not new, as animation’s potential ability to represent the world has 
long been a topic of some contention. A key focal point for this debate has been the remarks 
of philosopher and film theorist Stanley Cavell in his text, The World Viewed: Reflections on 
the Ontology of Film (1979), in which he declares that the material basis of the media of 
movies is “a succession of automatic worlds projections” (72, emphasis in original). Key to 
this understanding is Cavell’s use of the term ‘automatic’, which he uses to refer to the 
camera’s mechanical ability to record objects and the world, in which he emphasises the 
supposed “absence of the human hand” (73). Cavell also reflects on what the relationship 
between audiences and actors means for the ontology of film, writing that one of the 
ontological properties of film is that audiences are mechanically absent from the actors (25). 
Movie audiences are not present at something which is happening in the moment, but are 
instead present for something which has already happened, which they then “absorb (like a 
memory)” (26). The difference between an actor and a ‘star’ is also demarcated, with Cavell 
exploring this distinction by comparing the presence and role of the actor on the stage and 
the actor on the screen. On the stage, actor and character exist simultaneously, and the actor 
must succumb to the being of the character in order to fully reveal the possibilities of the role. 
On screen, the performer becomes the subject for study, and an “exemplary screen 
performance is one in which, at a time, a star is born” (28). Cavell uses the example of 
Humphrey Bogart; ‘Bogart’ the star is a figure created by and through the screen 
performances of Humphrey Bogart the man and actor. Bogart’s presence in films such as The 
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Maltese Falcon (1941) create the figure of ‘Bogart’, “in the sense that if those films did not 
exist, Bogart would not exist, the name “Bogart” would not mean what it does” (28).  
      
 Responding to Cavell, film theorist Andrew Sesonske (1974) declares it striking that 
Cavell does not make mention of perhaps one of the biggest stars of them all—Mickey Mouse. 
Musing as to why Cavell might not have chosen to discuss animated cartoons and their stars, 
Sesonske writes:  
      
…these lively creatures nor their actions ever existed until they were projected on the 
screen. Their projected world exists only now, at the moment of projection—and when 
we ask if there is any feature in which it differs from reality, the answer is, “Yes, every 
feature.” Neither space nor time nor the laws of nature are the same. There is a world 
we experience here, but not the world—a world I know and see but to which I am 
nevertheless not present, yet not a world past. (563-564)  
      
For Sesonske, the worlds of animated cartoons are not automatic world projections, but 
fragments that, when organised and projected in a certain order, determine the being and 
character of that world. The difference between these animated worlds and Cavell’s 
automatic world projections can be understood as the difference between the recording of 
motion, and editing, “differences that led Eisenstein to declare montage the essential step in 
making films” (Sesonske 564). Sesonske argues that Cavell does not take into account these 
differences, and that in doing so he risks an understanding of the cinema as something of an 
“immaculate conception” (564). Responding in turn to Sesonske, Cavell acknowledges that if 
“any region of film counters my insistence upon the projection of reality as essential to the 
medium of movies” then the region of animated cartoons “counters it completely” (167). He 
      
      
25 
 
makes clear his position on the world of animated cartoons, which is that “cartoons are not 
movies” (168). Cavell admits that the onus falls on him to prove this statement, particularly 
as it can be argued via the terms set out in his own text that cartoons are, in fact, movies. He 
sets out to provide a series of short reflections on the worlds of animated cartoons, which 
includes the observation that cartoons as he knows them are chiefly populated with 
anthropomorphised animals. He also observes that the world these animals inhabit is 
typically animated: “it may not remain the stable background of the actions of the live figures, 
but act on its own. It is animistic” (169). Cavell clarifies that his characterisation of movies 
as automatic world projections is not intended to rule out the consideration of cartoons as a 
sub-set of film altogether, or that they should not exist (“That would be bad”); he instead 
suggests that he might classify cartoons, distinct from live action movies, as “successions of 
animated world projections” (173).  
      
 Cavell’s writing on animated cartoons is indicative of some of the long ingrained 
perceptions of animation by film theory, as he at one point declares that the world of cartoons 
is “essentially a child’s world, [although] I hope I will not be taken as belittling it, nor as 
denying that it remains an ineluctable substatum of our own” (169). By positioning animation 
in such a direct oppositional relationship to the world of live action cinema, Cavell reinforces 
the notion (intentionally or not) that animation is either a lesser subset of this cinema, or 
that animated film can only be for children (and the oft-repeated notion that animation is 
only for children dismisses the potential complexities and importance of films and other 
media made for children). Indeed, in the decades since Cavell penned these thoughts on 
animated cartoons, the term ‘cartoon’ itself has come to denote a specific style of animation 
and is no longer used as an all-encompassing term. Cavell’s thoughts turn primarily to the 
Disney animated feature films Dumbo (1941) and Bambi (1942), although he confesses that 
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he has not seen the latter. He also writes of the Fleischer Brothers animated series Popeye 
the Sailor (1933-1942). There is a presumption in Cavell’s writing that animation finds itself 
unable to move beyond the childish; his suggestion that cartoons should be classified 
“animated world projections” implies that the world we inhabit is not already animate and 
animated. Ryan Pierson (2012), re-examining Cavell’s claims, argues that such an 
“unequivocal divide between “cartoons” and “movies” now plainly seems irresponsible and 
dangerous, and not merely because of a general desire to study animated films more closely” 
(17). In the nearly forty years of animation scholarship since Cavell published The World 
Viewed, there have been numerous undertakings and theoretical inquiries into the 
differences between ‘animated’ worlds, the ‘real’ world, and cinematic worlds, as well as the 
ways animation may provide new perspectives and insights into the ‘natural’ world, or reflect 
lived experience. To claim such an absolute disconnect between cartoons and movies, or 
animation and cinema, presumes a narrow conception of an ideal mode of representation. As 
Cholodenko writes in the introduction to his 1991 anthology The Illusion of Life, “If one may 
think of animation as a form of film, its neglect would be both extraordinary and predictable” 
(9).  
      
 However, Cavell’s remarks around the ontological distinctions between cartoons 
(animation) and movies (live action cinema), and the persistence of these remarks within 
animation scholarship, speaks to the continuing problem of how we are to understand the 
interrelation between the two. There are, of course, material, aesthetic, and ontological 
differences between live action film and animation; although we may find the statement 
‘cartoons are not movies’ reductive, Cavell’s reflections raise questions (still unanswered) 
regarding how we may define the two in relation to each other, and for many serve as a 
starting point for thinking through the nature of animated worlds, as well as the differences 
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(and similarities) between animation and cinema. Perhaps Cavell’s most intriguing 
comments regarding the differences between animated worlds and the world of lived 
experience are his remarks around the nature of corporeality in cartoons:  
      
…what is abrogated is not gravity (things and creatures do fall, and petals are 
sometimes charmingly difficult to climb up to) but corporeality. The bodies of these 
creatures never get in their way. Their bodies are indestructible, one might say almost 
immortal; they are totally subject to will, and perfectly expressive … They are 
animations, disembodiments, pure spirits. (170)  
      
I will return to these remarks on the corporeality of animated bodies in a later chapter, but it 
is important to note here that Cavell refers primarily to the animated bodies of 
anthropomorphic animals, and to some cartoon human figures as well. He asks, for instance, 
whether or not Popeye has a soul, or indeed, a human body, writing that “Popeye’s body 
survives, or ignores, everything that brute human strength can deliberately inflict upon it—
if, that is, it at some point receives its magic infusion of canned fuel” (171-172). Although 
this musing is predicated on a dichotomised understanding of the relationship between body 
and soul, Cavell does touch upon a number of ontological debates that have preoccupied 
animation studies, such as animism, anthropomorphism, and animations ability to represent 
the ‘real’ world.  
      
 Cavell’s conjectures are based on his memories and understandings of cartoon 
animation, but it has long been clear that the worlds of animation are far more diverse than 
the cartoon films of Disney. Animation has been variously labelled a style, a genre, a 
technique, and a form of film. Finding an appropriate and specific definition of animation 
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that also acknowledges its multiplicities of form, style, and technique proves a difficult (if not 
impossible) task. Philip Denslow (1997) astutely notes that whatever the chosen definition, 
“it faces challenges from new developments in technology used to produce and distribute 
animation” (1). Defining animation becomes increasingly complicated via the introduction 
and development of new technologies, also acknowledged by Wells in his foundational text 
Understanding Animation (1998). Wells offers a “working definition” of animation as “a film 
made by hand, frame-by-frame, providing an illusion of movement which has not been 
directly recorded in the conventional photographic sense” (10). He admits, however, that 
while this may satisfy for defining cel, hand-drawn and model animation (animation using 
clay, puppets, or other sculpted or handcrafted figures), it does not sufficiently describe other 
kinds of animation including animation which is computer generated (10). It also leaves out 
the question of ‘experimental’ or ‘abstract’ animation. Many turn to Canadian animator and 
filmmaker Norman McLaren’s oft-quoted definition: “Animation is not the art of drawings 
that move, but rather the art of movements that are drawn. What happens between each 
frame is more important that what happens on each frame” (qtd. in Wells 10). McLaren’s 
definition implies a movement that is unseen (between the frames), as well as a tension 
between movement and stasis. I will return to the importance of this notion of ‘between’ the 
frames (the in-between) later in this chapter.  
      
 McLaren’s definition also places emphasis on hand-crafted animation—animation 
that is drawn, painted, or even scratched directly on the film strip itself. In a mechanical 
sense, animation can perhaps be understood as a series of singular, static images or frames 
that, when projected at a certain number of frames per second, generate the illusion of 
movement and the illusion of life. However, invoking McLaren’s definition also becomes 
more complicated when taking digital animation into consideration. Because of the 
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increasing prevalence of digital animation technologies, attempts have been made to 
redefine animation within this specific context. Omar O Linares Martinez (2015), for 
example, seeks to define animation “as a distinct type of moving image with solely illusory 
movement” (42). Key to this definition is the source of the illusory movement, with the 
criteria formulated to apply to a range of animation techniques encompassing both analogue 
and digital animation, so long as the illusory movement is generated by “producing and 
displaying an artificial arrangement of graphic positions without reproducing the positions 
of real-time movement” (42). Martinez’s definition relies on demarcating the distinction 
between the artificial image and artificial movement, as he writes that “part of the problem 
is distinguishing between animated and recorded movement, a distinction found in the 
source of animation’s illusion of motion, which is the arrangement of its graphic positions” 
(43). Refreshingly, Martinez’s first criterion attempts to seek a definition of animation not 
through what it lacks, or what it is not, but by what it is, through a key property that 
animation exhibits. Through his first criterion, Martinez defines animation as a moving 
image with solely illusory movement, generated via a set of graphic positions that produce 
an intervallic illusion of motion—that is, the “periodic and sequential display of a series of 
images that results in an illusion of movement for a viewer’s perception” (44). This definition 
of animation as solely illusory movement is opposed to a definition of live action cinema as 
a “visual reconstitution of movement” (45). While cinema reconstitutes the intervallic 
capture of real-time movement, animation produces illusory movement, and the difference 
between the two can be determined by examining the source of the illusory movement.  
      
 Martinez’s second criterion (which he describes as the negative criterion, because it 
draws from what animation is not), defines animation as the absence of any correspondence 
with real-time movement (47). This raises the question of the status of animation that is 
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derived from motion capture or rotoscopic techniques; regarding motion capture specifically, 
Martinez argues that as the illusory movement corresponds to “the intervallic registers of 
real-time movement”— thus, being a reconstitution of movement—it cannot be considered 
animation (50). This is problematic, as it would seem to dismiss a large realm of films created 
by, or utilising, motion capture technology, including Robert Zemeckis’ The Polar Express 
(2004) and Steven Spielberg’s The Adventures of Tintin (2011). Martinez does not address 
animation created using the rotoscope technique at all, which arguably also corresponds with 
real-time movement. However, he readily admits that many motion pictures can now be 
considered hybrid, combining both animation and reconstituted real-time movement, hence 
requiring case by case analysis. Martinez’s criteria are highly specific as he attempts to 
provide a definition that encompasses both digital and analogue forms of animation.  
      
 Singular definitions of animation often remain incomplete or reductive—too broad or 
too narrow. Although Martinez’s criteria and definition are useful for thinking the relation 
between animation and movement, particularly in digital contexts, by focusing on a singular 
ontological characteristic (movement, or rather, illusory movement) his definition is also 
limited, as he admits that through his framework he cannot take into account the ways the 
concept of animation intersects with the notion of ‘the illusion of life’ or liveliness (55). 
However, by choosing to explore a highly specified definition that encompasses both digital 
and analogue techniques, Martinez attempts to rectify what Buchan has described as the 
‘problem’ of defining animation: “like the term experimental film, animation is an imprecise, 
fuzzy catchall that heaps an enormous and historically far-reaching, artistically diverse body 
of work into one pot” (2014 113, emphasis in original).  
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 It is important and necessary to pay attention to the ever evolving discourse around 
how to define animation, including debates around how to classify and distinguish digital and 
non-digital animation. However, as noted above by Beckman, although these oppositions are 
sometimes useful insofar as setting up basic terms of reference and understanding, relying 
on a series of binary oppositions such as ‘digital’ and ‘non-digital’  may lead to inaccuracies, 
failing to account for not only the differences between the terms, but the differences 
contained within the terms (2014 2). Martinez’s criteria attempts to displace this opposition 
between digital and non-digital by conceiving a definition that accounts for a property both 
share—the illusion of movement. While this is a helpful starting point, Martinez encounters 
the same problem, in that the multitude of differences between the terms ‘digital’ and ‘non-
digital’ are left unaccounted for. Likewise, the multiplicities contained within the terms 
‘digital’ and ‘non-digital’ are not accurately reflected, with Martinez conceding that a case by 
case approach would be necessary in order to consider how potential individual examples of 
animation film are to be defined. The task of finding a neat yet expansive definition of 
animation proves in many ways to be paradoxical one. A closer examination of the 
genealogies of animation will further reveal the difficulties scholars face in this respect. 
      
On genealogies  
      
 There is no single way to survey the history of animation and legacy of animation 
studies, but it should be understood that early writing on animation “was composed of a 
dispersed and international authorship from various disciplines, professions, and national or 
cultural contexts” (Buchan 2014 112). As Cholodenko (1991) also notes, much of the writing 
on animation pre-1990 consisted primarily of guides to animation, animation histories, and 
specialist texts, including Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston’s Disney Animation: The Illusion 
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of Life (1981), and Sergei Eisenstein’s highly influential wrings on Disney animation, 
collected and published as Eisenstein on Disney (1988). Esther Leslie (2014) asks the 
question, “Does animation have a history?” (25). This question leads into a meditation on the 
history (and ahistory) of the animated medium, and whether or not animation has evolved 
and developed in the same manner as cinema (in terms of its technical development in 
particular). It is generally accepted that the emergence of animation as an art, a filmic 
technique, and a medium is a convergence of multiple art forms, mechanisms and 
performative tricks and techniques. How then are we to understand or trace the development 
of animation, particularly as it intertwines so closely with the history of cinema? As Leslie 
writes:  
      
Animation is too obviously manifold to set out upon a single line of development. It 
begins with shadow play or with thumb cinemas, with zoetropes or magic lanterns, 
with lightning sketches or cel animation, with hidden wheels and pulleys or with stop-
motion photography. It starts and stops in many places. (2014 26)  
      
The introduction and increasing prevalence of digital animation techniques and computer-
generated imagery within the realm of what has been understood as live action film has been 
described as not only a reconvergence of animation and cinema, but as an inversion of the 
cinema/animation hierarchy (Cholodenko 1991; Manovich 2001). This is considered a 
reconvergence, rather than a convergence, as it is argued that cinema and animation emerged 
through many of the same experiments and artistic endeavours in photography, mechanics, 
and optics. Maureen Furniss (2016) writes that prior to the first projections of moving images, 
“principles related to animation were developed thanks to new discoveries in the fields of 
science, mechanics, and entertainment” (12). Before the Lumière Brothers screened their first 
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moving images recorded with their Cinématographe in 1895, proto-cinematic optical toys 
and devices that experimented with the illusion of movement were relatively commonplace. 
It was in the nineteenth century that devices such as the thaumatrope, phenakistoscope, 
zoetrope, and praxinoscope emerged, devices which marked what Wells describes as the 
“eventual emergence of the cinematic apparatus” (1998 12). The emergence of animation and 
cinema is tied up as much in the study of motion and the natural sciences as it is in histories 
of art. Furniss is also adamant that cinema and animation emerged not only through 
experiments in photography, but through the study of human and animal locomotion (2016 
20). Animation, prefaced on movement, requires an understanding of how living things move, 
and photography, as well as scientific and medical studies of motion (including the studies of 
Etienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge) became crucial to artists and early cartoonists 
in this respect (Furniss 20).  Early cinema saw experiments with trick films (such as the films 
of Georges Méliès), claymation, and stop-motion photography, proving that even when it was 
in “a formative stage, developing aesthetic norms, new technologies and conventions for 
production,” animation was very much present in early film histories, even if it was only to 
provide “special effects” (Furniss 28). Magic lantern shows were also commonplace, used not 
only as public entertainment but for presentations by the scientific community; these would 
become the precursors to film projections (Furniss 14).  
      
 Arguably one of the most important figures in the history of moving images was 
Charles-Émile Reynaud, who developed and patented a praxinoscope and was able to make 
the transition to screen projection with a large-scale praxinoscope, which he later patented 
as the Théâtre Optique, in 1888. The Théâtre Optique is considered a remarkable 
development, and Reynaud’s pantomimes lumineuses (luminous pantomimes) are often 
described as the first animated projections; the device did not rely on looped actions and 
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cyclical movements (such as with the zoetrope), but enabled the development of linear 
narratives and actions (Leslie 2013 74). The sheer amount of work involved in creating 
moving images for the Théâtre Optique was staggering: “Images were painted on gelatine 
squares suspended within leather bands (up to 700 images on a strip 65 millimetres wide and 
up to 500 meters long), which were routed through the projector and aligned with a mirrored 
surface using a series of spools” (Furniss 2016 24). Reynaud’s Pauvre Pierrot, shown in 1892, 
consisted of five hundred images and lasted fifteen minutes (only a five minute fragment 
survives). 
      
 Other precursors to cinematic animation include automata, comic strips, and 
‘lightning cartoons’ or lightning sketches. Malcolm Cook (2013) warns that we must be wary 
when classifying the lightning cartoon as an act of pre-cinematic animation. Nevertheless, 
he understands it as a performance that anticipates the development of early animated 
cartoons, describing it as an act “characterized by qualities that are normally associated with 
animation, such as transformation, the movement of line drawings, and the desire to bring 
drawings to life” (238). The act of the lightning sketch involved a cartoonist creating a large 
drawing or caricature in front of a live audience, who would watch as the cartoonist caused 
the lines to transform and take new shape before their eyes. The invention of the camera 
meant that these acts were often filmed, and cartoonists such as J. Stuart Blackton would take 
advantage of this new medium in films such as The Enchanted Drawing (1900) and Humorous 
Phases of Funny Faces (1906). Blackton’s influence in the development of the animated film 
also cannot be underestimated, as he is considered “responsible for distinguishing the 
concept of the animated film as a viable aesthetic and economic vehicle outside the context 
of orthodox live-action cinemas” (Wells 1998 14). The memory of the lightning sketch has 
left a tangible trace on the many animated films which operate under the same principle—
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the transformation of the drawn line: “Along with chalk—or ink—any number of substances 
have been used to indicate the human hand tangibly interfering: finger paint on glass, 
shifting sand … One substance transmutes into another, from line to protoplasm and back 
again …” (Klein 2000 1). The lightning sketch recalls the influence (or the intrusion) of the 
human hand, hinting at the processes involved in animating images, whether these are 
created using chalk, ink, paint, clay, or sand—an influence that is tangibly felt in the ink on 
glass films of Caroline Leaf, the stop-motion, clay and object animation films of Jan 
Švankmajer, and the sand on glass animation of Marieka Walsh.  
      
 The histories of animation and cinema are irrevocably intertwined, however for many 
years animation was seen as a lesser form of cinema. Where cinema has been allowed to 
occupy the realm of the cultural and the intellectual, animation has historically found itself 
relegated to the realm of children’s entertainment. Cholodenko (1991) writes that by 
“neglecting animation, film theorists—when they have thought about it at all—have regarded 
animation as either the ‘step-child’ of cinema or as not belonging to cinema at all, belonging 
rather to the graphic arts” (9). Lev Manovich echoes this view in The Language of New Media 
(2001), writing that once cinema became an established form of popular entertainment and 
technology, it disavowed its origins in animatic technologies, and animation was soon 
“delegated to cinema’s bastard relative, its supplement and shadow” (298). Cinema, which 
predicates itself on its ability to capture and record the ‘real’, or that which already exists in 
the world, “works hard to erase any traces of its own production processes,” whereas 
animation openly foregrounds its artificial character (298). Manovich attributes cinemas 
disavowal of animation and special effects technologies—anything that “thus could reveal 
that cinema was not really different from animation”—as an attempt by film theorists, 
historians, and practitioners to hide cinemas artifice (299). Indeed, Cholodenko has long held 
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the view that rather than cinema’s ‘step-child’ or ‘bastard relative’, animation could in fact 
be considered to have “not only preceded the advent of cinema but engendered it,” in what 
he terms an “ironical inversion” of the cinema/animation binary (9-10). In The Illusion of Life 
II (2007) he argues that “not only is animation a form of the media, the media—all media, 
including film—are forms of animation” (20). It is important to iterate here, however, that 
Buchan notes Manovich’s claim that cinema finds its origin in animation is “based on the 
premise of a digital cinema, and on graphic cinema” and does not take into account object or 
puppet animation. Likewise, she notes that Cholodenko’s collection also reveals that when 
we talk about animation, emphasis is placed on 2D, drawn or digital animation at the expense 
of other techniques, styles and aesthetics. While both The Illusion of Life anthologies remain 
key contributions to animation studies with regards to the theorising of animation and its 
relation to film studies, it is telling that this graphic mode of animation “did and still does 
dominate the understanding of what animation is” (2014 114).  
      
 Some have cautioned against perpetuating the notion that animation preceded, and 
made possible, cinema. Donald Crafton (2011) writes that while he finds such arguments 
intriguing, he remains sceptical and claims that such a genealogy may be “largely semantics, 
deploying disingenuous definitions of animation and cinema” (94). Crafton is here defending 
a claim made previously in Before Mickey (1993) which is that for him, “the animated film is 
a subspecies of film in general” (6). He critically examines the claims made by Cholodenko, 
Manovich, and others regarding animation as the supposed originator of the cinematic arts. 
He undertakes an etymological examination of the term animation, as well as a critique of 
the grouping of optical toys such as the zoetrope and praxinoscope as pre-cinema animation. 
He attributes their classification as such to a certain “unreflective familiarity with animation 
cinema and with cinema, luring us to give a name to what formerly were artefacts and 
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techniques without a classification” (97). Crafton pays particular attention to Reynaud and 
his Théâtre Optique, challenging the popular belief that Reynaud’s device was the animatic 
apparatus that linked nineteenth century optical toys and devices to the cinema. It is difficult, 
Crafton writes, to find any concrete connections or influences that mark the Théâtre Optique 
as pre-cinema or early animation cinema: “It was only a ‘precursor’ when we project 
backward our notions of cinema and wilfully ignore its economic, social and artistic 
circumstances” (101). He concludes that, “calling cinema ‘animation’ leads us to ask, once 
again, ‘what is animation?’” (107). Although I agree with the assessment of others in that 
optical devices and experiments producing the illusion of movement, such as the zoetrope 
and praxinoscope, should be considered precursors to cinematic animation, I find Crafton’s 
argument regarding the way we should consider the relationship between cinema and 
animation highly pertinent. The article further highlights the importance of disrupting the 
cinema/animation binary, not through a simple hierarchical inversion, but through 
rethinking the complexity of their interrelation. Crafton may be right when he states that a 
“shared reliance” on the biomechanical effect which produces the illusion of movement—the 
“minimal conditions for the ‘animation effect’ to occur”— characteristic of optical toys, 
animated cartoons and cinema, is not demonstrative of a “paternal claim that earlier 
applications were necessary for later ones” (2011 96). Although we must still come to 
understand the ways animation has been marginalised in its relation to cinema, Crafton’s 
argument for not declaring animation as the origin of cinema is compelling. Rather than 
understanding the animation-cinema relationship as oppositional, we must instead consider 
their shared histories, common technologies, and their increasingly complex interrelations. 
To claim animation as the ground from which cinema emerges runs contrary to one of the 
key claims of this thesis, which is that animation provides a way for us to continue to refigure 
mind/body dualism. This refiguration does not mean privileging the body at expense of the 
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mind, but displacing the hierarchy through a reconsideration of the mind-body interrelation. 
If this is the case, animation cannot also be held as a priori to live action cinema.  
 
Animation-Cinema 
      
Buchan writes that although animation studies has been active for decades, film studies 
is only just beginning to “deeply engage with a cinematic form that has more to do with 
sculpture, algorithms, or painting than with the genres of narrative cinema” (2014 111). She 
also writes that without the likes of Cavell and others (such as Sesonske, Noël Carroll and 
Gilles Deleuze), there would be no animation theory, with Cavell’s thoughts on cartoons 
sparking a range of responses and providing starting points for discussions around the 
ontology of animation today. Writing such as Cavell’s has directly contributed to some of the 
key, foundational questions of animation studies, including the search for a unifying 
definition or theory of animation (see above). Remarks that would seem to dismiss the 
importance of animation as a medium and form of art would lead to a certain scrambling for 
legitimacy within animation studies, and for a recognition of the discipline from film studies. 
Today, many still reiterate the case for animation as a form of art—a case, according to 
Carroll, that was made for cinema as well. In Engaging the Moving Image (2003), Carroll 
writes that one major task for film theorists in the early twentieth century was making the 
case for film as art: “if one could show that the film medium supported a unique artform, then 
film deserved an equal place among the arts” (1). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, he claims 
that this need to legitimise film as an art form was no longer pressing, as “[h]istory and taste 
have secured that much; film had produced uncontroversial masterpieces” (2). It wasn’t long 
after this sense of urgency for proving film as an art form had passed that the need to 
legitimise animation as an art form worthy of the same scholarly attention became a major 
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focus for those interested in the study and production of animation. Perhaps the urgency to 
prove the legitimacy of animation is also now less pressing; animation too has produced 
‘uncontroversial masterpieces’ and, in this sense, its legitimacy is secured. The biggest 
misconception animation must still overcome is the presumption or declaration that 
animation is only another form of film, or a genre of film. To take animation as only a genre 
of film in particular is problematic (animation can express a variety of genres), while also 
calling into question how we are to understand genre (Buchan 2013 3). Animation studies has 
much to offer film and media studies in terms of new approaches and modes of theorising 
film; Cholodenko saw this as one of the goals of The Illusion of Life anthologies—the 
articulation of the intersections between animation and philosophy, animation and film, and 
animation and media theory (amongst other disciplines). Further to this, animation as a 
medium, an art form, and an object (and tool) of philosophical inquiry is well suited to serve 
as the site to think through the connections and interrelations between various concepts, as 
animation is itself “of the order of the ‘in between’ … it cannot be thought without thinking 
the nature of the ‘in between’” (1991 13-14).  
 
 This notion of the in-between signifies in a number of different ways for animation. 
The in-between first refers to the literal gap between the frames, the flicker or moment of 
absence which makes animation, the illusion of life and movement, possible. It may also refer 
to the frames between key frames; inbetweens may refer to intermediate frames of animation 
(both drawn and computer generated) which contribute to a smoother, more fluid movement 
between key poses. But the in-between may also refer to the meeting place between concepts 
and ontological characteristics; animation, of the order of life and movement, movement and 
stillness, frames these concepts and the connections between them. The space between 
becomes a threshold, as the medium of animation can problematise the distinction between 
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the animate and inanimate just as the rise of digital animation and digital effects 
technologies continues to problematise the distinction between animation and cinema.  
      
 I have outlined above the various debates and questions regarding what animation is 
and animation’s genealogies, questions which are necessary in order to outline the 
interrelation between animation and cinema. However, it would appear that as scholarship 
on animation continues to grow, the gap between animation and cinema neither diminishes, 
nor is it thoroughly addressed. This is despite the fact that, as Buchan writes, animation is a 
“cinematic form that can be analyzed through almost all formal and stylistic cinematic 
parameters and theorized using many film studies approaches” (2014 115). Film and media 
studies should not be hesitant in approaching the theorisation of animated films in this way, 
and conversely, scholars of animation must necessarily utilise film theory, in order to better 
address both animation’s specificity, and its multiplicities (particularly as the term animation 
refers to a wide variety of techniques, styles, aesthetics, and approaches). For Buchan, 
animation studies has long been preoccupied with articulating an “innate difference between 
live action and animation film,” without thinking of “resolving the problem of animation 
within the larger scope of film studies” (2014 121). Animation and cinema, so often conceived 
of in dualistic, oppositional terms, requires some form of encounter in order to think through 
their differences, similarities, and specificities—how can you have a ‘theory of animation’ if 
you do not first understand its relation to film theory? Buchan finds a “partial answer” to this 
question in the remarks of Gilles Deleuze, in the interview, “The Brain is the Screen” (1998). 
Here, Deleuze remarks:  
      
The encounter between two disciplines doesn’t happen when one of them sets about 
reflecting on the other, but when one realizes that is must resolve for itself and with 
      
      
41 
 
its own means a problem which is similar to that which is posed in another. We can 
conceive that similar problems, at diverse moments, in different occasions and 
conditions, can shake up diverse sciences, and painting, and music, and philosophy, 
and literature, and cinema. They are the same shudders in quite different terrains. 
(49).  
      
For Buchan, we may begin to productively overcome the marginalisation of animation studies 
(which she notes many animation scholars refer to as a ‘ghetto’—pertinent here as Deleuze 
also writes that “the critique of cinema becomes bad when it closes up over cinema as on a 
ghetto” (49)) by taking up a critical, comparative approach. As for a ‘theory of animation’, 
Buchan considers this an “impossible question” but firmly contends that ongoing animation 
scholarship must work with film theory, consider fine-arts practices and cinematic 
representation, make use of micro-analysis techniques, and consider the different 
spectatorial experiences animation offers (122-123). Perhaps Buchan’s most important 
suggestion for the continuing development of animation scholarship is that investigations 
must “draw on interdisciplinary methodologies to contextualize the making of animation 
films in related practices areas” and that we must “approach the high-flowing generalities by 
a roundabout (piecemeal) route and work across multiple fronts and disciplines in a dialogical 
exchange” (2014 123).  
      
 These last two claims are of particular relevance to the task of this thesis, which is to 
explore the ways in which feminist conceptualisations of corporeality and the body may 
operate through or be enacted by animation, as well as the ways animation enables us to think 
through feminist theories of the body. The encounter between two disciplines I propose to 
examine is not between animation and cinema, although understanding and acknowledging 
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the dualistic ways this interrelation has been conceived of is necessary, but between 
animation and feminism. Between animation and feminist studies, as Deleuze suggests, we 
can perceive “the same shudders in quite different terrains”, as both animation studies and 
feminist studies have sought to displace different binaries and think through questions of 
ontology—for animation studies, the ontology of animation, its materiality, and its histories, 
and for feminism, the ontology of the body, of matter, and of nature. Working together in a 
dialogical exchange between animation and feminism, and approaching the body in 
animation through feminist frameworks of corporeality, materiality, and becomings, will 
further contribute to the diversity and richness of animation studies. These feminist 
frameworks will be developed in chapters three and four of this thesis, as well as a 
methodology for how we may begin to make a meaningful connection between feminist 
philosophy and animation. To do this, we must conceive of animation in its broadest sense 
as a form of art and as a concept.  
      
 Of course, the need for an encounter or exchange between animation and other 
disciplines has long been called for; Cholodenko, thinking of animation not only as a form of 
film but as a concept, notes that just as in literary theory, philosophy, and film studies, 
animation may be thought of as a ‘meeting ground’ between various disciplines. In this 
regard, he sees the essays in The Illusion of Life anthologies as “‘inbetweeners’, the ‘meeting 
grounds’ of animation with philosophy, film theory, art theory, media theory, literary theory, 
critical theory, psychoanalysis, sociology, the biomedical sciences, etc.” (1991 13-14). For 
Cholodenko, animation necessitates, by its very nature, a thinking of the notion of the in 
between, whether this be the in-between of animation as concept and animation as film, or 
animation film and live action film. This notion of the in between gestures towards Norman 
McLaren’s definition, quoted above: “Animation is not the art of drawings that move, but 
      
      
43 
 
rather the art of movements that are drawn. What happens between each frame is more 
important that what happens on each frame” (in Wells 1998 10). This notion of the in between 
here implies that it is the between moment that enables (the illusion of) movement and the 
illusion of life and liveliness. I understand this moment of in-between as a moment of 
transformation, not only from one frame to the next, but as the moment that animates. 
Transformation is also central to feminist movements. In the introduction to 
Transformations: Thinking Through Feminism (2000), Sara Ahmed et al. Write, “The desire 
for transformation animates feminist praxis” and that transformation itself can be thought 
of as the object of feminism (1). If we understand animation as the implication of life and 
movement, with the notion of transformation as the mediating in between, then it is possible 
animation can open up new ways to think the interrelation and interaction between mind and 
body, or as a means of transforming that particular dichotomy. As will be explored in chapter 
three, the mind/body dualism that pervades Western thought is a dichotomy that carries 
various parallel associations, including culture/nature, masculine/feminine, and 
man/woman. Is it possible the cinema/animation hierarchy is also an extension of this 
dichotomy? Equating animation purely to the feminine, or to ‘nature’, may be a step too far, 
but there is no doubt that animation has been the negated or disavowed relation of live action 
cinema, and that women in animation (as creators, artists and animators, as well as in their 
representations on screen) have also had to deal with discrimination and marginalisation. I 
propose that the alignment of key theorisations around animation, its practices and 
processes, alongside feminist corporeal theory may engender new ways to think the female 
body in animation through feminist perspectives. Taking into account the animation process 
in this theorisation is necessary, as a way to understand how animation may enact these 
feminist conceptions of corporeality, and how this feminist philosophy may work through 
animation. I do not make the claim that animation and feminism have never before 
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encountered each other, but that there has been a lack of critical interrogation into animated 
figures from feminist perspectives. In the following chapter, I turn to these previous 
encounters between animation and feminism in order to examine the ways in which 
animation has taken up feminist thought and perspectives, and to make the case for the 
necessary movement towards a feminist ontology of animated bodies.  
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Chapter Two – Animated Women 
      
…how can women analyze their own exploitation, inscribe their own demands, within an order prescribed 
by the masculine? Is a woman’s politics possible within that order? 
—Luce Irigaray, The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine 
      
 In the interview The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine 
(1985), Luce Irigaray addresses the notion that the feminine “is always described in terms of 
deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds monopoly on value: the 
male sex” (69). For Irigaray (and many feminist scholars that follow her), Western discourse 
has consistently relegated woman and the feminine as secondary, complementary, or as the 
“negative image that provides male sexuality with an unfailingly phallic self-representation” 
(70). Irigaray speaks directly to Freud’s theory of sexuality, and in particular his notion that 
the feminine is the necessary complement of male sexuality, when she points out that Freud 
himself is “enmeshed in a power structure and an ideology of the patriarchal type” (70). 
Comfortably established within a patriarchal order, Freud cannot formulate or conceptualise 
an understanding of the feminine or female sexuality outside of that order. If we are to 
develop an understanding of Woman, women, and the feminine that does not position them 
in terms of deficiency or lack, Irigaray argues, then it is “indeed precisely philosophical 
discourse that we have to challenge, and disrupt, inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the 
law for all others” (74). If Western philosophical discourse is an order prescribed by the 
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masculine, then challenging and disrupting that discourse becomes a necessity in order to 
reassert and affirm the place of women and the feminine. If philosophical discourse “sets 
forth the law for all others” then this must necessarily include discourses around 
psychoanalysis, literary studies, film theory, and animation studies. Following Irigaray, who 
asks how women’s politics is possible within an order prescribed by the masculine, this 
chapter asks how women’s animation is made possible within that same order? How can we 
formulate an understanding of feminist animation outside a masculine order? What does 
feminist animation look like?  
      
 In her formative text, Women and Animation: A Compendium (1992), the first 
anglophone text entirely devoted to women in animation, Jayne Pilling argues that women 
have had a far greater impact in the medium of animation than they have had in live action 
cinema. While this is a broad claim, it is undoubtedly true that women have always 
maintained a presence throughout animation history, and that many have had an indelible 
impact on the development of the medium and the wider animation industry. Can the very 
presence of women in animation, whether they work within the commercial sector or whether 
they work independently, already be understood as a disruption of a patriarchal and 
phallocentric norm within a primarily male-dominated industry? The commercial industry is 
here understood as referring to the global network of animation studios and production 
houses producing widely distributed content via major distributors and networks, whereas 
independent animators are broadly understood as those who work alone or within small 
teams and studios. As will be discussed later in this chapter however, the distinction between 
commercial and independent animation is a slippery one, and not clearly demarcated. Can 
independent female animators (such as Vera Neubauer, Monique Renault, and Michèle 
Cournoyer) directly challenge and address patriarchal conventions and ideologies in their 
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work, not only through the content of their films (which may directly address feminist 
concerns) but through aesthetic forms and modes of production? This chapter argues that 
feminist animation operates as an interrogation of “the conditions under which systematicity 
itself is possible”, deliberately setting itself against or outside a specific masculine order 
(Irigaray 74). Other women in animation, such as Margaret (M.J.) Winkler and Mary Blair, who 
worked specifically within the commercial industry, undertake what Irigaray might describe 
as playing with mimesis, “Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an 
affirmation, and thus begin to thwart it” (76).  
      
 To make the claim that animation studies has never encountered feminism would be 
naïve, as there have been fairly regular analyses of the work of female animators and feminist 
readings of animated films since at least the early 1990s. In recent years there has also been 
a renewed focus on women in animation behind the scenes in various capacities—as artists, 
animators, directors and producers. The impact of women’s labour in the animation industry 
is being reappraised, with a particular focus on the women of the early ink and paint 
departments (although this research tends to be focused on Western, and specifically 
American, contexts). This reappraisal is itself part of the larger task undertaken by feminist 
art theorists, historians and critics to reveal the ‘hidden’ women throughout art history (and 
by extension, animation history) who have previously seldom, or never, been written about. 
Not only does this re-examination of animation history uncover and highlight the women 
who have been unacknowledged, but this re-evaluation of animation’s gendered past 
critiques how these women have been written about. Annabelle Honess Roe (2017) points out 
that when women are written about in animation history books and texts, they tend to be 
described as “either the helpmeet to the ‘great men’ of animation history (think of Evelyn 
Lambart or Joy Batchelor), or lone artisanal craftswomen, working outside the system of 
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cultural capital exchange of the industry” (n.p.). The following chapter will draw upon these 
feminist revisions of animation history, providing an overview of the current literature 
around women in animation, as well as the encounters between animation and feminism. 
This will include an examination of early pioneers and key figures throughout animation 
history, such as Margaret Winkler and Lotte Reiniger, as well as key examples of animation 
that express feminist ideologies and perspectives. This chapter will highlight the material, 
historical trace left by these women, whilst reflecting on the ways in which the discourse 
around women in animation continues to shift. As discussions of representation both on and 
off the screen continue to dominate, it is important to consider how scholarship on women 
in animation (and feminism and animation) can also operate in excess of these issues. 
Undoubtedly, representation matters, and it is necessary to understand the current state of 
scholarship around women in animation and representation. However, a turn towards a 
materialist feminist approach to animation history and the art of animation will open up new 
and generative connections between animation and feminism.  
      
Feminist Animation(s)  
      
 Much of the literature discussing the representation of women in animation centres 
around key figures from, and works produced by, Western animation studios. Texts focusing 
on gender, culture and representation in animation include From Mouse to Mermaid: The 
Politics of Film, Gender and Culture (ed. Bell, Haas, and Sells, 1995), an anthology which 
examines issues of representation in Disney films (including live action and hybrid feature 
films); Amy M. Davis’ book Good Girls and Wicked Witches: Women in Disney’s Feature 
Animation (2006), is a critical examination of the representations of girls and women in 
Disney animated feature films; Davis is also the author of the counterpart book Handsome 
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Heroes and Vile Villains: Men in Disney’s Feature Animation (2013). Animating Difference: 
Race, Gender and Sexuality in Contemporary Films for Children (C. Richard King, Carmen R. 
Lugo-Lugo, Mary K. Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2010) addresses representation and the intersections 
of race, sexuality and gender in animated feature films released by studios including Disney, 
Pixar, DreamWorks, and Twentieth Century Fox; Animating Difference covers a range of 
topics, including “Animated Representations of (Latino) Ethnicity and Nation”, and 
representations of femininity and constructions of citizenship (“Beyond Snow White”). The 
authors focus their attention on the ways the films discussed “project ethnicity, sexuality and 
gender onto characters, scenes, and stories” and how, “through imposition and juxtaposition 
they politicize characters, scenes, and stories” (5). Whilst this text offers in-depth analysis 
and critique of a range of animated films, these analyses are still limited to American 
animation, forgoing the opportunity to examine animated films for children from European, 
Asian, or Australian contexts (although the book does include a brief discussion of British 
animation studio Aardman Animations’ Chicken Run (2000), which was co-financed and 
distributed by DreamWorks).  
      
 There is a wealth of literature in the form of feminist critiques and readings of 
animated texts, with articles offering close analyses of independent short films, feature 
length commercial productions, and various animated television series. Examples include 
Ewan Kirkland’s article “The Politics of Powerpuff: Putting the ‘Girl’ in ‘Girl Power’” (2010), 
which discusses the ways in which Cartoon Network’s The Powerpuff Girls (1998-2005) 
“engages with the pre-millenial discourse of ‘Girl Power’” (10); in a similar vein, Katia Perea’s 
article “Girl Cartoons Second Wave: Transforming the Genre” (2015) examines ‘girl cartoons’ 
that feature empowered girl characters, their evolution since the 1980s, and their potentially 
transgressive nature. Perea notes that while such cartoons are not unproblematic, with the 
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occasional “mean girls and misogyny boys” stereotypes, overall she concludes that “US 
television girl cartoons can counter the themes historically used to construct little girls’ 
identity” (200-201). Following this girl power theme, in her article “Narrowcasting Feminism: 
MTV’s Daria” (2015), Laura Ivins-Hulley examines how the animated series Daria (Glenn 
Eichler and Susie Lewis, 1997-2001) became a focal point for a girl power cultural moment. 
She examines the way the show enacts “a tension between discourses of female 
empowerment and the constraints of consumerist culture” (1198). Joel Gwynne (2015) 
examines the way television animation comedies The Simpsons (1989 - present) and King of 
the Hill (1991-2010) provide a feminist critique of domesticity through the figure of the 
housewife. He argues that the fact that characters Marge Simpson and Peggy Hill are not, in 
fact, ‘real women’ complicates the understanding of women’s agency in comedy. Because the 
actors who voice these characters are ‘disembodied’, “the audience is able to consider the 
words spoken by female characters and the political messages these words convey, 
unencumbered by the problematic exigencies of female corporeality” (66). I would argue that 
this description of female corporeality as “problematic exigencies” is itself problematic, 
implicitly assuming an unruly, undesirable female corporeality as something to be overcome 
and controlled. This statement also denies (or fails to acknowledge) that these animated 
female characters also have bodies, even if those bodies are made of different stuff than ‘real’, 
fleshed bodies.  
      
 Feminist critiques and analyses such as those described above are reasonably 
common, and many animators have also chosen to explicitly address feminist issues and 
ideologies through their work. Jayne Pilling credits the rise of a number of prominent female 
animators in the 1970s and 1980s, in part, to ‘the women’s movement’, which succeeded in 
“creating an encouraging climate and influencing, to some degree at least, the availability of 
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funding” (1992 48). Perhaps one of the most recognised examples of independent animation 
addressing feminist issues to emerge during this period is the work of the Leeds Animation 
Workshop (LAW). Established in 1978, the British women’s animation cooperative is still 
operating in Leeds today. The works produced by LAW are some of the few examples in 
Pilling’s Compendium that are explicitly described as feminist in content. Antonia Lant 
(2006), as part of her larger discussion around the distribution and funding of British 
independent cinema of the 1980s, argues that LAW solved the problem of how to elaborate 
theoretical issues, questions of realism, and how to represent women’s politics and daily lives 
through the use of animation. Lant argues that for LAW, “Animation’s anti-literal quality 
provided an answer, albeit a different one, to debates about realism, and afforded LAW the 
opportunity to make a populist feminist counter-propaganda from the Left” (162). LAW were 
able to foster relationships with the local community and target their audiences (including 
activists, teachers, and local community members) through extensive consultation in the 
research and development phases of their animation process. Since the Workshop began, 
they have produced animated short films tackling and raising awareness around issues 
including sexual harassment, environmental issues, equal pay and equal opportunities, child 
protection, and bereavement. According to co-founder Gillian Lacey, LAW “believed 
passionately in the ideals - opportunities for women, a flat rate wage, no individual credits 
on the films, a collective work process”, ideals which also included “the creation of cartoon 
women who do not have huge tits and eyelashes” (in Pilling 1992, 36). Of the films they have 
produced (as of 2018, thirty-one) titles that directly address issues of feminist activism 
include Give Us a Smile (1983), about the kinds of sexual harassment many women face in 
their day-to-day lives, Through the Glass Ceiling (1994), addressing the need for equal 
opportunity in the workplace, and Did I Say Hairdressing? I Meant Astrophysics (1998), which 
concerns the underrepresentation of women in STEM (science, technology, engineering and 
      
      
52 
 
mathematics). Today LAW remains a “not-for-profit, cooperative company, which produces 
and distributes animated films on social and educational issues”; they currently have a 
number of projects in development, including films about health issues, energy conservation 
and hate crimes.1   
      
 LAW is a prominent example of a long-running independent animation collective that 
have consistently addressed feminist and social justice issues throughout their oeuvre. A 
more recent example of a short, independent animated film that has directly addressed 
feminist issues, and specifically the lack of understanding of female sexuality, is the short 
animated documentary, Le Clitoris (Lori Malépart-Traversy, 2016). Using an 
anthropomorphised caricature of the clitoris animated against a bright pink background, 
Malépart-Traversy traces the history (or rather the ahistory) of this organ. Through voice-
over, she describes the anatomy of the organ itself, its purpose in terms of pleasure, and the 
ways it has been repeatedly discovered and rediscovered by various men. Malépart-Traversy 
informs us through voice over that the existence of the clitoris “has been well known since 
Ancient Greece, but it wasn’t until 1559 that Italian surgeon Realdo Colombo officially 
identified it”, while an animated figure in a white lab coat sails across an ocean and sights a 
mountain of sorts in the distance. Making landfall, he climbs the mountain, atop which 
protrudes the clitoris and the vaginal opening, and plants his flag. A second man appears and 
plants his own flag, as Malépart-Traversy informs us that this second man, a few years later, 
would claim that he was the one to discover the clitoris: “Since then, the clitoris has 
continued to be forgotten or misrepresented in literature.” Malépart-Traversy does not forget 
Sigmund Freud (whom she declares “the Number One enemy of the clitoris”) as the inventor 
 
1 Leeds Animation Workshop. www.leedsanimation.org.uk/about/. Accessed 29 August 2016. 
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of the concept of the vaginal orgasm, which she claims would engender “a wave of clitoral 
obscurantism”. Through its examination of the misrepresentation of the clitoris, Le Clitoris 
also explores what Irigaray might describe as the refusal to acknowledge that female sexuality 
might have its own specificities.  
      
 There are many animators who have contributed, and continue to contribute, to the 
rich and varied examples of feminist animation. In particular, several women in animation 
have become recurring figures throughout animation scholarship, their body of work coming 
to represent key examples of animation expressing a feminist ideology or politics. These 
figures and films include Suzan Pitt, with films such as Asparagus (1979) and Joy Street 
(1995); Vera Neubauer with films such as The Decision (1981) and The Lady of the Lake 
(1995); Monique Renault’s All Men Are Created Equal (1987); Joanna Quinn’s Beryl series; 
and Marjut Rimmimen’s I’m Not A Feminist, But … (1986). Throughout this thesis I will 
explore a range of examples of animated film and key figures, in particular the films of 
Michèle Cournoyer, as I examine the various ways feminist theory and politics both inform 
and are enacted through animation. However, despite the range of feminist examples 
available, and the quality and diversity of those works, the marginalisation of women in 
animation continues. The work and contribution of women in animation remains too little 
acknowledged, both in historical texts and in professional settings. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I continue my examination of current literature as I turn to the women throughout 
animation history who have made a material contribution to the medium, and the ways 
women have had to continually combat marginalisation. While this will not be an exhaustive 
examination of their history, I aim to trace some of the key material contributions made by 
these women to the medium.   
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“Feminine Competition”  
      
 It would be remiss here not to discuss some of the recent events which have effected 
women in the animation industry. Like women across the creative industries and the 
workforce in general, women in animation have had to combat severe discrimination. The 
U.S based organisation Women in Animation, who continue to advocate for gender parity 
within the animation industry by 2025, highlight the fact that as of 2015 while 60% of 
animation students were women, women only made up 20% of animation creatives. These 
creative roles include producers and directors, writers, artists and designers, and animators.2 
More recently, the Animation Guild (based in Los Angeles) has found that the number of its 
members who are women has increased, from 20.6% in April 2015, to 25.6% as of March 2018 
(the Guild’s membership includes 4230 writers, artists and technicians).3 Despite this slight 
increase, these statistics would seem to reflect the perception that the animation industry is 
something of a ‘boys club’. Andi Spark (2016), a practitioner with a strong background in 
character animation and directing, and currently head of the animation program at Griffith 
University, Australia, has written of this marginalisation faced by women, recalling a senior 
lecturer once telling her, “You haven’t got what it takes to be an animator” (n.p.). In her 
article “Pursuing the Animatrix: Musings on Defining a Term to Describe Woman-Centered 
Animation” (2016), Spark reflects on her own career within the Australian animation 
industry, beginning with her time as an inker and painter at Burbank Films in Sydney, and 
the various roadblocks women in animation have continued to face as they fight for equal 
 
2 “50/50 by 2025” Women in Animation, www.womeninanimation.org/5050-by-2025/. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. 
3 McLean, Thomas J. “Animation Guild Reports Quarter of Members are Women” Animation World Network, 26 
March 2018, www.awn.com/news/animation-guild-reports-quarter-members-are-women. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. 
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representation. She argues that one of the reasons women continue to remain marginalised 
relates to a restrictive and narrow understanding of ‘femininity’—women tend to be hired for 
the more nurturing roles (production assistants, production managers, and producers) rather 
than the creative roles (directors and animators). In order to address such marginalisation, 
Spark argues that one approach needed in order to assist women seeking a career in 
animation is to provide inspiration. In order for women to feel that they have the chance to 
succeed, we need a greater variety of female-led projects; this is “essential for women to 
combat the ‘imposter syndrome’ of feeling that they don’t belong and that even when they 
are in a senior creative or executive position, that they’re there by accident” (2016 n.p.).  
      
 Of course, more than representation and inspiration, it is becoming abundantly clear 
that a major shift is needed in the culture of the industry. This has been brought into sharp 
relief thanks to the #MeToo movement (founded by American civil rights activist Tarana 
Burke in 2006). When Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein was accused of sexual assault, 
harassment and misconduct in 2016, many other women throughout the creative industries 
came forward with stories of their own. It soon came to light that John Lasseter, co-founder 
of Pixar Animation Studios and, at the time, Chief Creative Officer of Disney Animation, also 
stood accused of sexual misconduct and harassment, issues which executives at the company 
had  allegedly been aware of, but had failed to meaningfully address.4 Lasseter would take a 
six month sabbatical from Disney/Pixar, and eventually ceased involvement with the 
company entirely at the end of 2018.5 Jennifer Lee, screenwriter and co-director of the Disney 
animated feature film Frozen (co-director Chris Buck, 2013) was named as the new CCO at 
 
4 Masters, Kim. “John Lasseter’s Pattern of Alleged Misconduct Detailed by Disney/Pixar Insiders” The Hollywood 
Reporter, 21 November 2017 www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/john-lasseters-pattern-alleged-misconduct-
detailed-by-disney-pixar-insiders-1059594.  Accessed 4 Feb. 2018.            
5 Lasseter has since been hired at American animation studio Skydance Animation. 
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Walt Disney Animation Studios, with Pete Docter (director of Pixar features Up (2009) and 
Inside Out (2015)) stepping into the same role at Pixar. But Lasseter has not been the only 
high-profile, influential figure within the animation industry to face such allegations. These 
revelations were catalysing for the women and gender non-conforming people of the 
animation community and in October 2017, members of the Animation Guild penned an open 
letter to the industry at large, outlining clear demands for change and calling for an end to 
sexual abuse and harassment in the workplace. One of their demands, that the Guild establish 
an Anti-Harassment and Discrimination Committee, has already been met. This is an 
important step forward in combatting the harassment and marginalisation that women face 
in the industry, however, it is important to contextualise the issues women face now by 
acknowledging and addressing the systemic discrimination they have faced in the past.  
      
 In chapter one I discussed the early histories and genealogies of animation, citing 
several key figures key in the early development of the medium. Written histories of 
animation tend to focus only on these ‘great men’, including J. Stuart Blackton, Winsor 
McCay, Charles-Émile Reynaud, The Fleischer Brothers, and Walt Disney, leaving women 
often relegated to minor or supporting roles. However women have also left an indelible mark 
on the development of the medium; M.J. Winkler, the first woman distributor of cartoons in 
the U.S, was one such person, and one of the most influential figures in U.S animation history. 
In his text on early animation history, Before Mickey (1993), Donald Crafton outlines how 
Winkler began her career in the film industry as a secretary for Harry M. Warner, co-founder 
of Warner Brothers: “I was secretary to Harry M. Warner and as such travelled from New York 
to the West coast and around to film conventions meeting film people and learning much” 
(in Crafton 206). At the peak of her career, Winkler was the distributor for three of the most 
popular and recognised early U.S cartoons—Felix the Cat (Pat Sullivan and Otto Messmer), 
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the Fleischer Brothers’ Out of the Inkwell series, and Walt Disney’s Alice Comedies, which 
would effectively launch Disney’s career. J.B. Kaufman (2009) provides further insight into 
Winkler’s business style and the influence she held, outlining how both the Out of the Inkwell 
and Felix cartoons evolved under Winkler’s distribution. The hijinks of the mischievous 
animated figure Koko the Clown and his ventures into Max Fleischer’s live action world, for 
example, “reached new heights of delightful, inventive visual fantasy”, and the quality of 
Felix the Cat improved as “Winkler demanded a higher artistic and filmmaking standard” of 
Messmer and Sullivan before she would commit to the series (106-107). Kaufman notes that 
despite her success, Winkler’s “tough, no-nonsense style” meant that her working 
relationships with both the Fleischer’s and Sullivan suffered, with the former parting ways 
with Winkler in 1923, and Sullivan ending his agreement with her in 1925 (107). However, 
1923 was the year Winkler began distributing for Walt Disney, then still an emerging figure 
in the industry. Disney recognised Winkler’s influence—“his early letters to her make it clear 
that he was eager to defer to her wishes” — and correspondence between Winkler and Disney 
show how much power she wielded (108). Kaufman writes that “Winkler not only asserts 
herself with regard to contract terms and release schedules, but takes an active role in 
determining the content of the films” (108, original emphasis). Pushing for a higher density 
of gags and comic situations, making comments with regards to what worked and what didn’t, 
even requesting all raw footage as well as completed negatives so that she might occasionally 
recut the films in New York, Winkler’s contribution to these early Disney films aligns as much 
(if not more) with the role of a producer as it does a distributor. This is unsurprising, as 
Kaufman also points out that Winkler had originally intended to become a producer as well 
as a distributor (109).  
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 Despite operating one of the most successful distribution companies and representing 
three of the most important silent cartoon series of the 1920s, Winkler would often use her 
initials, ‘M.J.’ rather than her full name. The unique position she found herself in as female 
distributor in the 1920s is made clear in the following excerpt from a newspaper article of 
that period, quoted in Maureen Furniss’ Art in Motion: Animation Aesthetics (2007):  
      
Gentlemen, one of the few remaining fields in which you have not had to face feminine 
competition is now being invaded. It is the business of distributing motion pictures … 
Few of the motion picture men who have done business with M.J. Winkler Productions 
know that M.J is Margaret Winkler, and that she is young and nice looking. (in Furniss 
2007 234)  
      
The notice reveals Winkler’s full name with an air of surprise and bemusement, describing 
her as “feminine competition” who is “invading” a field that is traditionally dominated by 
men (although it should be acknowledged that when she left her former employers to set up 
her own business, Warner Brothers “demonstrated their support for her new venture” 
(Kaufman 106)). Furniss notes that Winkler’s strategy of using her initials rather than her full 
name was not an unusual tactic, and that many women in male-dominated fields often 
“adopted working names or monikers that are masculine-sounding or at least gender neutral” 
in order to avoid discrimination based on gender (234). Despite the barriers she faced, 
Winkler developed an impressive reputation with regards to her business acumen; Crafton 
describes her as a “straightforward businessperson”, in contrast to her husband and the man 
who would eventually take over her business, Charles Mintz, a so-called “wheeler-dealer in 
the grand style” (208). Mintz, who also began his career at Warner Brothers, married Winkler 
in 1923 and gradually assumed control of the business, with Winkler retiring completely in 
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1926 to raise their children (Kaufman, 109). Mintz is best known for securing the rights to 
Disney character, Oswald the Lucky Rabbit, whilst at the same time hiring away most of 
Disney’s animation staff (a move that would ultimately lead Disney and creative partner Ub 
Iwerks to design the character that would become Mickey Mouse).  
      
 Crafton describes Winkler as a pioneer in the field of animation, particularly regarding 
her accomplishments for having ‘discovered’ Sullivan, the Fleischers, and Disney, but that 
unfortunately, after her marriage and retirement and perhaps due to the exploits of her 
husband, she “faded quietly into oblivion” (211). While most animation history texts discuss 
Winkler to some extent (Crafton 1993; Kaufman 2009; Furniss 2007, 2016) she is often only 
briefly mentioned, or written of in connection to her husband. Leonard Maltin’s otherwise 
thorough historical text, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated Cartoons 
(Revised Edition, 1987) only briefly mentions Winkler four times. The first three references 
to her are in the chapter on Walt Disney—a statement that “Distributor M.J. Winkler” had 
agreed to finance Disney’s Alice series (30); a note that “Constant pressure from Winkler in 
New York” had forced Disney to continually struggle to improve (32); and a reference to 
Winkler only in context of her husband’s dealings with Disney regarding Oswald the Lucky 
Rabbit (33). The last mention of Winkler is within an entire chapter devoted to Mintz’s post-
Oswald career with Columbia Pictures. Here Maltin only writes, “No stranger to the animation 
field, Margaret Winkler had distributed Fleischer’s cartoons for several years and was just 
signing up an unknown from the Mid-west named Walt Disney. Her husband, Charles Mintz, 
was gradually taking over the company and wanted to get out of the independent States’ 
Rights market and into the big time” (209). Despite the fact that Winkler is so often described 
as a pioneer in animation there still remains relatively little space devoted to her in animation 
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history texts, with Kaufman’s essay perhaps the most significant examination of her career.6 
Winkler’s presence remains embedded within animation—the title cards of Disney’s Alice 
Comedies proclaim “M.J. Winkler Presents” as well as the name of her production company 
“Winkler Pictures”—but, besides the archival letters and documents that Kaufman and 
Crafton reference in their examinations of her career, there is little else to draw from when 
evaluating her impact on cartoon history. Jason Douglass grapples with this problem of how 
to write the history of women in animation when there is there is very little to draw upon in 
the case of Helena Smith Dayton. In his essay “Artist, Author, and Pioneering Motion Picture 
Animator: The Career of Helena Smith Dayton” (2017), Douglass considers the life and career 
of Smith Dayton, and how it may be possible to understand her aesthetic and artistic 
contribution to the medium when none of her films survive. Smith Dayton was a sculptor and 
early stop-motion animator (as well as “prominent suffragist”); Douglass writes that while a 
number of texts, photographs and interviews “affirm her position as a pioneer of clay 
animation, and quite possibly as one of the first commercial female animators in the United 
States” she has nevertheless remained undervalued in histories of silent cinema (n.p.). 
Douglass draws from a variety of archival materials to (re)construct a history of Smith 
Dayton’s contribution to animation, and interrogates previous (limited) research into her 
career and process. For instance, he finds that Michael Frierson’s short examination of Smith 
Dayton in his text Clay Animation: American Highlights 1908 to the Present (1994) ultimately 
devalues her work via unfavourable comparisons with male counterparts of the period: this 
“undermines Dayton’s accomplishments and flattens her into a factoid” (n.p.). Douglass’s 
work serves to reassert Smith Dayton’s accomplishments, repositioning her within animation 
history. He argues that while the fact that Smith Dayton was a woman has undoubtedly 
 
6 She is also depicted as a major figure in the fictionalised filmic account of Disney’s early career, Walt Before 
Mickey (dir. Khoa Le, 2015) 
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contributed to the lack of attention she has received in animation histories, this problem is 
compounded when it appears that none of her works have survived.  
      
 Douglass’ examination of Smith Dayton and his reappraisal of the ways she has 
previously been written about are part of the larger task undertaken by feminist scholars to 
reveal the unacknowledged contributions of women to art and cultural histories. In the last 
decade, the most prominent scholarship reappraising the historical contributions of women 
in animation has been that which re-evaluates the labour performed by the women of the 
early ink and paint departments. It is a commonly held belief that in the early years of the 
animation industry, inking and painting were the only jobs women were allowed to perform. 
Andi Spark even writes that her first job in animation was “piecework cel-painting” where 
she soon discovered that “the Ink & Paint department was traditionally the only place for 
females in the animation industry” (2016 n.p.). Kristen Thompson (2014) describes the period 
between the 1920s and 1960s as one in which “the animation industry was a labour force 
segregated by gender” (n.p.). Disney in particular does not deny this aspect of their history, 
acknowledging on the Walt Disney Family Museum website, that “If you were a man blessed 
with both creativity and artistic talent, you held a spot in the Animation Department, but if 
you were a woman with the same skills, the only department open for you at the time was the 
Ink and Paint”.7 The now (in)famous letter sent to Mary Ford by the Disney Studios in 1938, 
which has been widely circulated and shared online, further contributes to this perception. 
The letter reads: “Women do not do any of the creative work in connection with preparing 
cartoons for the screen, as that work is performed entirely by young men. For this reason girls 
 
7 Culler, Mary Beth. “Look Closer: Women in the Disney Ink and Paint Department” The Walt Disney Family 
Museum,  2012 www.waltdisney.org/blog/look-closer-women-disney-ink-and-paint-department. Accessed 24 
Nov. 2017. 
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are not considered for the training school.”8 The letter advises Ford that women may only 
apply for the work that consists of inking and painting, and that in order to do this it would 
be necessary for her to come to the studio with samples of pen, ink and water colour work.  
      
 However, while women were more often than not confined to the ink and paint 
departments, this does not mean that women never worked outside of them. For example, 
Davis (2005) highlights four women working at the Disney studios in creative positions 
outside of Ink and Paint in the 1930s and 1940s—Retta Scott (animator), Bianca Majolie (story 
development), Sylvia Moberly Holland (conceptual art), and Mary Blair. Retta Scott holds the 
distinction of being the first credited female animator at the Disney studios for her work on 
Bambi (1942), although she also worked uncredited on Fantasia (1940) and Dumbo (1941).9 
Of these four women, the work of concept artist Mary Blair is perhaps the most recognised 
today. Blair first came to Walt Disney’s attention for her concept art for Saludos Amigos 
(1942). John Canemaker (2003) writes that Disney loved her art, even though it often 
contrasted sharply with the typical style of the studio. Blair’s concept work was “flat, 
antirealist and childlike (faux naïf), painted with a wildly unrealistic color palette” (ix). 
According to Disney animators Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston (1981), everyone at the 
studio loved Blair’s “crisp, fresh drawings”, but once animated according to the principles of 
Disney animation “they often lost the spirit of her design” (192). Because her work was highly 
stylised and made use of flat planes, whereas Disney’s principles focused on “warmth and 
personality”, it became difficult for the animators to translate her work directly to the screen 
(Thomas and Johnston 192). As such, her contribution to Disney animated films can be more 
 
8“The creative work is performed by young men” Letters of Note, 9 September 2009, 
www.lettersofnote.com/2009/09/get-back-in-tracing-room.html. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018 
9 “Disney Artists’ Holiday Wishes: Highlighting Retta Scott” The Walt Disney Family Museum, 2011, 
www.waltdisney.org/blog/disney-artists-holiday-wishes-highlighting-retta-scott. Accessed 7 Nov. 2018. 
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clearly found in “a setting, a color, a costume, a concept, or a piece of staging, often 
uncomfortably attached to a fully dimensional, traditional-style of animation” (Canemaker 
46). Blair’s artistic influence can be felt and seen in animated feature films including 
Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), and Peter Pan (1953), in which the colour 
palettes, moods, and layouts of her concept work strongly influenced the final design, layouts 
and background art of the films. Blair’s other key contribution to the world of Disney was in 
helping design the “It’s a Small World” attraction for the 1964 New York World’s Fair (which 
would go on to find a permanent home at the Disneyland theme park).  
      
 Scholars and historians are quick to note that there have been several prominent 
exceptions to the rule that women could only work in the ink and paint departments. 
However, when writing the histories of the women of ink and paint, it is crucial that their 
work is not deemed as ‘less important’ than the work performed by the (primarily male) 
animators. Positioning the work of the ‘feminised’ ink and paint department as merely the 
supporting role to the creative work performed by the animation departments devalues the 
role of the inkers and painters and negates the importance of their work, denying them any 
kind of creative autonomy and ultimately reinforcing the masculine/feminine binary 
opposition that underlies the disregard of the contribution of women in animation. There 
have been a number of investigations into the role of the inkers and painters over the last 
decade. For example, Patricia Zohn’s article for Vanity Fair, “Coloring the Kingdom” (2010) 
highlights the women who coloured the early Disney animated features films. Drawing 
primarily from personal letters, documents, and interviews with Zohn’s aunt, Rae Medby 
McSpadden, and her ink and paint colleagues, Zohn details the experience of these women 
working on Disney’s first feature animation, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937). Zohn’s 
article describes the often exhausting experience of completing the film; McSpadden and the 
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various other ink and paint artists are frank about these experiences, with Zohn noting that 
during Snow White “it was not at all unusual to see the “girls”—as Walt paternalistically 
referred to them—thin and exhausted, collapsed on the lawn, in the ladies’ lounge, or even 
under their desks” (n.p.). Zohn not only describes the labour conditions, but details the skills 
required of the women who were inkers and painters. She describes the “highly specialized, 
on-site training” the women undertook (whether they had a background in art or not), and 
the creative input they were sometimes able to have: “When they thought Snow White’s 
cheeks too pale, painters came up with just the right rosy blend to top them off. When her 
black hair was too dull, they perked it up with highlights” (n.p.). Whilst underlining the ways 
in which the women’s labour was conceived of as a supporting role to the work performed by 
men, importantly, Zohn also highlights the talent and artistry that the ink and paint 
department demanded of its employees. Inking and painting was a role that required minute 
attention to detail, but remained “reducible to a simple imperative of time; ever nimble but 
never showy, their job was to make what the men did look good” (Zohn, n.p.).  
      
 This notion of “reducible” labour has been further explored since the publication of 
Zohn’s article. Kristen Thompson’s article, ““Quick-Like a Bunny!” The Ink and Paint 
Machine, Female Labor and Color Production” (2014) explores the gendered segregation of 
labor in the animation industry, particularly prevalent between the 1920s and 1960s. 
Thompson draws on oral histories of women in animation, and suggests that the use of colour 
in Disney animation in particular not only evokes “an affective and sensual delight in color’s 
abstraction, purity and movement” but foregrounds “color’s materiality as magical, indeed 
transgressive” (n.p.). She analyses this use of colour in Snow White, and also analyses the 
ways colour is connected to notions of femininity in the promotional film, The Reluctant 
Dragon (Alfred Werker, 1941). Thompson argues that the latter film presents an image of the 
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ink and paint department as “a novel and theatricalized component of the animation 
machine, and one that was quintessentially feminized” (n.p.). Operating as a promotional, 
‘behind-the-scenes’ film, The Reluctant Dragon provides humorous insights into the making 
of a Disney animated cartoon. The film follows Robert Benchley, an actor and comedian, as 
he visits the studio in order to pitch Walt Disney an idea for a movie. Stepping into the 
multiplane camera room, Benchley steps out of black and white and into a world of bright 
technicolor, but the colours become even more dazzling once he follows Disney employee 
Doris (played by actor Frances Gifford) into the world of the Ink and Paint department—the 
‘Rainbow Room’, as Doris calls it. The women of ink and paint wear bright, white lab coats 
and mix up their paints with “a couple of hundred different chemicals” in order to create the 
perfect tones and shades. We watch as the colours are mixed and processed in a technicolor 
factory, in a whimsical montage set to the tune of the seven dwarves song “Dig, Dig, Dig” 
from Snow White.  
      
 Although the ‘Rainbow Room’ segment is not the only scene in which women appear 
in the film (several can be seen in the background of the ‘Art Class’, sculpting clay models, as 
secretaries and even a nurse), it is the only scene in which women dominate the screen. 
Whilst mixing colours the women are also seen pouring solutions into beakers, with one even 
wearing a gas mask. The entire process is feminised, coded as something between chemistry 
and cookery. At one point Benchley asks Doris, “Don’t tell me you cook all this yourselves?” 
As Thompson describes it, “Benchley’s banter with Doris domesticates the female labor of 
ink and paint, connecting it to other traditional tasks of femininity” (n.p.). The Rainbow 
Room scene ends with Benchley commenting favourably on Doris’ appearance as she holds a 
completed cel from Bambi (1941) in front of her face. “Like it?” she asks, to which he replies, 
“It’d be alright if you could get that reindeer out of the way.” Doris laughs as if flattered. 
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Thompson argues that the Rainbow Room sequence links the processes of colour production 
to female labor, femininity, and domesticity:  
From the domestication of chemistry into the culinary arts, which suggests the 
(fictional) chemistry of color production is transgressive yet comical, to these 
concluding shots which privilege the female body as the center of visual interest even 
over the very artwork that is being promoted in this film, the animation color machine 
repeatedly reinscribes female labor as femininity. (2014, n.p.)  
      
Recent publications continue to provide further context and expansive detail regarding the 
role of women in the ink and paint departments. Mindy Johnson’s Ink & Paint: The Women 
of Walt Disney’s Animation (2017) provides an enriched history of women’s contribution to 
the medium of film and animation from the days of Georges Méliès and Charles Pathé, to the 
transition towards and rising dominance of digital animation from the 1980s onwards. 
Indeed, Johnson’s book suggests that perhaps the image of the woman in the gas mask in The 
Reluctant Dragon wasn’t so outlandish after all, as it includes an image of a woman wearing 
a similar mask as she mixes elements for pigments at the Hyperion Paint Lab (106). Johnson 
details how the painters received training in the various elements of the paint, binders and 
pigments, and colour matching (for consistency across the animation cels); the female 
chemists in the paint labs are said to have developed “deodorizing solutions applied to 
various paints so the artists were not annoyed or distracted by odoriferous paints”, as well as 
a “wallpaper remover for various remodelling efforts and glass cleaner designed for the needs 
of the Camera Department” (107). Johnson contextualises her history of women in animation 
alongside both the technical advancements in the animation process made at the Disney 
studio itself, and the significant historical events of the 1900s, including World War II and 
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the effects this had at the studio—with many of the men serving in the war, more women 
stepped into the roles of assistant animators and into the camera departments (195-196).  
      
 The majority of the literature discussing the role of women as inkers and painters is 
confined to Western animation studios, however there have been some recent works that 
choose to explore the labour of women in other cultural and geographical contexts. In her 
article “Shiage and Women’s Flexible Labor in the Japanese Animation Industry” (2018), 
Diane Wei Lewis examines the art of shiage—the inking, colouring, cleaning, and finishing of 
cels—and how women largely provided this source of so-called ‘flexible’ labour. Much of the 
colouring work in the Japanese animation industry in the 1970s was outsourced; Lewis 
examines a number of advertisements for correspondence courses which appeared in 
women’s magazines of the time for animation colouring, tracing, and inbetweening. These 
ads were marketed towards women who might perform shiage at home as ‘side-work’ to their 
normal housewife duties (although as Lewis notes, many of these ads would be exposed as 
scams in the 1980s). These ads would often appear alongside others related to various 
domestic crafts and hobbies, as well as ads relating to professional tasks and skills such as 
bookkeeping. As Lewis writes, these ads “emphasised the relationship between animation 
work and creativity, media consumption, and leisure” (119). They also, however, link the task 
of inking and painting, much as The Reluctant Dragon did, to homely, domestic, feminised 
activities. A prominent example of the kind of labour performed by women in the Japanese 
animation industry during this time comes from Miyazaki Hayao, one of Japan’s most 
prominent animation directors and co-founder of Studio Ghibli. In a lecture titled ‘A Woman 
Finish Inspector’, Miyazaki relates the story of a finish inspector whom he worked with during 
production of the television series Heidi: Girl of the Alps (Arupusu no Shoujo Haiji, dir. 
Takahata Isao, 1974), on which Miyazaki served as a layout artist and animator. The role of 
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the finish inspector, as Miyazaki describes it, was to make sure that all coloured animation 
cels were checked for mistakes in colouring, or for dirt and scratches—an “enormous 
task…Men could do it, but for some reason all finish inspectors seem to be women” (180). 
Miyazaki describes meeting her for the first time in the studio, where she had only had a few 
hours sleep before returning to work at her desk. 
      
 Originally delivering this lecture in 1982, Miyazaki describes the animation studio and 
workplace at the time as “chaotic”, with “its conditions inhuman to the extreme” (179). 
Whilst Miyazaki does not name the finish inspector in his lecture, he tells us that she was 
supervising cels on a project that produced six to seven thousand cels per week. When he 
entered the studio each morning, she would wake up and return to work, despite only have 
slept approximately two hours. During the final days of projects, when everyone was under 
pressure with deadlines approaching, she would “telephone here and there to call in many 
women to work on clean-up animation” (182). Miyazaki concedes in retrospect that the hours 
she worked were probably “in violation of the Labor Standard Law and the regulations against 
women working later at night”, but that he and others at the studio found that she was the 
only one they could rely on to do the work properly (185). She would always offer him tea and 
sweets, and it was only later he realised that “at times of such stress, sweets were probably 
the only thing her body could digest” (186). Eventually, the finish inspector collapsed and 
was taken to hospital (implied as the result of being overworked) but that when he went to 
visit her, she assured him she would be better soon. On being discharged she would return to 
work (186). Miyazaki relates the story of the finish inspector in order to communicate the 
kind of dedication, commitment and ambition he feels is necessary for working in animation 
production: “I wonder how many people working in animation production have the same kind 
of commitment as the finish inspector of whom I’ve been speaking?” (186). He speaks of her 
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with respect and admiration and yet, as described by Lewis and Thompson above, the image 
of a group of women “Nibbling on sweets and sipping tea” as they work on colour clean-up 
evokes a scene of domesticity (182). Even concerns for the finish inspectors health are linked 
to perceptions of ‘feminine’ necessity: “we felt that staying up night after night would surely 
lead to her developing health problems, so we negotiated with the company and had a soaking 
bath put in for her. After all, she was a woman, and with so many all-nighters, she had no 
time to do her normal beauty routines” (184). Women’s labour and colour production are 
again equated to images of femininity and domesticity; however, Miyazaki’s story is also 
careful to underscore the value of this labour.   
      
Domestic Crafts and ‘Feminine’ Art 
      
 Early representations of women working within the ink and paint departments and 
colour production may have linked the work to perceived notions of traditional femininity 
and domesticity, but these representations were not confined to women working within the 
major studios in the commercial animation industry. Whilst many women worked in 
animation studios as inkers, painters, tracers, and inbetweeners, they also worked 
independently outside of the studio system; the freedom of form and variety of materials 
available may have meant that, for many women, animation offered an outlet for creative 
expression that may not have been as easily accessibly as live action cinematic practice. As 
Pilling writes:  
      
Whether its informed by a distaste for the hierarchical nature of male dominated live-
action films or commercial animation studios, by personal or socially inculcated lack 
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of confidence, for many the attraction of animation has been, initially at least, that it 
can be done by oneself. And yet the result can be shared by many. (1992 6)  
      
Independent animation has been championed as a space in which women have “unlimited 
potential for expression” as well as the ability to “give voice to the intensely personal” (Pilling 
6). Echoing this view, Australian animator and researcher Ann Shenfield writes that 
animation may be an area women find appealing because of “the ability to work almost 
completely independently while retaining tight control of most aspects of the production” 
(2003 124). Simultaneously, however, the image of the sole female animator has also been 
consistently linked to domestic, ‘homely’ craft work. As noted above by Roe, women in 
animation (when they have been written about in the past) tend to either be depicted “as 
helpmeet to the ‘great men’ of animation history (think of Evelyn Lambart or Joy Batchelor), 
or lone artisanal craftswomen”; this latter image is one which is often “at once celebratory 
and essentialist,” where the animation worked performed by these women is “equated to 
other feminised craft activities that can be carried out in the home” (2017 n.p.). The issue 
with equating the labour and art of animation to activities which have been traditionally been 
understood as ‘feminine’ domestic crafts is neatly summarised by Marion Quigley in her text, 
Women Do Animate—Interviews with 10 Australian animators (2005). Quigley writes that 
these so-called domestic crafts have been “derided as less than (male) ‘art’ in patriarchal 
societies” despite the fact that they are often “characterised by painstaking, methodical work 
and attention to detail” (16-17). The marginalisation of art by women will be further 
discussed in chapter six of this thesis. The perceived connection between women’s 
independent animation and traditionally ‘feminine’ domestic crafts is one that is often 
remarked upon by animators themselves. Australian animator and researcher Ann Shenfield 
points out that there is something of an equivalence between the labour of animation and the 
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labour of “intensive domestic craft forms such as embroidery or tapestry that is likewise 
created stitch by stitch, or frame by frame” (124). Australian animator Lee Whitmore states 
that, “A female friend once compared animation the way I do it to knitting — you pull it out 
and do a little bit at a time” (2005 66).  
      
 Women’s artwork in the past has been dismissed, deemed less important than the 
artwork of the ‘masters’ (who are usually men), therefore denying women access to the order 
of the cultural and the artisanal. However, the use of techniques and materials traditionally 
associated with domestic activities in animation can also be understood in part as a feminist 
reclamation of that domestic space and of the artform itself. German animation pioneer and 
director, Lotte Reiniger, is one animator whose work is considered an example of such 
reclamation. Born in Berlin in 1899, Reiniger holds the distinction of directing the world’s 
oldest surviving animated feature film, The Adventures of Prince Achmed (Die Abenteuer des 
Prinzen Achmed, 1926), which was produced and screened over a decade before Disney would 
screen Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937). Prince Achmed, based on stories from The 
Thousand and One Nights, is preceded as a feature-length animation by the now lost The 
Apostle (El Apóstol, dir. Quirino Cristiani, 1917). Reiniger completed the film working with 
contemporaries Walter Ruttman and Berthold Bartosch (both highly regarded figures in 
experimental animation filmmaking and German expressionist cinema). Reiniger’s husband, 
Carl Koch, operated the camera, although as stressed by Reiniger, Koch was more than just a 
cameraman: “he had a great understanding of cinematic language, truly extraordinary. He 
was the brains, I was the crazy one” (Reiniger 11). Prince Achmed screened for a cinema that 
was “bursting at the seams”: “I was in the lighting box and saw all these people waiting for 
my film, Fritz Lang among them” (Reiniger 11).  
      
      
      
72 
 
 It is a misconception that Reiniger’s work was primarily influenced by Chinese shadow 
theatre. According to Reiniger herself, she didn’t see puppets such as these until later in life, 
when she was able to see them in museums. Rather, Reiniger’s cut-out silhouette animation 
was based on a traditional German folk art of cutting out paper silhouette figures 
(scherenschnitte):  
      
When I was at school, all the children used to do paper cut outs, silhouettes, and I 
loved it. Later, I got the theatre bug and used to put on shows. When other children 
were out playing, I was ‘animating’ my silhouettes. I’d make them perform ‘Snow 
White’, for example. (Reiniger 9).  
      
Using her signature silhouette animation technique, animating cut out figures with 
articulated joints on under-lit glass, Reiniger would complete over seventy works during her 
career. However, despite her immense contribution to animation, Reiniger for many years 
remained under-acknowledged. According to animation scholar William Moritz (2009), a 
contributing factor in this lack of regard may have been the lack of availability of original 
prints and negatives, which were lost when Reiniger left Germany for England in the 1930s 
(14). This recalls the under theorisation and under-acknowledgement of the contribution of 
Helena Smith Dayton due to lack of any surviving materials, as explored above by Jason 
Douglas—it is difficult to write about something that no longer exists. However, many of 
copies of Reiniger’s works do survive, and so another key factor in her case may be an implicit 
assumption on the part of critics and film scholars that “silhouettes constitute a secondary 
or inferior form of animation”, particularly when held up against Disney’s Snow White 
(Moritz 14). Tashi Petter examines the probable dismissal of her animation based on her 
gender, noting that while Siegfried Kracauer pays tribute to Reiniger in his text From Calgary 
      
      
73 
 
to Hitler: A Psychological History of German film (1947), his description of her as operating 
within “a tiny realm of her own” is often seen as “patronizing, representing a marginalized 
‘domestic’ space occupied by Reiniger and her ‘sweet’ handcrafted films” (Petter 2017 n.p.).  
      
Maureen Furniss writes that the Bauhaus re-evaluation of the importance of usefulness 
in art rather than beauty led to the embracing of scissor-cutting as a form of artistic 
expression “rather than being reduced to a quaint pastime” (2016 74). According to Moritz, 
Reiniger’s silhouette films serve as a “kind of feminist validation of a women’s folk art form” 
(15). He details the popularity and history of silhouette art in Germany, particularly after the 
middle of the nineteenth century, where “it came to be practiced more and more by women 
who were not allowed access to other art training but who learned scissor-craft as part of their 
household duties” (15). Reiniger herself states that her parents were pleased that she was 
“sitting at home cutting out silhouettes as it was a peaceful hobby, and it didn’t take up much 
room” (Reiniger 9). Petter, following Moritz, argues that Reiniger’s animation is 
transformative and transgressive, turning a craft that was often practiced by women with no 
formal training into “a distinctly modern and aesthetically radical medium” (2017 n.p.). This 
is a transformation not only of a traditional craft, but of the domestic space itself. Petter notes 
in particular the “wonderfully subversive” manner in which Reiniger would advocate a ‘do-
it-yourself’ approach to animation, quite literally encouraging her audience to cut holes in 
their dining room tables and put a glass plate over it if they didn’t have a trick animation 
table of their own (2017 n.p.).  
      
This, however, leads to the major issues faced by those who animate independently—
time, space, and funding. Ben Mitchell, an independent animator and researcher, writes that 
the funding landscape for animation is ever-changing, with “a multitude of political factors 
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determining the perceived relevance of the arts throughout the world” (2016 172). The 
interviewees in Quigley’s text for example, whose collective careers span over five decades, 
all discuss issues of funding, finance, employment, and the opportunities to create, promote, 
and show their work. The responses reflect the personal experiences of each of the women; 
Anne Jolliffe, Australia’s first female animator who returned to the country in 1979 after 
working on several British productions, most notably the animated Beatles film Yellow 
Submarine (George Dunning, 1968), states that “In my experience, one of the biggest 
stumbling blocks involved with trying to get funding in Australia has been the need to have 
an expression of interest from a television station or distributor” (39). For Susan Kim, who 
completed her postgraduate degree in 1999 and is the youngest of Quigley’s interviewees, 
whilst creating animation is a financial struggle, she is “not out to make more money but to 
make films that explore ideas” (154). Kim discusses receiving funding for her work from the 
Australian Film Commission, a government funding body which since merged with several 
other funding and development organisations to become Screen Australia in 2008. Wendy 
Chandler, independent animator and academic, elaborates on the funding issues 
independent animators face in Australia:  
      
The funding bodies here really don’t understand animation. It’s lumped in the short-
film category. I think the perception here is that making a short film is a stepping 
stone to making a feature film. They’ll support you for say, three short films and then 
they push you towards making a feature or a series. At present I hope to go in that 
direction, but that’s not the case for all. If you’re an independent animator, you’re 
always making short films, so you know it’s a different way of looking at things. (in 
Quigley 2005 129).  
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Chandler explains that there is no stable middle ground between being an independent 
animator and working in a commercial studio: “You’re either an independent on the poverty 
line, or you go and work your way up through a studio in the commercial world and perhaps 
get to direct features like The Magic Pudding and Blinky Bill” (130). Independent animation 
may offer an alternative space for practitioners in which they have total creative control—the 
attraction being, as Pilling points out, “that it can be done by oneself” (6). However, the issue 
of maintaining a stable income provides its own challenges. Beyond access to funding, 
materials, and relevant software, other factors to consider are access to a space in which to 
animate, as well as finding the time. Are independent animators expected to be working on 
their animation full-time, or around regular day jobs? Income is a necessity for those who 
otherwise have no means of financial support and, as pointed out by British animator and 
researcher Samantha Moore at the 2017 Society for Animation Studies conference, having ‘a 
room of one’s own’ (a clear reference to Virginia Woolf) is vital for many independent 
animators in order to work. Moore photographs the spaces of various friends and colleagues 
who animate, and notes that while some have access to a dedicated space for working (a 
converted garden shed, or a home office) others have to make do with a kitchen table, or even 
a second bathroom serving as makeshift studio spaces (Moore 2017). As Shenfield also 
describes, “Homes are regularly makeshift studios and production roles cover assistant 
animator/babysitter” (2003 124). Australian animator Marieke Walsh describes completing 
her short sand-and-salt animation film, The Crossing (2016) while simultaneously caring for 
her infant son (2016).10 
 
 
 
10 Director introduction to the screening of the film at the 2016 Melbourne International Film Festival. 
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Drawing Lines 
 
 As quoted above, Wendy Chandler claims that there is no stable financial middle 
ground between working as an independent animator, or working in a commercial studio. 
However, in the scholarly discourse around women in animation this is also often the case — 
the focus is either on individual women working within an industrialised studio system, or 
women who work independently outside of that system. In fact, in much of the literature 
surrounding women in animation, commercial studios and independent animators are 
represented as inherently opposite, with no possibility given of any kind of interaction or 
crossover. Caroline Leaf, an animator at the National Film Board of Canada (NFB) and 
celebrated director of ink-on-glass animation The Street (1976) and Two Sisters (1991), 
etched directly on 70mm film, once stated that “When I was a student, I would never have 
wanted to be anybody’s inker or painter” (1992 44). There is a certain dismissal of the role of 
inkers and painters in the commercial studio system, perhaps as part of the rejection of the 
hierarchical structure and nature of these studios. Evelyn Lambart, the first female animator 
in Canada, describes the kind of animation done at the NFB as “exploratory” in nature, where 
“originality was valued tremendously. Derivative work was absolutely hated … in fact we were 
highly contemptuous of Disney” (1992 31). The line between ‘independent’ animation and 
‘commercial’ animation is often clearly delineated, with independent animation privileged 
for the creative independence and freedom afforded to the animator and director. However, 
as has been discussed above, the creative and artistic influence and input of the inkers and 
painters in commercial studios should not be dismissed. The feminist revision of these 
histories continues to reassess the contribution these women have made to the technical and 
artistic evolution of the medium. This chapter has not sought to reduce or dismiss the 
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differences between the two modes of production, but to highlight and draw connections 
between the material labour, effort, and traces left by women throughout animation history, 
both as ‘lone craftswomen’ and as inkers and painters (as well as the variety of roles women 
have undertaken at major studios). While this thesis will refer to examples from some 
commercial studio productions, it takes as its primary focus short films from animation 
filmmakers who work independently or in smaller, non-commercial studios. The material 
impact left by women at major studios such as Disney requires further investigation, however 
the freedom of form, of experimentation, and creative control generally afforded to those 
who work independently offers a wider range of possibilities for exploring the ways the female 
body becomes animated. Although it remains important to investigate issues of 
representation regarding animated bodies in feature-length commercial films, I turn in this 
thesis to independently produced animation in order to take into account the ways different 
animators and artists have conceptualised the body outside of patriarchal codes and 
conventions of representation. The specificity and multiplicity of bodies is reflected in the 
multiplicity contained with the term ‘animation’. 
      
This thesis intends to think through the ways form, materiality, and content intertwine 
and enact feminist corporeal philosophy, and independent animators, not bound by a studio 
aesthetic or in-house style, are free to experiment with dynamic interplay between form and 
content. The key animator I examine, Michèle Cournoyer, has created several of her works 
while working with the National Film Board of Canada (NFB), an organisation which provides 
its animators the facilities and space necessary in order to create works that best fit their 
styles and needs. Films produced at the NFB are also freely accessible to view on the NFB 
website. While her films explore various themes including war, pain, trauma, pleasure, 
sexuality and desire, addiction, and memory, they all take the body as her central focus, and 
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as the site through which the exploration of these themes and concepts take place. 
Cournoyer’s constantly unfolding metamorphosis—her transformation of the body—
destabilises the boundary between mind and body, inside and outside, between different 
bodies, and between bodies and place. The female body in Cournoyer’s films becomes a 
threshold, mutable, fragmentary, never complete, and always becoming. In the following 
chapter, I begin to work through the feminist corporeal frameworks which I will use to think 
through the ontology of animated bodies.  
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Chapter Three – Corporeal Frameworks 
      
Now woman is neither closed nor open. Indefinite, unfinished/in-finite, form is never complete in her. She 
is not infinite, but nor is she one unit: a letter, a number in a series, a proper name, single object (of a) sensible 
world, the simple ideality of an intelligible whole, the entity of a foundation, etc. This incompleteness of her 
form, of her morphology, allows her to become something else at any moment, which is not to say she is (n)ever 
unambiguously anything. Never completed in any metaphor. 
—Luce Irigaray, Volume without Contours  
      
In “Volume without Contours” (1991), feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray ponders the 
morphology and ontology of woman. She examines the place of woman as the “everywhere 
elsewhere from whence the ‘subject’ continues to draw his reserves, his re-sources” (53). 
Irigaray describes woman in a way she had rarely (if ever) been described previously; Woman 
and the feminine, left unarticulated and disavowed by Western thought, had been considered 
only in the sense of one whose role is to “be consumed again for new speculations, or rejected 
as unfit for consumption [consommation]” (54). She is the negation of the (male) subject, the 
one who makes the subject possible, a vacuum, unless she is mother: “she — at least — is not 
nothing. She is not that vacuum (of) woman” (54). Irigaray was one of the first to address the 
problem of woman’s exclusion from Western thought, an exclusion which has continued to 
occupy and haunt the works of feminist theorists such as Elizabeth Grosz (1994, 2008, 2011) 
and Rosi Braidotti (1991, 2011). For too long woman had been left as the void of philosophy, 
unaddressed and ignored. In her influential text, Volatile Bodies (1994), Grosz would 
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explicitly link this absence, or the positioning of woman as lack, to the mind/body dualism, a 
product of Cartesianism, which has pervaded (and continues to pervade) various disciplines. 
This mind/body dualism, Grosz tells us, is insidiously correlated with various other 
oppositional pairings, including but not limited to reason/passion, inside/outside, 
masculine/feminine, and man/woman (3). Oppositional pairings such as these lead to an 
implicit hierarchisation, causing the first term to become the privileged, valorised half of the 
pairing, and the second to become subjugated, lesser, negated. Through these associations, 
woman is ‘banished’ to the order of the corporeal, of the body, that which is unruly and which 
must be contained and overcome, while man is left to inhabit the order of the mind, the 
conceptual, and the cultural. There is no room in such a figuration for an understanding of 
the complexity of the interaction between the two. In such a hierarchy, Woman, women, and 
the feminine are understood only in their relation to their privileged counterpart (man, men, 
the masculine). As Irigaray describes her, “Woman remains nothing at all [ce rien du tout], 
this whole of nothing yet [ce tout de rien encore] where each (male) one comes to seek the 
means to replenish resemblance to self (as) to same” (53). 
 
 When Irigaray begins to describe woman as “neither closed nor open” and as “Indefinite, 
unfinished/in-finite”, with her form and morphology allowing her “to become something else 
at any moment”, she is recalling this void of woman, the sense of lack, as opposed to the 
wholeness of the rational subject. Since the publication of Irigaray’s essay, the reappraisal of 
woman and of the body, as well as of the various parallel relations of the mind/body 
opposition, have led to new conceptualisations of the subject. The questioning of the rational 
subject has led to an open challenge to the mind/body dualistic organisation of subjectivity. 
However, Irigaray’s description of the morphology of woman also recalls something of 
animation’s inherent potential for metamorphosis and transformation—a device (which is 
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yet more than simply a ‘device’) that enables “the collapse of the illusion of physical space”, 
and which “destabilises the image” allowing something to become something else at any 
moment (Wells 1998 69). Animation too has been considered the lesser term of a 
dichotomous pair, long considered the negated counterpart of cinema. As explored in chapter 
one, animation for a long time found itself rarely addressed within the realm of film theory, 
and despite its rising prevalence within screen studies, animation scholars such as Alan 
Cholodenko continue to find that terms such as animate and animation “remain taken-for-
granted, unexamined terms in their own right,” or utilised within scholarly papers with little 
to no critical interrogation of what they may signify (2007 25). Animation is a medium marked 
by its openness and its generative potentiality—it is not quite ‘infinite’ but neither is it 
‘complete’ or finite. This is not to make the assertion that ‘animation is to woman’ or ‘the 
feminine’ (that would be entirely reductive), but to suggest that animation studies and 
feminist theory may be take up questions of the body as parallel lines of theoretical inquiry. 
Exploring feminism’s struggle to reclaim the body from patriarchal and phallocentric 
discourse through animated forms may yet shed light on the ways the mind/body dichotomy 
can be displaced. Animation’s material properties, its constantly shifting (in)completeness 
and modes of becoming, makes it the ideal site to explore and reanimate a feminist 
conception of the mind/body relationship.  
 
 In the previous chapter I examined the histories of women in animation and the ways 
animation has previously encountered feminist ideologies. In this chapter, I will set out the 
feminist frameworks through which to begin a re-examination of the body (specifically, 
female bodies) in and through animation. This will allow us to begin a refiguration of the 
body in animation in excess of representation alone; by focusing on the material properties 
of various animated forms, animation’s ambiguous ontological status, and understanding the 
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animation process as a specific mode of becoming, animation and animated bodies may 
reveal something about the nature of corporeality. In order to do this, this chapter will 
provide a review of the literature of feminist theorisation of the body, outlining the ways in 
which the body has been addressed from feminist perspectives. This chapter will draw 
extensively from the work of Elizabeth Grosz, whose writings on the body, sexual difference, 
life, politics, art and becomings are integral to any feminist consideration of the mind/body 
dualism. Grosz follows Irigaray, and takes a Deleuzian and Darwinian approach, towards 
articulating feminist understandings of matter, nature, difference and becomings. Following 
Gilles Deleuze, Grosz understands difference as:  
 
…the undoing of all stabilities, the inherent and immanent condition for the failure 
of identity, or the pressure to develop a new understanding of identity that is 
concerned not with coinciding the subject with its past so much as opening the subject 
up to its becoming-more and becoming-other. (2011 97)  
 
As a medium that relies on the tensions and relations between movement and stasis, the 
animate and the inanimate, and as a medium that carries with it the potential for 
destabilising figures and bodies through metamorphosis, animation may provide a means to 
open up the subject (and our understanding of the subject) to their possibility of ‘becoming-
more’ or ‘becoming-other’. This chapter will begin to suggest the ways in which animation 
may not only be a useful philosophical tool for feminist inquiry, but the ways in which 
feminist thought can begin to open up and provide new ways to (re)think and (re)animate the 
body. Below I will outline the ways feminism has engaged with the mind/body dualism, and 
the debates within feminism regarding how this binary should be addressed. Re-examining 
these debates is necessary in order to delineate the ways animation (and particularly feminist 
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animation) has engaged with these dichotomies, and to begin to think through the further 
ways animation can potentially work through and displace such binaries.  
 
     Ghosts/Shells  
 
One of the central questions of Oshii Mamoru’s 1995 animated feature film Ghost in the 
Shell (Kôkaku Kidôtai) is whether or not the film’s protagonist, Major Motoko Kusanagi, has 
a soul. Ghost in the Shell (and its various spin-offs and iterations) is set in a not-too-distant 
future in which cyborgs are common. Donna J. Haraway defines the cyborg as “cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature 
of fiction” (2016 5). Cyborgs in the fictional world of Ghost in the Shell are humans who have 
integrated non-organic components into their bodies to varying degrees; almost all humans 
have cyberbrains (cybernetic augmentation of the brain), allowing them to access ‘the Net’ 
and directly link with one another. However, this also leaves them susceptible to hackers who 
may infiltrate their ‘ghost’ (consciousness), implanting false memories and controlling their 
actions. Kusanagi works within the secretive government organisation Section 9, a special 
operations group that deals with the worst cybercrime, as well as in counterterrorism 
measures. Her body is entirely artificial, with advanced physical capabilities that far exceed 
that of a fleshed, organic body. Details of her past are murky, but it is implied that a childhood 
accident led to her brain being placed within a fully prosthetic body—her ‘shell’. The film’s 
opening title sequence follows the construction of Kusanagi’s adult body; we watch as her 
brain is scanned, the ‘outside’ of her shell stripped away to reveal an interior metal skeletal 
structure and synthetic musculature. The Major’s body is coated in a thick, viscous liquid 
which brings her form further definition and hides her synthetic interior; once dried, this 
white substance flakes away, revealing a ‘complete’ Kusanagi, her skin flawless save for the 
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ports on the back of her neck which allow her to connect with and ‘plug in’ to others. She is 
the epitome of physical perfection, designed as the female ideal.  
 
Ghost in the Shell explores complex questions around potential human-machine, spirit-
body interactions and interfaces, asking the question, ‘Where does the ‘human’ end or begin?’ 
Kusanagi herself is ambivalent regarding her status as cyborg, often pondering whether she 
remains human, and what the limits may be of her ghost within the shell. The film sees 
Kusanagi tracking down a master hacker known only as ‘The Puppetmaster’, an artificially 
engineered, disembodied ghost, and ends with Kusanagi and the Puppetmaster merging their 
ghosts into a new being. This entity, neither Kusanagi nor Puppetmaster, transcends the 
cyborg body to inhabit the net as pure, disembodied consciousness (yet able to download into 
and take control of any body or shell they wish). In her analysis of the ways Ghost in the Shell 
portrays human-space interactions, Sharalyn Orbaugh writes that the freedom of movement 
Kusanagi’s cyborg body offers her “presages the complete freedom that will be hers in her 
new noncorporeal state” (96). Although in many ways Ghost in the Shell explores the 
complexities contained within a human/non-human binary (or the relations between human-
technological other), the film is still predicated upon a centuries old dichotomy of mind and 
body, privileging the mind at the expense of the physical, material ‘shell’. Kusanagi finds 
enlightenment and contentment when she is able to discard her body, and ascend to the ‘vast 
and infinite’ Net. This is a dichotomy that continues to reassert itself in contemporary 
thought and culture. 
 
As Elizabeth Grosz writes in the introduction to her text Volatile Bodies (1994), since its 
inception as a discipline, “philosophy has established itself on the foundations of a profound 
somatophobia” (5). This Cartesian thinking, established by René Descartes who distinguished 
      
      
85 
 
“a thinking substance (res cogitans, mind) from an extended substance (res extensa, body),” 
divided body from mind, considering this separation necessary for the foundation of 
knowledge, placing the mind in “a position of hierarchical superiority over and above nature, 
including the nature of the body” (6, emphasis in original). Cartesianism, and the 
somatophobia that accompanies it, has had profound implications for the understanding of 
bodies even into the contemporary era of Western thought. The mind/body dichotomy carries 
with it a series of parallel associations, including culture/nature, rational/irrational and 
male/female. Throughout these binary pairings, the primary term is elevated while the 
secondary term becomes subjugated in a relationship that is not only dichotomous, but 
hierarchical; for example, ‘male’ becomes the privileged term, placed in a position of 
superiority over ‘female’, thus allowing male to become aligned with terms such as mind and 
culture. As Londa Schiebinger (2000) explains, the mind/body dualism and its parallel 
associations “made males the guardians of culture and the things of the mind, while it 
associated females with the frailties and contingencies of the mortal body” (1). Schiebinger 
is one of many of feminist scholars who have pointed out the profound effect this dualism 
has had on the place of women, the feminine, and nature in Western culture (Braidotti 1991; 
Kirby 1991; Colebrook 2000; Alaimo and Hekman 2008). The parallel associations of mind 
and body, male and female, culture and nature (amongst others), often “function 
interchangeably”, which has allowed men and the masculine to be associated with mind, 
culture, and reason, leaving woman and the feminine associated with body and nature, that 
which is unruly, irrational, illogical (Grosz 1994 3). Susan Bordo (1993) explains, speaking of 
the relation of this dualism to gender, that the “cost of such projections to women is obvious. 
For if, whatever the specific historical content of the duality, the body is the negative term, 
and if woman is the body, then women are that negativity, whatever it may be” (5, emphasis 
in original). It has become the task of feminist scholars such as Grosz (and Schiebinger, and 
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Braidotti) to show how the dominant category is dependent on the subordinate one, as well 
as to reveal the ways such dualistic assumptions continue to undermine and pervade 
contemporary thought and cultural practice (including artistic practices such as filmmaking 
and animation). In demonstrating this, these scholars also demonstrate how the subordinate 
category may be generative and productive on its own terms. However, as Grosz writes, even 
feminist theory has often “uncritically adopted many philosophical assumptions regarding 
the role of the body in social, political, cultural, psychical, and sexual life” (1994 3). In this 
sense, a feminist corporeal perspective must directly address these blind spots in order to 
continue to counteract the mind/body opposition, a dualism that continues to subtly reassert 
itself despite the continuing challenges made to its dominance.  
 
Western thought after Descartes would come to recognise the problems with this 
classical, dualistic representation of subject and ‘other’, as well as with conception of the 
masculine subject as a rational being above and separate from nature. Rosi Braidotti explores 
the critique of the rational subject in Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in 
Contemporary Philosophy (1991); here she characterises anti-Cartesianism (led by 
philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze) as a challenge to the traditional 
constructions of subjectivity, of which the “Cartesian body-and-soul dichotomy is the 
paradigm” (1). Braidotti examines the ways French post-structuralist thinkers such as 
Foucault and Deleuze reconsider the place of woman and the feminine in the wake of the 
crisis of the rational subject. The rise of anti-Cartesianism, she writes, contributed to this 
crisis where through the questioning of traditional understandings of subjectivity, theorists 
were forced to turn to “the question of the feminine and of women in philosophy”— that 
which had thus far been considered the so-called ‘void’ of philosophical modernity (1). 
Contrary to those who assert that such a crisis “tends to endanger the ‘human person’”, 
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Braidotti approaches this crisis from a feminist, post-structuralist perspective, 
understanding it as both “critique and act of creation of new forms of thought” which “calls 
into question the very foundations and premises of what we recognize as ‘thinking’” (2-3). 
For Braidotti, the crisis of the rational subject and the problematic of the void “marks the 
opening of the borders” of Western thought and an opportunity to take into account and 
reassess the ‘problem’ of women and the feminine in philosophical discourse (6). Braidotti 
argues that women have reacted in “profoundly different theoretical ways” when 
encountering this same crisis; “The age of the ‘crisis’ and/or the ‘death’ of rationality is also, 
historically and discursively, the age which has witnessed the social and theoretical 
emergence of feminist theory and practice” (7). Displacing the dominance of the philosophic 
logos and the rational subject opens up the subject to new understandings that take into 
account a more complex interaction with nature and the feminine. Feminists have opened up 
Western thought and discourse to questions of the corporeal, the feminine, and of nature, 
questions which had until that point remained largely unaddressed.  
 
In The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine (1985), when asked why 
she began Speculum of the Other Woman (1985) with a critique of Freud, Irigaray responds, 
“All Freud’s statements describing feminine sexuality overlook the fact that the female sex 
might possibly have its own ‘specificity’” (69). As noted above, Irigaray was one of the first 
figures in feminist theory to consider the place (or the displacement) of women and the 
feminine in Western discourse. Her critiques of Freud and her engagement with 
psychoanalytic theory, as well as her writings on woman, the feminine, and sexual difference, 
have been highly influential and continue to impact the various inquiries into female 
corporeality that have come after her. For Irigaray, the reason the “philosophic logos” has for 
so long dominated Western discourse is due to “its power to reduce all others to the economy 
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of the Same” (1985 74, emphasis in original). By reducing the ‘other’ to this ‘economy of the 
Same’, difference is disavowed and sameness is tolerated only insofar as it is conceived of as 
oppositional, complementary, or as deficiency as it relates to the masculine. Whilst Irigaray 
refers primarily to the question of sexual difference, reducing all others to the economy of 
the Same is also a disavowal of any kind of racial difference. Neither does it acknowledge 
disabled bodies, as all others are positioned as subjugated to the white, heterosexual, able-
bodied, masculine subject. Critiques of Irigaray often find that she does not adequately 
address questions of race and disability, however by interrogating the understanding of the 
masculine subject as a universal norm, Irigaray opens up the possibility for the exploration 
of these differences and specificities. When the myth of a neutral, universal subjectivity is 
revealed, the binary of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is displaced and the relation between the terms 
opens to all manner of multiple and diverse subjectivities. Freud himself, Irigaray reminds us, 
was working from within a system of patriarchal power structures and ideologies which 
prevented him conceptualising the subject outside of a masculine order. His reliance on 
anatomical references to justify his ideas around sexuality are linked to the issue of 
reproduction—women are reduced to reproductive functions as part of his “tendency to fall 
back upon anatomy as an irrefutable criterion of truth” (1985 70-71).  
 
Braidotti also warns us that despite critiques exposing and rejecting the “complicity 
between the masculine subject and the universal,” feminists should be wary when thinking 
through discourses of the feminine and otherness. She notes that a renewed emphasis on the 
feminine “is no guarantee that the concerns and the revendications of women are actually 
being taken into account” (1991 10). There are at least two implications of such a warning—
the first, echoed by Grosz (1994), is that the alignment of the feminine with a ‘radical 
otherness’ does not necessarily address the underlying assumptions regarding the 
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association of women with the body and with nature; feminist discourse must thoroughly 
interrogate this alignment in order to be certain that their concerns are being thoroughly 
evaluated. Second, to align the feminine with the corporeal without thoroughly investigating 
and reappraising the nature of the corporeal, feminists risk falling into an essentialist trap, 
whereby the biological body becomes the key condition for defining the female subject. 
Reducing woman to the matter of biology not only discounts the historicity of the body,  
phenomenological perspectives, and cultural and social inscriptions of the body, it assumes 
that the body and nature are immutable and fixed. Without a thorough interrogation of the 
nature of corporeality, and new understandings of nature as mutable, flexible, and active (as 
culturally inscribed), it is not desirable to align women with that term which has been 
associated with negativity or lack.  
 
Avoiding Essentialism  
 
The correlation of Woman and the feminine to the body and nature is somewhat 
paradoxical—the body is at once seen as passive and malleable, and yet also unruly, that 
which needs to be tamed or controlled. What is common in these arrangements however, is 
that the association of women with the body consigns them as lesser, excluded from culture, 
and dissociated from mind. In the past feminist theorists have sought to distance women 
from these so-called corporeal trappings, in doing so avoiding biologically determinist, 
essentialist rhetoric that has been traditionally used to relegate woman as ‘other’, only 
conceived of as counterpoint to man. As Irigaray tells us, “The ‘feminine’ is always described 
in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds monopoly on 
value” (1985 69). Thus, the turn from the corporeal and towards social constructionist models 
of the subject is not surprising, as for so long the bodies of women have been used to 
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systematically devalue the female subject, at once presumed and represented as naturally 
weaker, more frail, or more unruly than the bodies of men. Grosz writes that in the 
oppositional pairing of man and woman, not only is femininity excluded from the realm of 
the mind, each sex is attributed their own form of corporeality. However, the corporeality 
granted to women is not autonomous or active, but is “judged in terms of a “natural 
inequality,” as if there were a standard or measure for the value of bodies independent of sex” 
(1994 14). This too assumes that the anatomical, fleshed body is also immutable and fixed. 
As Grosz explains, this is why feminist scholars have resisted associating women and 
femininity with the corporeal, as in the past the mind/body dichotomy has left the masculine 
subject free to inhabit a perceived conceptual order (mind) “while at the same time enabling 
them to satisfy their (sometimes disavowed) need for corporeal contact through their access 
to women’s bodies and services” (14). When women are equated with the body in the dualistic 
oppositions outlined above, they are implicitly (and explicitly) denied access to, or the ability 
to obtain, knowledge and power; this association with the body affords no measure of control, 
and the corporeal specificity granted to them is at once judged as inferior to the corporeal 
specificity of men.  
 
Patriarchy seeks to contain and control the bodies of women, which has led to women 
seeking to define themselves outside the order of the corporeal. However, feminist theory’s 
reluctance to address corporeality in an attempt to avoid essentialist rhetoric has its own 
consequences. Vicki Kirby (1991) for example, asks how women, “man’s attenuated inversion 
… a mere specular reflection through which his identity is grounded” can possibly be 
understood from an embodied position if feminist theorists refuse to engage with the 
question of what a body is and what it can do (5). She notes that while feminist discourse is 
“usually quick to distance itself from the dubious investments” of terms such as “biologism, 
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naturalism, and universalism,” she questions the automatic reaction that deems any inquiry 
into the ‘nature’ of women as essentialist (6). If women have been excluded and marginalised 
due to a perceived, essentialist ‘ground’ of femaleness or femininity, then rethinking the 
nature of that ground becomes a necessity: “Emerging discussions of essentialism are 
attempting to confront feminism’s anxieties in order to exorcise the somatophobia that 
underpins the legacy of phallocentrism’s mind/body split” (Kirby 10). In seeking to abstract 
themselves from the corporeal, certain feminist scholars have left the body unacknowledged, 
allowing the mind/body opposition to remain uninterrogated. 
 
Victoria Pitts-Taylor argues in the introduction to Mattering: Feminism, Science, and 
Materialism (2016) that feminism’s and new materialism’s seemingly urgent interest in 
matter and mattering arises from debates within feminist scholarship “where the sustained 
theorization of the body has come up against the limits of representational paradigms” (1). 
Here, Pitts-Taylor argues that as long as representational paradigms continue to exclude 
notions of matter and materiality as active, dynamic and unfolding, instead rendering 
corporeality and nature as passive and inert, then these paradigms continue to preserve the 
dualisms of mind/body, culture/nature, that feminist scholars have actively sought to undo 
(2). I find the same concerns regarding the issue of animation and representation—while 
animation is, of course, representational, it is necessary to think the active, dynamic and 
unfolding materiality of animation in excess of issues of representation. How may the 
materiality of animation extend the limits of these representational paradigms? The need for 
this urgent return to matter and materiality is outlined by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman 
in the introduction to their anthology, Material Feminisms (2008). There they write that the 
resistance to materiality and the turn towards social constructionist models of the subject, 
whilst fruitful in generating analyses of the relations between power, knowledge, language, 
      
      
92 
 
and subjectivity, left materiality and corporeality under theorised (1). They claim that this 
“retreat from materiality” left the body and nature defined as little more than the “products 
of discourse,” with the immense amount of scholarship on the body too often “confined to 
analysis of discourses about the body” (3). Rather than understanding the body and nature as 
discursive effects, Alaimo and Hekman argue that a reappraisal of their agency is necessary:  
 
Nature can no longer be imagined as a pliable resource of industrial production or 
social construction. Nature is agentic—it acts, and those actions have consequences 
for both the human and the nonhuman world. We need ways of understanding the 
agency, significance, and ongoing transformative power of the world—ways that 
count for myriad “intra-actions” (in Karen Barad’s terms) between phenomena that 
are material, discursive, human, more-than-human, corporeal, and technological.  
(2008 4-5).  
 
This reconceptualisation of nature has led to renewed interest in material feminisms and the 
body. I will undertake a more detailed examination of the ways a reconceptualisation of 
women and the body also necessities a reconceptualisation of nature in chapter four.  
 
Claire Colebrook (2000) calls for the relations between the body and its representation to 
be rethought in “From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The Feminist 
Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz, and Gatens”, in which she accounts for the different ways 
feminist thought has approached the theorising the body. She writes that while first wave 
feminism fought for political and social equality, and second wave feminism asserted 
difference and specificity, it was during feminism’s third wave that the body emerged “as a 
means of deconstructing this sameness/difference opposition,” an opposition which has 
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continued to reassert itself throughout the history of feminism (76). Colebrook provides a 
detailed analysis of the “two ways (at least)” in which the body has been approached within 
feminist discourse (76). She writes that in the first approach, which she describes as linguistic 
critique, the body is “always already discursive … an intensely political site, not a pre-
representational ground, but an effect of representation that passes itself off as grounding” 
(77). The second approach understands that while “no simple appeal can be made to the body 
as some ultimate foundation … it possesses a force and being that marks the very character 
of representation” (77). For Colebrook, these positions are best exemplified through 
comparing and contrasting the writings of feminist and queer scholar Judith Butler, and 
Australian feminist theorists Grosz, Moira Gatens, and Genevieve Lloyd. She pays close 
attention to Butler’s text, Bodies That Matter (1993), in which Butler addresses the question 
of the materiality of the body. Colebrook’s account of the differences between Butler’s 
approach and the ways Grosz, Gatens and Lloyd conceive of the body not only articulates the 
two key ways the body has been addressed within feminist thought, but also demonstrates 
why this thesis approaches the body in animation form corporeal and material feminist 
perspectives.  
 
Butler has previously addressed the concept of gender as performance in her 1990 text 
Gender Trouble, with Bodies That Matter partially written as a follow-up to questions raised 
there regarding the materiality of bodies. Namely, Butler explores the question, “What are 
the constraints by which bodies are materialised as ‘sexed’” (xi). For Butler, the body is 
constituted as discursive, “always posited or signified as prior. This signification produces as 
an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims 
to discover as that which precedes its own action” (Butler 6, emphasis in original). Colebrook 
elaborates the limitations of this position:   
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Butler’s distinction between sex and gender (or the materiality of the body and its 
representation), even when adopted critically, still works within a dichotomous logic 
of priority and origins. According to Butler, the ground of “sex” is posited after the 
attribution of gender; sex is effected subsequent to the performance of certain 
attributes. Butler sees the pre-discursive ground of “sex” as an effect of the discursive 
representation of gender. (Colebrook 82, emphasis in original).  
 
Whilst Butler does not seek to disavow the materiality of bodies or to reduce them to merely 
a linguistic effect, she does question the conditions of materiality as “absolute exterior”: “To 
have the concept of matter is to lose the exteriority that the concept is supposed to secure. 
Can language simply refer to materiality, or is language also the very condition under which 
materiality may be said to appear?” (1993 6). For Butler, feminists should not be interested 
in “taking materiality as irreducible” but rather in “conducting a critical genealogy” of the 
constitution of materiality and its relation to the feminine (8). She argues that in 
acknowledging the matter of the body and its relation to the mind/body dualism, feminists 
risk unintentionally reproducing and upholding those dichotomies that they seek to 
overturn; although, Butler herself acknowledges, rethinking the form/matter binary 
necessarily entails for many feminist scholars a rethinking or “unsettling” of matter, which 
may indeed initiate “new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter” (1993 6). However, as 
Colebrook asserts, it is in fact Butler who, as quoted above, continues to works within a 
“dichotomous logic of priority and origins” (82). Butler’s distinction between sex and gender 
(materiality and its representation) leaves ‘sex’ as an effect of gender. 
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Within feminist and gender studies, the sex/gender distinction has often been 
conceptualised as the difference between materiality and its representation, and also as its 
lived experience. Thus, Colebrook prefers what she describes as the ‘Contemporary 
Australian Feminism’ of Gatens, Grosz, and Lloyd, finding that their thinking and writing has 
challenged, in different ways, the distinction between ‘what is’ and its representation. For 
example, she finds that Gatens’s critique of the sex/gender distinction exposes the “critically 
untenable” idea of ‘sex’ as some kind of “pre-linguistic real”, whilst at the same time noting 
the “no less problematic” notion of gender as the representational aspect of a “putative brute 
givenness of sex” (83).  In her foundational essay “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction” 
(1983), Gatens critiques this distinction for assuming the body as a “neutral, passive entity, a 
blank state, on which is inscribed various social “lessons” … a passive mediator of these 
inscriptions” (144). In conversation with Mary Walsh twenty years after the publication of 
her critique, Gatens states that the meaning of the sex/gender distinction as it is used today 
has shifted, with the term ‘gender’ operating “almost as a synonym for women, as if men 
don’t have a gender” (in Walsh 214). For Gatens, the focus on the concept of gender risks the 
erasure of the question of sexual difference, leaving “the body and corporeality out of the 
picture,” relying once again on “an unconvincing mind-body distinction” (in Walsh 213). 
Both Gatens and Colebrook understand the sex/gender distinction as reinforcing and 
extending the dualism that has long been upheld within Western thought.  
 
It is in the writings of Grosz and Lloyd that Colebrook finds the necessary rethinking of 
the boundary between the real and its representation (‘sex’ and ‘gender’, ‘body’ and ‘mind’, 
‘origin’ and ‘effect’). Colebrook argues that Grosz’s writing on corporeality does not “merely 
locate the corporeal as a materiality or simple other of the supposed ideality of thought” but 
rather “the body is precisely that peculiar given which is idealized, imagined, or em-bodied 
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in order for any given as such to emerge” (85). Colebrook identifies a common, speculative 
thread amongst all three corporeal feminists: “what are the specific ways in which the real 
becomes meaningful?” (89). Through the Spinozism of Gatens and Lloyd, which “affirms 
becoming as an actualization and enhancement or enrichment of being,” and Grosz’s use of 
Henri Bergson and Deleuze to “differentiate between a future that is playing out of the past’s 
possibilities … and a future that creates,” Colebrook finds the possibility of a feminist 
becoming of philosophy (90). This becoming destabilises the ground of the real, demanding 
a refiguration of corporeality and, by extension, of nature. Conceptualising feminism as a 
specific mode of becoming opens up the possibility for other kinds of becomings (Colebrook 
91). To return to the question of this thesis, can rethinking the body in animation from such 
feminist perspectives, such as those outlined by Grosz, help us to ‘animate’ these becomings? 
How may animation visualise and enact becoming as a destabilisation of the real, allowing us 
to rethink the boundary between real and representation? How might the body in animation 
allow us to rethink the nature of corporeality, and displace the mind/body dualism? 
 
  I have outlined above the debates regarding how feminism should address the mind/body 
dualism. Within feminism (and also particularly within corporeal feminism) there are 
continuing debates around how best to extract the body from the mind/body binary without 
relying on essentialist rhetoric, and indeed, whether it is possible to conceive of an embodied, 
female subjectivity that does not fall back on a dichotomous logic of inside and outside, mind 
and body, conceiving of the body as negative or lack. It is now pertinent to turn to a more 
detailed examination of the corporeal feminism of Elizabeth Grosz. Grosz’s approach to the 
body as threshold, as neither natural entity nor purely socially constructed effect of 
representation, is the most useful way of thinking through what animation can do with—how 
it can work through, with, and alongside—the body. Thinking through the feminism of Grosz, 
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and the ways in which she addresses the “imperceptible movements” that are the multiple 
becomings that “make up natural, cultural and political life” is an approach which allows us 
to think through the animation of the body in excess of representation alone (2011 1). For 
Grosz, becomings and the movements that make up these becomings are more interesting 
than that which becomes.  
 
Reclaiming the Body  
 
Grosz is one of the most well-known and prolific anglophone feminist scholars of the 
body, life, and ontologies of difference; her book Volatile Bodies (1994) is an essential text 
for feminist corporeal theory, and examines the various ways in which the body in Western 
discourse has been treated. She explores psychoanalytical and phenomenological 
perspectives on the body, drawing from and critiquing various theorists across these 
disciplines including Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Grosz pays particularly close attention to the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, as well as Luce Irigaray, focusing on the potential usefulness of the former for a 
feminist reconfiguration of the body, and the latter for thinking through the ontological 
status of the ‘sexed’ body. The purpose of Volatile Bodies is, broadly, to begin to think 
through a feminist framework for conceptualising the body and its materiality, reclaiming it 
from the dualistic hierarchy that has left the body, and women, subject to a patriarchal order. 
Philosophy, Grosz points out, “has always considered itself a discipline concerned primarily 
or exclusively with ideas, concepts, reason and judgement,” which has left the corporeality 
of bodies marginalised and problematised (4). Often the body is treated in a contradictory 
manner, at once acknowledged and dismissed. As discussed above, this conceptualisation of 
the body has had a series of flow-on effects even into the contemporary era:  
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Misogynist thought has commonly found a convenient self-justification for women’s 
secondary social positions by containing them within bodies that are represented, 
even constructed, as frail, imperfect, unruly, and unreliable, subject to various 
intrusions which are not under conscious control. Female sexuality and women’s 
powers of reproduction are the defining (cultural) characteristics of women, and, at 
the same time, these very functions render women vulnerable, in need of protection 
or special treatment, as variously prescribed by the patriarchy. (1994 13-14) 
 
For Grosz, only part of the ‘problem’ of the body lies in the failure to thoroughly 
acknowledge and consider the body, its sexual specificity, and the ways in which sexual 
difference contributes to the production of truth and knowledge. The other contributing 
factor to this problem lies in that feminist scholars and feminist theory has in the past 
“uncritically adopted many philosophical assumptions regarding the role of the body” 
without attempting to rethink the nature of bodies (3). Too often the body is understood or 
written of through a lens of neutrality, with no thought given either to sexual difference or 
the multiplicity of bodies. In order for feminist theory to effectively reconcile the binary split 
between body and mind, feminists must first critically interrogate these assumptions.  
 
Grosz argues that we cannot explain away the gulf between mind and body through 
reductionism (by reducing body to mind or vice versa) because this reductionism denies any 
interaction between mind and body. It asserts “that either one or the other of the binary terms 
is “really” its opposite and can be explained by or translated into the terms of its other” (7). 
This has implications for the ways in which we reconsider the cinema-animation 
interrelation, which has been discussed in chapter one of this thesis—we cannot explain away 
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the difference between the two by saying cinema is really animation and vice versa. A 
Spinozist account of the body offers an alternative perspective, in which body and mind 
(extension and thought) are not separate, self-contained substances but rather two attributes 
of a singular substance that are inseparable from one another. As Grosz explains, Baruch 
Spinoza’s “most fundamental assumption is the notion of an absolute and infinite substance, 
singular in both kind and number”; ‘finite things’ are not substances of their own accord but 
rather modes, attributes, or modifications of this singular substance (10). In this 
understanding, body and mind are inseparable from each other, complementary. The mind 
does not operate independently of the body and vice versa. Despite this liberation of the body 
from dualism, Grosz details two key limitations she finds with Spinoza’s monism. First, “he 
is committed to a psychophysical parallelism which cannot explain the causal or other 
interactions of mind and body … Insofar as they may be understood as necessarily 
interlocked, there can be no question of their interaction” (13). And second, this Spinozist 
account of the body assumes the body (and the subject) as ‘whole’ and ‘complete’ (hence, 
closed), or as “a completed and integrated system (albeit one that grows and transforms 
itself)” (13). Organic bodies, Grosz reminds us, are made up of a series of “composite minor 
totalities brought together to form higher-level integrations and unifications through various 
processes of stratification”—a feminist reconfiguration of the body must take into account 
this “cumulative complexity” the “irreducible neurophysiological and psychological 
dimensions,” as well as the “fragmentations, fracturing, dislocations that orient bodies and 
body parts toward other bodies and body parts” (13).  
 
Understandably, this is no easy task, and as such, Grosz first sets out to address what had, 
until that time, been left mostly unspoken—that is, the way anti-Cartesian accounts of the 
body fail to take into consideration the sexual specificity (and multiplicity) of bodies, as well 
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as the ways in which the mind/body opposition, aligned with the male/female and 
culture/nature oppositions (amongst others), implicitly justifies misogynistic and 
phallocentric thought in political and cultural discourse and rhetoric. Grosz confronts these 
anxieties, and in doing so begins to set out a feminist framework for refiguring the body 
outside these dualistic entanglements. In order for feminists to “resuscitate a concept of the 
body for their own purposes, it must be extricated from the biological and pseudo-naturalist 
appropriations from which it has historically suffered” (20). Grosz outlines her starting points 
to begin to think what a feminist philosophy of the body might look like. She argues that first, 
such a conceptualisation must avoid dichotomous thinking, resisting reductionism and 
dualism whilst remaining suspicious of monism, and seek an account of materiality which 
sees “animate materiality and the materiality of language in interaction” (22). Corporeality 
must not be associated with a singular sex or race, and must take into account the plurality 
and multiplicity of bodies, acknowledging there is no singular model or neutral body type 
that can stand in for all bodies. Essentialism must also be avoided, although “one is always 
implicated in essentialism even as one flees it” (23). Whilst the body is of nature, it also 
cannot be separated from social, political, cultural and geographic inscriptions. Rather, it is 
the body’s “openness of organic processes to cultural intervention, transformation, or even 
production” that must be explored (23). Accounts of the body must articulate the interaction 
between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the body, the psychical and the physical, “while avoiding 
a reductionism of mind to brain” (23). Grosz’s final criterion for a feminist approach to the 
body is that rather than “adhering” to and upholding binary pairings, these pairings must 
become problematised by thinking the body as “the threshold or borderline concept”:  
      
The body is neither—while also being both—the private or the public, self or other, 
natural or cultural, psychical or social, instinctive or learned, genetically or 
      
      
101 
 
environmentally determined. In the face of social constructionism, the body’s 
tangibility, its matter, its (quasi) nature may be invoked; but in opposition to 
essentialism, biologism, and naturalism, it is the body as cultural product that must 
be stressed. (23-24).  
 
The body as threshold, as in-between, will become important to this thesis’ consideration 
of the body in animation. As she examines the ways in which the body has been conceived 
from various perspectives—from the inside out and the outside in—Grosz invokes the 
metaphor of the Möbius strip, a twisted surface which is at once inside and outside, in order 
to visualise the ways in which the psychical figurations of the body’s interior produce and 
effect the body’s exterior; the reverse of this is that the exterior (social inscription) also 
produces the body’s interior. Psychoanalytic and phenomenological perspectives, which are 
concerned with the psychical inscription of bodies, as well as the pleasure, sensation and 
experiences of bodies, “marks the “inside” of the Möbius surface; what marks its “outside” 
surface is more law, right, requirement, social imperative, custom, and corporeal habits” 
(1994 117). The exterior surface of the Möbius strip marks the theories whereby the body is 
understood as that which is actively produced, by various powers of inscription, as social 
object and receptive surface, “a flat plane whose incision or inscription produces the (illusion 
or effects of) depth and interiority” (116). Here the body is understood as produced within 
specific historical and social contexts. Regarding the body from the inside out, the interior 
surface of the strip, Grosz examines theorists including Freud, Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty; 
regarding the inversion, the outside in, Grosz examines theorists including Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Foucault. The latter in particular has been thoroughly and actively taken up 
and interrogated by feminist scholarship regarding the body. 
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Michael Peters (2009) writes that feminist scholars have found Foucault particularly 
valuable for arguing the female body as “constituted through its social, medical, symbolic and 
cultural inscriptions”—rather than being “regarded as a cultural given” (and indeed, a natural 
given) the body is assigned meaning through various cultural representations and 
interventions which are never stable or static (17). However, as Grosz points out, if sex and 
sexuality are, as Foucault posits, “the results of the inscription of particular kinds of power, 
on what are these inscriptions articulated?” (155). Viewing the body as a “blank, passive 
page” is problematic, as this neutrality has in the past implicitly stood in for the masculine, 
or male bodies and male pleasures (156). Although, as Grosz also notes, Foucault is 
transparent about women’s exclusion from such models of the subject (“It was an ethics for 
men: an ethics thought, written and taught by men and addressed to men—to free men, 
obviously” (Foucault in Grosz 158)), Foucault himself cuts off the possibility for women to 
discuss techniques of the self, women’s prison, or women’s sexuality “by implying that there 
was not a corresponding ethics of women’s self-production during the classical age” (158). 
Grosz reminds us that feminists must refigure these metaphors of social inscription of 
corporeal surfaces if they are to remain of strategic value.  
 
At the point of inversion along the Möbius strip, which she describes as the “point of 
twisting or self-transformation in which the inside flips over to become the outside, or the 
outside turns over on itself to become the inside”, Grosz locates Deleuze and Guattari (160). 
It is here that Grosz turns towards the question of whether or not it is possible to overcome 
the mind/body dualism by using the terms and concepts associated with the body and the 
corporeal—“the (disavowed) grounds and terms on which the opposition is erected and made 
possible” (160). What is there to be gained or lost in such a transposition or inversion? Grosz 
turns to an examination of feminism and rhizomatics, which she acknowledges is contentious 
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within feminist theory (although, she points out, so are all the male theorists she has thus far 
discussed); nevertheless, she finds a feminist revision of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of corporeality highly useful for thinking beyond binary systems (161).  
 
Grosz lists and unpacks the reservations of several feminist scholars—including Irigaray 
and Braidotti—toward the Deleuzian project of rhizomatics, such as the notions of ‘becoming 
woman’, the “romantic elevation of psychoses, schizophrenia, becoming” within Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, and the masculinist, machinic metaphors of functioning 
they evoke which “utilize tropes and terms made possible only through women’s expulsion 
and denigration” (163). However, as Grosz argues (and indeed, what much of Volatiles Bodies 
acknowledges), no major philosophical text can completely escape accusations of 
phallocentrism, “insofar as the very categories, concepts, and methodologies for both 
phallocentrism and its critique are derived from our received history of texts and knowledges” 
(164). Grosz is not interested in ignoring criticisms levelled against Deleuze and Guattari, but 
is interested in the ways they challenge common assumptions regarding corporeality, the 
mind/body binary, identity, matter, and relations between subject and object: “their work 
may help to clear the ground of metaphysical oppositions and concepts so that women may 
be able to derive their own knowledges, accounts of themselves and the world” (164).  
 
Grosz finds that a Deleuzian framework has much to offer for feminist theorisations of 
the body and of materiality, and outlines some of the key differences a shift from a 
psychoanalytic and semiotic perspective towards a Deleuzian perspective may offer for a 
feminist theorising of the body. First, the resistance to hierarchical relations between the 
social and the psychical does not privilege one at the expense of the other. Subjectivity (and 
female subjectivity and sexual specificity) are conceived of as a series of forces, intensities, 
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flows, “requiring codifications or territorializations and in turn exerting their own 
deterritorializing and decodifying force” (180). Second, a Deleuzian framework refuses a 
dualistic view of the world and of the subject, complicating the binary relationship between 
the real and its representation: “This duplication is required to mediate between usually 
incompatible terms … but if their relation is construed as a direct and unmediated one, this 
double world is unnecessary” (181). Third, a Deleuzian framework refuses binarism by 
reframing the ‘either/or’ figuration as ‘both/and’. Fourth, this framework ‘de-massifies’ those 
entities which dualism pre-supposes as dichotomously opposed, instead theorizing them as 
a series of destabilising processes and as “a myriad of intensities and flows” (181). Fifth, 
things are read in terms of their effects, capabilities and what they do, rather than in terms 
of a singular explanatory paradigm. And finally, Grosz finds that as psychoanalytic theory is 
particularly unsatisfactory (as well as other attempts to account for femininity), a Deleuzian 
framework offers a necessary and welcome alternative attempt to provide a model of 
femininity, female subjectivity and corporeality that is understood as positivity, rather than 
as lack (182). There are of course drawbacks—Grosz notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
frameworks “inevitably fall prey to their own criticisms … insofar as they deterritorialize 
women’s bodies and subjectivities only to reterritorialize them as part of a more universalist 
movement of becoming”—but she also finds that to outright dismiss their value to feminism 
would be premature (182). I will further discuss how Deleuzian frameworks have continued 
to shape the work of Grosz in the next chapter.  
 
On the question of sexual difference, Grosz moves from male theorists who have written 
about and discussed the body in terms of a universal subject, in which the masculine stands 
in for all, to feminist theorists who question dualism whilst considering the irreducible 
differences between bodies. These male theorists, overall, ignore the specificities and the 
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multiplicities of different bodies, failing to acknowledge that there is no singular model of 
the body that can be applied to any (or every) subject. I have already addressed Irigaray in the 
previous chapter when I began to ask how feminist animation may be possible within an order 
that is prescribed by the masculine; here Grosz asks how a feminist framework of the body  is 
possible within overwhelming masculinist discourse. Grosz does not claim that sexual 
difference is “purely a matter of inscription”, and nor does she find that the body is a fixed, 
inert, purely biological entity:  
 
Differences between bodies, not only at the level of experience and subjectivity but 
also at the level of practical and physical capacities, enjoy considerable social and 
historical variation. Processes and capacities that seem impossible for a body to 
undertake at some times and in some cultures are readily possible in others. What are 
regarded as purely fixed and unchangeable elements of facticity, biologically given 
factors, are amenable to wider historical vicissitudes and transformations. (190).  
 
Grosz specifically pays attention to the work of Julia Kristeva (Powers of Horror, 1982) 
and her writings on body fluids, Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1980), and the ways 
Kristeva uses Douglas’s work; woven throughout these examinations is the voice and writings 
of Luce Irigaray. Overall, for Grosz the questions of sexual difference is not a strictly 
ontological one; it is ontological insofar as it makes possible what things, entities or beings 
exist, but beyond that sexual difference is “the simultaneous recognition and effacement of 
the spacings, the intervals, the irreducible if unspecifiable positioning” that binds things, 
entities, bodies together without conceiving of them as ‘whole’ or complete (209).  
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Returning to the model of the Möbius strip, Grosz notes that it is only one possible model 
for representing the interactions between the interiority and surfaces of the body; there is a 
certain “infinite pliability” of the body, she notes, which means that other models of the body 
may prove just as (if not more) useful, and that the Möbius strip tends to preclude the 
representation of modes of becoming (210). Grosz alludes to becomings in her examination 
of Deleuze and Guattari, and her fascination with these movements, which she describes in 
Volatile Bodies as “always specific movements, specific forms of motion and rest, speed and 
slowness, points and flows of intensity”, continue throughout her body of work (173). Her 
theorisation around becomings features prominently in her 2011 text, Becoming Undone. 
This book is Grosz’s attempt to think traditionally discursive concepts such as freedom, 
autonomy, and subjectivity through materiality, problematising their use in feminist theory 
by returning to the ontological aspect of these terms. Becoming Undone can be broadly 
understood as Grosz’s attempt to rethink the nature of nature, of materiality, not as a stable 
ground on which culture rests, but itself mutable, changeable, fluctuating, and dynamic. In 
the next chapter, I will detail how Grosz explores the possibilities of these modes of becoming 
as her work moves into the theorising of ontologies of life, politics, and art. Grosz’s writings 
on the body and becoming prove useful for thinking through the connections between 
animation, the body, and becoming.  
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Chapter Four – Animated Becomings 
 
Animation is the medium that allows for a dramatization of a skirmish with nature. This skirmish is not a 
fascistic one of subjugation. It is rather a wrestling with what is natural about nature, and what is historical, 
which is to say, changeable, about it. 
—Esther Leslie, Animation and History  
 
In the 1980 episode of the science documentary series Cosmos, ‘One Voice in the Cosmic 
Fugue’, astrophysicist and science educator Carl Sagan explores the “simple chemical 
circumstance” that led to the first molecules coming together to form the first cells. As Sagan 
narrates, we watch as simple images of single-cell organisms evolve to become multi-cellular, 
and then to ever more complex organisms, through computer-graphic morphing. The 
animated lines, set against a black background, develop and evolve through a sustained 
metamorphosis. As the life-forms evolve, Sagan explains how certain physical adaptations, 
resulting from natural selection, have led to various branching pathways of evolution, 
although he always remains focused on the “unbroken thread” that has led to human 
evolution (for example, he states that one evolutionary branch resulted in the development 
of “our cousin” the starfish, before noting that “we don’t come from starfish”). This first 
sequence lasts approximately five minutes, and as evolution ‘concludes’ with the figure of 
the modern-day human (a woman), Sagan invites us to witness the metamorphosis again, this 
time compressed into forty seconds. At the conclusion of this second sequence (in which the 
branching pathways are disregarded), Sagan states: “Those are some of the things that 
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molecules do given four billion years of evolution … Every plant and animal alive today has a 
history as ancient and illustrious as ours. Humans stand on one branch, but now we effect the 
future of every branch of this four billion year old tree.” As he speaks, the image of a tree, 
with various diverging branches, is superimposed over the image of the woman, with one 
branch highlighted in blue symbolising the evolutionary branch upon which humans stand. 
In 2014, the sequel to Sagan’s series, Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey (hosted by Neil deGrasse 
Tyson), would use the same ani-morphing sequence and image of the tree in 
acknowledgement of and tribute to its predecessor.   
 
The animation in Cosmos serves a pedagogical purpose; Raz Greenberg argues that the 
use of animation in Cosmos, and in this segment in particular, which is both conceptually 
and aesthetically appealing, is a key example of Sagan’s educational approach, serving as “an 
instrument in the hand of the scientist … Sagan believed the dynamic nature of animation to 
be well-suited for many of the points he wanted to deliver” (2014, n.p.). Greenberg examines 
the way Cosmos uses animation in conjunction with other modes of visual communication—
as well as alongside Sagan’s convincing, often poetic, rhetoric—in order to argue that 
evolution and natural selection is the only possible reason for the proliferation and diversity 
of life on earth. The forty second evolutionary metamorphosis in particular “creates an 
impression of an undisturbed line of both evolution and morphing” with the morphing effects 
in this sequence resulting in a fluid transformation and transition between evolutionary 
stages (n.p.). Greenberg links the process of evolution to the process of ani-morphing, 
following the use of the term by Norman M. Klein (2000); the ani-morph signifying the point 
between two images where the image is in-between what it is and what it is becoming, a self-
reflexive point in the transformation which recalls the hand of the animator and their control 
over the image. Overall, Greenberg argues that animation and ani-morphing is the ideal 
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means through which to represent evolution as “an artistic reflection of the scientific process 
that it represents” (n.p.).  
 
The choice to end this evolutionary becoming on the figure of a woman is an intriguing 
one—does it displace the primacy of ‘man’ as the privileged figure in human history, or does 
it foreground woman as the ground (the mother) from which life is brought forth? This linear 
animated metamorphosis would also seem to posit evolution and the development of life not 
as elaboration and difference, but as a singular line of development. Sagan’s voice over, and 
the placement of woman (and the human) on one branch of the tree is, in part, an attempt to 
mitigate this implication, although both the 1980 and 2014 series of Cosmos overall have a 
tendency to narrate the story of the cosmos through human perception, or on the human 
scale. The animated representation of evolution attempts to visualise and represent 
evolution on a temporal scale which a human can phenomenologically comprehend. Despite 
these limitations regarding the ability to represent the multiplicities and difference 
generated by evolution, as well as natural and sexual selection, overall the use of animated 
metamorphosis as a tool to represent evolution in Cosmos evidences the possibilities 
animation affords for working through understandings of nature as active, dynamic, and as 
always undergoing becomings. Nature is no longer to be understood as at once immutable 
and ahistorical; reappraising the ‘ground’ of nature, the ‘nature’ of nature, allows us to 
understand the relations between the corporeal and the incorporeal, the material and the 
immaterial, beyond reductive binary oppositions.  
 
I have begun this chapter with the short discussion of the animated representation of 
human evolution in Cosmos, as it leads into a discussion of the ways animation can begin to 
think through the mutability of nature, and the ways in which Elizabeth Grosz conceptualises 
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life, becoming, and difference. In the previous chapter, I outlined how the mind/body dualism 
and its extensions have informed and operated throughout Western discourse, leading to a 
disavowal of the corporeal, the feminine, and of woman. The hierarchy of mind and body has 
left women associated with the ‘unruly’ body, and with a nature that needs to be controlled 
and overcome. Grosz argues that in order to reclaim the body for feminist thought from these 
phallocentric understandings, we must understand that the body is “neither—while also 
being both—the private or the public, self or other, natural or cultural” (1994 23). In the face 
of purely social constructionist rhetoric, we must evoke the matter of the body, whilst at the 
same time stressing the influence of cultural inscription in order to oppose pure biologism 
and essentialism. In this sense, the body is to be understood as a threshold, as a borderline, 
and as in-between. Grosz begins to think through the concept of becoming, and specific 
modes of becoming, as a way to understand the differences between bodies, and as a way to 
understand the subject as unfixed and mutable. She considers the usefulness of Deleuzian 
modes of becoming for feminist theory when she writes that “Becoming-woman means going 
beyond identity and subjectivity, fragmenting and freeing up lines of flight, “liberating” 
multiplicities, corporeal and otherwise, that identity subsumes under the one” (1994 178). 
Grosz argues that bodies, and the materiality of bodies, “are never self-present, given things, 
immediate, certain self-evidences because embodiment, corporeality, insist on alterity” 
(1994 209). In this chapter I continue to think through the connections between animation, 
the body, and concepts of becoming; I continue my examination of Grosz’s texts, examining 
her writings on the possibilities of the humanities beyond the human, corporeal and 
incorporeal becomings, and ontologies of life, art, and difference. I consider how Grosz 
continues to evolve and re-examine the concept of becoming, and the ways in which it has 
informed her theorising of ontologies of life and difference. Whereas her earlier work asks 
whether it is possible to reconceptualise or overcome the mind/body dichotomy using the 
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very same disavowed terms and concepts on which such a dichotomy is made possible (the 
body, nature, matter, etc.,) her later work undertakes a thorough interrogation and 
reconsideration of such concepts as matter, nature, and life that reveal them as active, 
dynamic, and unfolding. From her focus on corporeality and embodiment, and the ways the 
body has been understood and written by various theorists from psychical, 
phenomenological, and social constructionist perspectives, she  goes on to expand on the 
relations between matter and non-matter, reappraising the agency of nature, and the 
becomings that all things undergo. Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics 
and Art (2011) is Grosz’s call for feminism to return to questions of ontology, and to the 
question of ‘the real’. I want to consider what a Groszian framework may mean for 
theorisations of the body in animation, and how we can begin to use this feminist theory to 
rethink or represent becomings through animation. In this chapter I draw out the connections 
between concepts of becoming and animated metamorphosis.   
 
Life, Difference, Becomings   
 
 In the introduction to the edited anthology Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, 
and Futures (1999), Grosz begins to articulate the themes and connections that will continue 
to inform her later works, namely the encounters between Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson. 
The Becomings anthology is an attempt to foreground the concept of time as it enables 
various becomings and the unfolding of difference. Of time, Grosz writes:  
 
Time is that which disappears as such in order to make appearance, all appearance 
and disappearance, that is, events, possible. Its disappearance is twofold: it disappears 
into events, processes, movements, things, as the mode of their becoming. And it 
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disappears in our representations, whether scientific or artistic, historical or 
contemporary, where it is tied to, bound up in, and represented by means of space and 
spatiality. (1-2) 
 
Time disappears in historic and scientific representations (such as in Cosmos’s 
compression of forty billion years of evolution) but time is also what disappears during the 
process of evolution itself; time is that which makes evolution possible, and is necessary to 
our understanding of this specific mode of becoming. Grosz argues that while time has been 
understood as “the neutral “medium” in which matter and life are framed” it should instead 
be understood as “a dynamic force in their framing” (3). The Becomings anthology addresses 
various scholars who take time and duration as their focus (including Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Bergson, and Deleuze); it is also where Grosz briefly introduces Charles Darwin as someone 
“who enabled both cosmology and biology to consider time as an open-ended, even random, 
becoming” (3). She finds an “uncanny convergence” in the ways Deleuze, Bergson, Nietzsche 
and Darwin conceive of time: “each conceptualizes time as becoming, as an opening up which 
is at the same time a form of bifurcation or divergence. Each conceives of time as difference” 
(3-4). Although her reference to Darwin in the Becomings anthology is brief, Grosz continues 
to take up his writings, and in particular his theorisations on sexual selection, in her later 
work. She is well aware of the hesitations held by feminist scholars towards Darwin, 
particularly as they relate to the resistance towards problematic biological accounts of the 
body and of nature. She herself notes that such accounts have often “been actively if 
unconsciously used by those with various paternalistic, patriarchal, racist and class 
commitments to rationalize their various positions” (2008 Material Feminisms 23-24). 
However, rather than reading Darwin’s writings as a complete disavowal of the mutability of 
nature, Grosz argues that a closer examination of Darwin may instead open up our 
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understandings of corporeality, matter, and nature, writing that his work offers a “complex 
account of the movements of difference, bifurcation, and becoming that characterize all 
forms of life” (28). Grosz takes up and interrogates Darwinian theories of sexual selection, 
and the ways they contribute to understandings of the connections between “difference and 
becoming, between matter and the elaboration of life” in order to conceive of a nature that is 
dynamic, active, and variable (28).  
 
Grosz explores and draws out the connections between Darwin, Bergson, and Deleuze in 
Becoming Undone (2011), thoroughly considering the intersections between these 
philosophies of life and becoming with art and the body. Becoming Undone is the most 
pertinent text through which to consider the ways in which Grosz’s writings on becomings 
and difference, in relation to politics and art, can begin to work through and alongside 
animation (or even how animation may enact such becomings). Here Grosz defines 
becomings as the “series of imperceptible movements” and “evolutionary transformations 
that make up natural, cultural and political life”; she proposes that “what it is that becomes, 
and what it becomes” are less interesting than the movement, or the becoming, itself (2011 
1). The process or movement of becoming, rather than the so-called ‘start’ or ‘end’ points of 
that movement is where difference is elaborated, identity destabilised, and where meaning 
emerges. Grosz writes, “Things undergo becomings, which transform them in ways which are 
unpredictable and irreversible”—these things are not limited to living things, but also 
material things, non-human life, and natural objects (1). Every becoming has “its own time, 
its own movements, its own force”—there is no singular mode or model of becoming, and 
such becomings “both make and unmake” objects, things, and beings (2).  
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Through her articulation of the intersections of life, politics and art that does not place 
the human at the centre of the humanities, the sciences, or philosophy, but instead sees the 
human as only one species among many, as “one among many of the trajectories that life on 
earth has elaborated”, Grosz’s writings here align with posthumanist perspectives (2). Rosi 
Braidotti (2013) defines posthumanism as arising out of the collision between the “lethal 
binaries” of humanism and anti-humanism, and as a historical moment that seeks alternative 
ways to conceptualise the human subject “without sinking into the rhetoric of the crisis of 
Man” (37). For Braidotti, the posthumanist challenge is to conceptualise life not only beyond 
the self, but beyond the species, as posthumanism necessarily displaces anthropocentric 
understandings of our relationship to animals as well as to nature and non-living matter. 
Unlike Grosz, however, Braidotti’s view is more monistic, as she seeks to conceptualise a 
nature-culture continuum where the posthuman subject “exceeds the boundaries of both 
anthropocentrism and of compensatory humanism, to acquire a planetary dimension” (89). 
Grosz does not explicitly frame her arguments through a posthumanist lens, although she 
seeks to understand the ways in which Darwinian thought “opens up life to other forms of 
development beyond, outside, and after the human (while still following a trajectory of sexual 
difference” (2011 2-3). Life is thus understood as the elaboration of “endless variation and 
endless difference”, and cannot help but produce various excesses of creativity, intensity, 
flow, force, and sexuality (3). This excess becomes the condition for art’s emergence, as well 
as for “the creation of new forms of politics, new modes of living” (8). Reading Darwin’s 
writings on sexual selection, Deleuze’s work on becomings, and Irigaray’s conception of 
sexual difference, Grosz elaborates on human and inhuman becomings, feminism and 
difference, and how such concepts implicitly inform the creation and production of art.  
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Grosz takes up Darwin’s theories of sexual selection (rather than natural selection) as a 
means to discuss the place of the animal, or the nonhuman, within the humanities. This is 
yet another extension and re-examination of the various dichotomous pairings that shape 
our discourse (human/nonhuman, human/animal-other). Grosz is interested in what a 
humanities that does not privilege the human might look like, and the ways in which the 
humanities and the ‘natural sciences’ may intersect; hence, what might Darwin’s conception 
of the world of human and non-human relations mean for the humanities? Darwin, Grosz 
tells us, posits that “the differences between man and other animal species are differences of 
degree, not differences in kind”, and that differences between humans (cultural, sexual, 
racial, etc.) are also, therefore, differences of degree (16-17, emphasis added). When we 
understand difference as such, as “a difference that can be obtained by insensible gradations, 
the slowest movements of transformation that link the existence of one species to the 
emergence of another,” then the primacy that has been given to the human within this order 
of the natural world is necessarily displaced (17). Following this, just as the centrality of the 
human is displaced (or reoriented) as one among many in a post-anthropocentric context, 
then we must acknowledge and take into account “the animal conditions for the emergence 
of so-called human qualities,” such as ethics, aesthetics, and rationality (21):  
 
Life must be understood as the ongoing exploration of and experimentation with the 
forms of bodily activity that living things are capable of undertaking. This is perhaps 
the only ethics internal to life itself: to maximize action, to enable the proliferation 
of actions, movements. (22, emphasis added) 
 
Grosz writes that “life erupts from (and transforms) the material conditions that enable 
matter to “remember” (the simplest organic cell)” (32); this notion of life erupting from and 
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transforming the material conditions that make it possible brings to mind the conflation of 
life and movement that makes possible animation—an understanding of animation as that 
which erupts from the inanimate, transforming the stillness of the images and their 
materials. In turn, it is the dynamic potential of those materials which allows for and enriches 
these various animated movements and becomings. This non-dualistic co-implication of life 
and matter becomes the condition for the very possibility of art: “Life brings art to matter 
and art brings matter to life” (38). Art, Grosz explains, is not understood here as “fabrication” 
but “intensification”, produced through an excess of matter which is taken up and used by 
life, and through an excess of life which is directed into an elaboration of materiality; life is 
“the becoming-artistic of the material world” (39). I will further elaborate on this notion of 
becoming-artistic, and the connections Grosz articulates between art, matter, and life in the 
next chapter, as her writing opens up new ways to think through the ways animation, 
feminism, and art may inform and operate through each other. I turn now to Grosz’s writing 
on the concept of becoming, that which undermines “the stability of fixed objects,” a 
philosophy of “movement and change” that does not conceive of the states of beings, objects, 
and things as supposedly fixed (2011 51).  
 
In Volatile Bodies, Grosz concentrates her writing on Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions 
of rhizomatics, assemblages, machines, desire, multiplicity, becoming, and the Body without 
Organs (BwO). It is the BwO and the notion of ‘becoming-woman’ that primarily occupies her 
attention:  
 
The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and 
teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization … The full body 
without organs is a body populated by multiplicities. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 30)  
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The BwO refers to all kinds of bodies (human, non-human, textual, sociocultural, etc.); the 
concept of the BwO does not relate to notions of embodiment, but rather the capacities and 
potentiality of bodies, as the “tendency to which all bodies, whatever their organization, 
aspire” (1994 169). The BwO opposes a conception of the body that is “stratified, regulated, 
ordered, and functional, as it is subordinated to the exigencies of property and propriety” 
(169-170). The BwO cannot be thought of in terms of being a “singular, definable “type” or 
structure” but can only be thought or differentiated from others via the “movement and flow 
of intensities that is allows or produces on its surface”—it is not thought in terms of what it 
is, but what it does (170).  
 
In contrast to the indeterminate nature of the BwO, Grosz describes becomings as “always 
specific movements, specific forms of motion and rest, speed and slowness, points and flows 
of intensity” (173). Becomings are not a matter of metaphor, mimesis, or symbolism, but 
rather involve (particularly in the case of becoming-animal) “the relation set up between a 
psychical subject, an object, and an animal”—there is a third, mediating term between the 
subject and the animal through which “the subject enters into connections with the animal” 
(174). Becoming-woman is the “most privileged” mode of becoming in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings as the BwO and all becomings “necessarily pass through and are part of the processes 
of becoming-woman” (175). It is the figure of the little girl who becomes the privileged site 
of this process of becoming-woman. Grosz critiques this use of the girl however, whom 
Deleuze and Guattari effectively “decorporealize” by denying the specificity of her body, 
rendering her body as “indeterminate in-betweenness, a transgressive movement in itself” 
(175). Deleuze and Guattari describe her as “an abstract line, or a line of flight … girls do not 
belong to an age, group, sex, order or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, 
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ages, sexes” (Deleuze and Guattari in Grosz, 175). Here Grosz encounters the difficulty faced 
by scholars who attempt to take up the works of Deleuze and Guattari for feminist purposes; 
becoming-woman, which can be understood as a series of destabilising processes and 
movements which unfixes the notion of a whole and complete subjectivity or state of ‘being-
ness’ is useful for men as a means to escape “the systems of binary polarization of unities … 
[implying] a de- and restructuring of male sexuality, of the forms of genital domination” 
(177). However, it is not clear what becoming-woman implies for women. For women, does 
becoming-woman necessarily mean “abandoning the very struggles by which feminists have 
sought to provide new social places and values for women” (177)? Grosz argues that Deleuze 
and Guattari do not ask that women and feminists abandon these struggles, but stresses that 
feminism should “not content itself with a final goal, a resting point, a point of stability or 
identity”—identity, subjectivity, and political struggles are never stable or static, but 
constantly unfolding (becoming something else) (178). The concept of becoming-woman 
(and following this, becoming-imperceptible) is not without what Grosz describes as 
“worrisome implications”: the movement towards imperceptibility implies a materialism 
beyond the body, or “an acid dissolution of the body, and the subject along with it” (179). 
Further to this, the notion of becoming-woman as the process through which all becomings 
must first pass through—a preliminary or primary stage—tends to sound “alarmingly similar 
to a number of (male) political groups that have supported feminism on condition that it be 
regarded as a stage, phase, element, or subdivision of a broader cause” (179).  
 
Grosz departs from the concept of becoming-woman in Becoming Undone in order to 
conceptualise becoming as the means by which objects - living and non-living - become more 
than themselves, these objects containing the potential to become more than or other than 
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themselves. Becoming is here understood as the principle of matter and its potential for 
transformation:  
 
Becoming is a (perpetual) change in substance, but it cannot be identified with a 
substance—or subject—that changes. Change does not need an underlying static 
object, a vehicle somehow carrying change along with it. Change preexists objects and 
is their condition of possibility. (2011 51)  
 
Becomings are open-ended, a constant unfolding, the result of the force of duration, of 
temporality, of difference, that makes life and difference possible. Becoming begets life and 
difference. Becoming is inherent in matter, its potentiality. It is “the very principle of matter 
itself”, as life and matter carry within them the “possibilities of mutual transformation” (52). 
I would like to return once more here to the representation of evolution in Cosmos, which is 
portrayed in a single, unfolding line of development. If, following Grosz’s reading of Darwin, 
the differences between the human and non-human (or animal other) are differences of 
degree obtained by “insensible gradations, the slowest movements of transformation”, then 
does the representation of four billion years of evolution in forty seconds erase this 
understanding of differences of degree by making these insensible gradations sensible (2011 
17)? Here time is compressed, and evolution ceases once the final end point—the human 
woman—has been reached. The cosmic scale of evolution is reduced to a human scale, and 
while the image of the branching tree attempts to place the human as one among many, the 
linear metamorphosis overrides this image. However, as Grosz posits in her introduction to 
Becoming Undone, it is the becoming, the movement, the evolution itself which is of interest, 
not the thing itself or that which it eventually becomes—and that becoming is a constant 
unfolding, which does not simply ‘stop’.  Even death, as Braidotti argues, is understood 
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instead as the becoming-imperceptible of the subject “as the furthest frontier of the 
processes of intensive transformation or becoming” (2013 136). Within this unfolding, 
animated metamorphosis, there are moments of in-between where the animated line passes, 
slips, or moves between what it was and what it is becoming; one fish metamorphs, fluidly, 
into another fish, which in turn moves between an animal of the ocean and then an animal 
of the land, never quite one thing or the other. It is this process of animated metamorphosis 
as a mode of enacting or representing this movement or becoming that I am interested in, 
and I shall explore this further below.  
 
In chapter one, I explored the various ways theorists have grappled with questions 
regarding the ontologies, definitions, and genealogies of animation. The writings of Deleuze 
have been taken up by animation scholars, particularly as they attempt to theorise animation 
and movement. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, examining Bergson’s second thesis on 
movement, Deleuze remarks upon cinema’s ability to reproduce movement, writing that 
“cinema is the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever 
that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of 
continuity” (5-6). However, regarding this thesis of movement at least, Deleuze does not 
consider the ‘cartoon film’ as belonging to the cinema, because the cartoon film is that which 
“reproduces movement through an order of exposures [poses] projected in such a way that 
they pass into one another, or are ‘transformed’” (6). Rather than a succession of equidistant 
any-instant-whatevers, which presents or describes the figure in a unique or privileged 
moment, in the cartoon film it is “the continuity of movement which describes the figure” 
(6). The cartoon figure is “always in the process of being formed or dissolving through the 
movement of lines and points taken at any-instant-whatevers” (6). Scholars within animation 
studies have since sought to articulate the ways in which these brief statements of Deleuze 
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towards animated cartoons can indeed open up new ways of thinking movement (or the 
illusion of movement) in animation. For example, Frieda Riggs (2007) declares Deleuze and 
Guattari thinkers of animation, and that they are animating thinkers. Riggs finds that in his 
Cinema books, Deleuze sets out to animate the thinking of both cinema and philosophy 
through the creation of new concepts, and that Deleuze and Guattari perform animation 
through their writing. Thinking animation through a Deleuzian understanding of becoming, 
Riggs finds that animation itself is a process, form, and figure “that exceeds more traditional 
characterisations and definitions of it … it has a life of its own—the life of illusion;” she also 
finds that animation is that which “encompasses any and every project concerned with giving 
life and movement” (246).  
 
Keith Broadfoot and Rex Butler (1991) write that Deleuze’s argument, demonstrated by 
Eadweard Muybridge’s images of a horse trotting, is that, “Movement is not a series of forms 
or Ideas put into motion—a series of poses of privileged instants as in classical dance or 
photography. Instead, it is movement itself which produces these forms or Ideas” (264-265). 
Broadfoot and Butler stress that when considering what precisely is meant by movement in 
the cinema, cinema itself must be thought regarding the “interrelationship between poses 
and movement” (265, emphasis in original). They remind us that the Muybridge photographs 
prove that movement is what happens in between the poses or privileged instants: cinema is 
“never a matter of simply giving movement through its poses or instants because these 
themselves always presuppose a prior movement” (267). At the same time, neither can 
movement simply be relegated to “the non-point or the non-instant: the line or time” (267):  
 
It is not a matter of saying that motion only occurs in these Muybridge photogrammes 
in the frames between the individual cels, in the image before or the image after the 
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image which seems to move. We cannot just say that movement is always in between. 
If this were so, and every image depended on every other image for its movement, we 
would merely get Zeno’s paradox again in another form. We still could not say how 
motion either begins or ends. (268).  
 
This is the paradox of the movement-image, hence why Broadfoot and Butler go on to 
suggest that Deleuze’s understanding of cartoon animation (only one kind of animation) 
leaves us free to posit that in other kinds of animation (of the order of the time-image), the 
distinction between movement and the pose may no longer be discernible. They also note 
that Deleuze’s equation of the figure (in cinema and animation) with continuity of 
movement, rather than taking movement itself as a tangible thing, is perhaps in fact “the 
ultimate ambition of all great cartoons: the presentation—impossible—of this simultaneity 
of the figure and the breaking of the figure, of time (space) and movement” (270). Broadfoot 
and Butler point out that it is therefore unsurprising that filmmaker and theorist Sergei 
Eisenstein, who “embodies for Deleuze the cinema of the movement-image,” would find in 
the animation of Walt Disney “the realisation of his cinematic aims” (271).  
 
Transformation and Metamorphosis  
 
I have noted above that Grosz critiques Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the figure of the 
little girl as the privileged site for the process of becoming-woman; Grosz notes that this 
figure of the little girl has occupied other of Deleuze’s writings due to his fascination with 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice. The figure of Alice is also a source of fascination for Eisenstein, who 
would evoke the transformations of Alice in his writings on animation and the plasmatic. 
Eisenstein’s image of a transforming Alice—she who shrinks and grows—features 
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prominently in his formulation of the plasmatic (which follows from his musing on the 
‘impossible’ transformations in Disney’s early works). He writes of Alice that “here too, as we 
see, there seems to be the same playing at ‘something else’, ‘the impossible’” (Eisenstein 11). 
Alice has long been a familiar figure within animation film (a live action Alice featuring 
prominently in Walt Disney’s first hybrid carton/live action Alice Comedies in which Alice 
would find herself in various cartoon worlds). She would return in Disney’s 1951 Alice in 
Wonderland feature length film. In this film, whilst lost in Wonderland, Alice is asked several 
times by its various inhabitants precisely who or what she is. At one point, finding herself 
conversing with flowers in a garden bed, The Rose asks Alice what species or genus she is. 
Alice responds, “Well, I guess you would call me a … genus, humanus … Alice.” The flowers 
are unsatisfied and, concluding that she is a weed, chase her out of the garden bed. Later on, 
the blue caterpillar poses a similar question to Alice:  
 
“Who R U?”  
“I hardly know, sir! I’ve changed so many times since this morning, you see …”  
“No, I do not ‘C’. Explain yourself.”  
“I’m afraid I can’t explain myself sir, because I’m not myself, you know.”  
 
Alice continually finds herself shrinking and growing throughout the film, at points small 
enough to walk among the flowers, climb upon mushrooms, and fit inside glass bottles, and 
at others too large to fit inside houses and courtrooms, or tall enough to break through the 
canopy of a forest. 
 
In another adaptation of Carroll’s story, Jan Švankmajer’s Alice (Neco z Alenky,1988), 
Alice’s transformations and metamorphoses take on a more surreal, uncanny quality. A live 
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action Alice (Kristyna Kohoutova) drinks from a bottle of a dark blue-black ink, and rather 
than simply shrinking, is transformed into a small, porcelain doll. Doll-Alice throws away the 
bottle (in a gesture of exasperation), becoming animated through stop-motion techniques. 
Unable to reach the key on the table to go through a small door, Doll-Alice eats a cookie that 
falls from the open draw of the table, and shoots upwards, becoming the live action little girl 
again. These transformations reoccur at various points throughout the film—in the pool of 
tears, in the White Rabbit’s house—until at last, rather than simply transforming from doll to 
human by eating a cookie or drinking the ink, the human Alice emerges from within the doll, 
using her hands to tear apart the Doll from the inside out, leaving its shell on the floor as 
Kohoutova narrates, “No more cakes or ink please, thought Alice to herself.” When this film’s 
blue caterpillar (an animated sock puppet wearing dentures) asks the live action Alice, “Who 
are you?” Alice returns the question, “And who are you?” The caterpillar only responds, 
“Why?” The question of who Alice and the caterpillar are, or what they are, is (to follow Grosz) 
less important and interesting than the transformations they undergo. In Disney’s film, Alice 
cannot adequately explain herself, nor who or what she is, to anyone she encounters, 
wandering within a world of nonsense, where nothing is what it is because everything is what 
it isn’t. In Švankmajer’s Alice, when the question is turned back on the animated object of 
the blue caterpillar, it too cannot (or will not) explain itself. After telling her that one side of 
the (wooden) mushrooms will make her grow taller, and that the other side will make her 
grow shorter, the caterpillar spits out its dentures as a needle and thread become animated 
and move on their own, sewing the now still caterpillar’s eyes shut.  
 
The figure of Alice is central to Eisenstein’s musings regarding what he found so attractive 
about the early works of Walt Disney (although his work can also be applied to animated film 
more broadly). His writings are some of the earliest theoretical contributions to the study of 
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animation, and his notion of the plasmatic, in particular, has become a key concept within 
animation studies. Eisenstein’s highly influential writings on the early works of Disney 
featuring Mickey Mouse, as well as the various Silly Symphonies, sought to understand the 
attractiveness of these “living drawings” (6). He reflects on impossible transformations that 
take place in the worlds of animation, connecting such transformations, coincidentally, to 
“those pre-stages that were traced out by … Darwin” (10). He describes the transformations 
that take place in the Silly Symphony Merbabies (1938), as well as the various metamorphoses 
of Mickey, Goofy, Donald and Minnie as a “playing at ‘something else’, ‘the impossible’” (11). 
To understand this playing at something else, Eisenstein finds he must turn to the works of 
Lewis Carroll. He describes Alice’s various transformations once fallen down the rabbit hole—
her shrinking, then growing, then shrinking again—and asks whether or not this process of 
becoming (big and small) is one Disney has borrowed from Lewis for his animated works: “Is 
there a borrowing here by Disney? Or is this image of elasticity of shapes generally 
widespread?” (12).  
 
Eisenstein finds the tendency towards images of stretching, transformation, and elasticity 
in the artworks of various cultures, from Germany to Japan. He is not surprised by the 
existence of such impossible transformations, but at their attractiveness, an attractiveness 
for which he declares the ‘pre-requisite’ to be “a rejection of once-and forever allotted form, 
freedom from ossification, the ability to dynamically assume any form” (21). He terms this 
ability plasmaticness, a term which denotes the instability of form, a form which “behaves 
like the primal protoplasm,” a being or figure which possesses a form which is yet unstable, 
and is able to assume and attach itself to any form (21). The shrinking and stretching and 
constant transformation that animated figures undertake is not only understood in the literal 
sense of one figure transforming into another, but refers to the ‘squashing’ and ‘stretching’ 
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of characters bodies, their elongation and rubberiness. It is this changeability, fluidity, 
mutability, instability and plasmaticness which recalls Grosz’s description of the movements 
of becoming, the open-ended, unpredictable transformations and unfolding of things that 
elaborate difference. Like becomings, Eisenstein’s notion of the plasmatic (and the processes 
of animation in general) disrupts and undermines “the stability of fixed objects” (Grosz 2011 
51).   
 
 Inextricable from the concept of the plasmatic is animation’s affinity for metamorphosis; 
Eisenstein later declares that, “Metamorphoses is a direct protest against the standardly 
immutable” (43). Plasmatic qualities can also be found in the digital morph (the effect 
wherein a digital image fluidly morphs often seamlessly into something completely 
different), with its “effortless shape-shifting” and “its queerly hermetic liquidity” (Sobchack 
2000 xi). Norman M. Klein describes this process—which he terms ani-morphing—as 
“molting, melting, melding, mutation” (2000 25). The notion of the plasmatic is closely 
associated and often aligned with metamorphosis. To describe it simply, metamorphosis can 
be understood as a visual or material transformation in which an image, object, character or 
background transforms into something else, and as Klein describes it has become a part of  
animation’s “narrative language—a poetics of the moving image” (2010 92). Paul Wells (1998) 
privileges the ways in which metamorphosis functions as a narrative strategy; not only does 
it link images and connect objects, but by “enabling the collapse of the illusion of physical 
space, metamorphosis destabilises the image, conflating horror and humour, dream and 
reality, certainty and speculation” (69). When an animated image or figure undergoes 
metamorphosis, it is the drawn line or the material properties of the figure or image that is 
shaped, transformed, and manipulated, the transformation emerging as the frames unfold. 
The space between the frames is crucial here—the in-between becomes the space that enables 
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this metamorphosis to take place, just as the in-between, the absence, the pause, or the gap 
between the frames allows animation to spring forth from a fleeting moment of 
inanimateness. It is not just the drawn line that undergoes metamorphosis—animated 
materialities such as ink, sand, or clay also undergo animated metamorphosis, the mutability 
of the materials brought to the fore.  For Klein, a key moment that takes place during 
animated metamorphosis is the mid-point in the cycle—“a lapse or hesitation ,what I call an 
ani-morph” (2000 22, emphasis in original). This is the point during the movement of 
metamorphosis during which the figure, body, scene, or action is between what it is or was, 
and what it is becoming. For Klein, this ani-morph is a moment that gestures towards the 
animator, their hand, and the animation process. It is a moment of uncertainty, and of 
potentiality; it can be sustained indefinitely. It is this moment of potentiality which I find 
evokes Grosz’s notion of becoming, the means by which philosophy may enact or play with 
notions of “undoing and redoing, unbecoming and becoming, that which approaches the real 
with increasing complexity” (2011 56).  
 
Animation can be defined by its potentiality, both of form, and of materiality. It is this 
potentiality that according to Esther Leslie, allows us to dramatise or animate a “skirmish 
with nature” or the “wresting with what is natural about nature” (2014 29). When animated 
bodies undergo metamorphic transformations, when they reach the sustained moment of in-
between, the mutability of the human body is revealed; the boundaries between inside and 
outside, mind and body, between different bodies, bodies and machines, bodies and objects, 
human and non-human bodies fall away. Metamorphosis does not necessarily perform the 
same function all the time; the transformation of Ariel’s mermaid tail into a pair of human 
legs in The Little Mermaid (1989)—a transformation that is completed in a brief moment of 
rupture—does not perform the same function as the transformation of bodies in the ink-on-
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paper animations of Michèle Cournoyer, which are ongoing, sustained, and emerge through 
Cournoyer’s animation process outside of a narrative function. The use of metamorphosis in 
Cournoyer’s films are non-linear, not driven by narrative causality, and distort and fold time 
and place.  
 
Freedom to…   
 
In Becoming Undone, Grosz asks, “Is feminist theory best served through its traditional 
focus on women’s attainment of a freedom from patriarchal, racist, colonialist, 
heteronormative constraint? Or by exploring what the female—or feminist—subject is and is 
capable of making and doing?” (61). Following Grosz, I ask how feminism may best serve 
animation—what can feminism do for animation beyond feminist critique and 
representation, and how may feminism help explore what the female subject is capable of 
becoming? What is feminist animation capable of creating, making and doing, and what may 
it offer for the undoing of patriarchal and dualistic constraints? Through her previous 
elaborations of the centrality of matter in the generation of life (and the ways in which life 
transforms matter), difference and the concept of becoming (of life and matter becoming 
more than themselves), Grosz also underlines the importance of taking into consideration 
matter and materiality in feminist thought. She conceptualises this renewed focus on matter 
as a movement away from the term ‘freedom from’ towards a ‘freedom to’ where women’s 
freedom, agency and autonomy is conceived of positively rather than negatively (60). In this 
more positive elaboration of the understanding of freedom, freedom is understood not as the 
elimination of that which oppresses, but as “the capacity for action” (60). Whilst Grosz does 
not deny the relevance and usefulness of ‘freedom from’ within political and social contexts, 
she argues that feminist theory must turn towards (or return to) this notion of ‘freedom to’ 
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in philosophical (as well as political) struggles, thinking freedom in an ontological sense, as 
well as in a material one. Freedom becomes then “not the transcendent property of the 
human, but the immanent and sometimes latent capacity for life in all its complexities” (68). 
Following Bergson, Grosz declares that it is indetermination which is the “condition for the 
open-ended action of living beings, the ways in which living bodies are mobilized for action 
that cannot be specified in advance”:  
 
Living bodies can act, not simply or mainly through deliberate or conscious decision, 
but through indetermination, through the capacity they bring to the material world, 
to objects, to make them useful for life in ways that cannot be specified in advance.  
Indetermination spreads from the living to the nonliving through the virtuality that 
the living bring to the inorganic, the potential for the inorganic to be otherwise, to 
lend itself to incorporation, transformation, and energetic protraction in the life and 
activities of species and individuals … Life opens the universe to becoming more than 
it is. (69-70).  
 
This indeterminacy is understood as the latent principle of all matter; animation provides 
a way to explore this indeterminacy of matter and of life, and more specifically, a way to 
explore the feminist possibilities and understandings of freedom and the body. Freedom is 
thus understood as “primarily of the body: it is linked to the body’s capacity for movement 
and thus its multiple possibilities of action” (72). A feminist understanding of the notion of 
freedom is more than women’s struggle for political, social, and economic freedom, or 
freedom from patriarchal power structures and relations, but a freedom to act differently. 
This understanding of freedom opens up feminism to “new interests, perspectives, and 
frameworks”, allowing for men and women to expand upon and unfold new activities of 
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knowledge production (73). This is the future that Grosz believes feminism and feminist 
theory should strive towards: the creation of new concepts, knowledges, techniques, and 
modes of production, rather than simply the critique of old concepts and knowledges. At its 
best, she reminds us, feminist theory “can become the provocation to think otherwise, to 
become otherwise. It can be a process of humbling the pretensions of consciousness to 
knowledge and mastery and a spur to stimulate a process of opening oneself up to the 
otherness that is the world itself … feminist theory has the potential to make us become other 
than ourselves, to make us unrecognizable” (87). Grosz does not suggest we abandon 
discourse around representation, political struggle and identity, but rather advocates for a 
feminist return to ontology, to the generation of new concepts and knowledges.   
 
To return to Suzanne Buchan’s suggestion which I raised in chapter one, regarding the 
need for animation scholarship to draw on interdisciplinary knowledges and methodologies: 
I do not here propose to use feminist theory to resolve for animation studies the question of 
its larger place within the scope of film and media studies. What Buchan does suggest is that 
animation studies must “draw on interdisciplinary methodologies to contextualize the 
making of animation films” (2014 123); she also notes that in exploring the “vast richness of 
animation film,” writings on animation may unintentionally skim writings on feminist theory 
(as well as queer theory, colonialism, spectatorship etc.) without truly applying these to 
animated film (112). Animation cannot definitively resolve for feminist theory the questions 
of the corporeal, of the body, of nature, materiality, life and becoming that have been outlined 
in the previous two chapters, but what has been lacking in animation studies is an 
interdisciplinary approach which considers feminist perspectives on these matters—
particularly of the body—in animated film. Buchan describes the animated figures that 
populate animated worlds as “ontological puzzles” and notes that writing on these animated 
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figures often makes use of “the same terms and descriptors as for human actors” (119). 
Animated figures may indeed present a paradox: they are “often composed of a combination 
of incompatible elements, and in projection they and the spaces they are in can visually defy 
physical, optical, and natural laws of gravity, electromagnetism, perspective, and entropy” 
(120). Buchan illustrates this with the example of Duck Amuck, a short in the Warner Brothers 
Animation ‘Merrie Melodies’ series, which sees Daffy Duck walk through a series of 
incomplete background artwork and ever-changing scenarios. He speaks directly to the 
animator, and grows ever more frustrated and angry as the hand of the animator intrudes to 
erase and re-draw him. At one point Daffy is caught between the frames; his world (and his 
figure) refuse to obey laws of gravity, of perception, and various other physical laws that real 
ducks are subject to. However, it is difficult to compare the cartoon figure of a character such 
as Daffy Duck (or Bugs Bunny, or Yosemite Sam, or any similarly animated cartoon figure) to 
the animated figures of the films of Michèle Cournoyer, whose lines and contours more 
closely resemble human bodies we are familiar with, yet whose bodies also defy supposedly 
unbreakable physical or natural laws. The ink and paper bodies of Cournoyer’s films undergo 
multiple transformations and metamorphoses, which will be outlined in more detail in a later 
chapter of this thesis. But Cournoyer’s films may also serve as an ideal starting point in order 
to consider the implications that feminist refigurations of the body might hold for bodies in 
animation. Cournoyer’s bodies of ink and paper allow us to think through, visualise, and 
animate feminist theories of the corporeal, of the body as threshold, of the interrelations 
between mind and body, and of the inherent ability held within matter to become-other that 
has been described above. More than simply a means of reflecting on the other, animation 
and feminist theory may find themselves in a productive and generative encounter which may 
open up new ways to understand or speak about the body in animation. This is feminism’s 
provocation to think otherwise through animated forms. In the following chapter, I will 
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further explore the ways in which animation and feminist philosophy may find themselves in 
a mutually productive encounter.  
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Chapter Five – Art Animating Philosophy 
 
Art is what intensifies, produces sensations, and uses them to intensify bodies. 
— Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art  
 
In chapter one of this thesis, I reviewed the ongoing debates regarding the  definition of 
animation, and the nature of the troubled relationship between animation and live action 
cinema. I explored the ways cinema and animation encounter one another, and elaborated 
not only why such encounters are necessary, but why it is necessary to rethink the 
cinema/animation interrelation. We cannot address the mind/body dualism through 
animation if we do not also attempt to find new ways to understand the relation between 
cinema and animation. Following Suzanne Buchan (2014), I suggested that animation studies 
must seek out encounters with other disciplines, feminist theory in particular, and that the 
concept of the in-between, highly significant to animation studies, may be of use not only to 
feminist theory of the body, but in thinking the encounter between animation and feminism. 
In chapter two I reviewed the current literature around animation and feminism, including 
feminist critiques of animated texts, feminist animators, and animated texts that illustrate a 
feminist political and cultural perspective; I also examined the historical marginalisation of 
women in animation. In chapters three and four, I laid out the feminist corporeal frameworks 
that have informed the writing of this thesis, with particular focus on the writings of Elizabeth 
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Grosz. Grosz asks what a feminist refiguration of the body might look like, and I ask how 
animation may enact this refiguration, and how feminist theories of the body may inform and 
operate through animation. In this chapter, I explore how we can begin to productively think 
the encounter between animation and feminist theory. The word ‘begin’ is key here, as 
feminism itself is inherently multi-disciplinary, engaging with various scholarly fields 
including aesthetics, film, art, philosophy, science, materialism, psychoanalysis, 
phenomenology, semiotics, post-colonialism, and post-structuralism. As such, there are 
multiple ways to approach animation through feminist perspectives. A key issue in engaging 
with animation through not only a feminist lens, but any philosophical or theoretical 
approach, is, as described by Jeff Malpas, that the medium of animation already often 
“appears as a field onto which already existing philosophical approaches and concerns can be 
projected and inscribed” (65). Rather than simply projecting or inscribing feminist corporeal 
and material theory onto animation, I would rather think feminist theory of the body through 
animation, alongside animation, and in turn see the ways animation may begin to open up 
and provide ways to move through these ideas.  
 
I turn once again to Grosz, and her book Chaos, Territory, Art (2008), in order to suggest 
a way in which feminism may begin to contribute to the theorising of animation, rather than 
simply provide a means to reflect on animation. In Chaos, Territory, Art, Grosz asks:  
 
What can philosophy contribute to an understanding of art other than an aesthetics, 
that is, a theory of art, a reflection on art? Instead of supervening from above, taking 
art as its object, how can philosophy work with art or perhaps as and alongside art, a 
point of relay or connection with art? Only by seeking what it shares with art, what 
common origin they share in the forces of the earth and of the living body, what ways 
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they divide and organize chaos to create a plane of coherence, a field of consistency, 
a plane of composition on which to think and to create. (4-5)  
 
To begin to think the ways feminist theory (of the body) can work with animation, as and 
alongside animation, it is necessary to remember that animation is a form of art. Art, as 
defined here by Grosz, is understood as “the regulation and organization of its materials—
paint, canvas, concrete, steel, marble, words, sounds, bodily movements, indeed any 
materials” which generate and intensify sensation; in generating and intensifying sensation, 
art impacts living bodies (4). Animation can surely be understood as the regulation and 
organisation of its materials. The question then becomes, what are the ways in which 
animation and feminism address chaos? Chaos is here defined as “the whirling, unpredictable 
movement of forces, vibratory oscillations that constitute the universe” (5).  
 
Animation as Art  
 
It would be an uncontroversial, if broad, statement to describe animation as a form of art. 
Nearly all forms of animation have their roots in various modes of artistic practice, such as 
painting, drawing, performance (including puppetry), photography, and sculpture, to name 
only a few. Scholars and animation practitioners have long claimed animation as a form of 
art deserving of academic and critical attention equal to the attention given to live action 
cinema. Perhaps paradoxically, as Alan Cholodenko reminds us in the introduction to The 
Illusion of Life (1991), it was film theorist’s regarding animation as not of the cinema, but 
“belonging rather to the graphic arts” that contributed to the marginalisation of animation 
within the context of film theory and film studies (9). Animation’s relation to the artistic 
(other than or outside the cinematic arts) became the very thing which contributed to its 
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negation within film theory. Today, one only has to turn to the various festivals devoted to 
animation around the world, including the Annecy International Animated Film Festival in 
France, the Ottawa International Animation Festival in Canada, the Melbourne International 
Animation Festival in Australia, and the Animation is Film Festival in Los Angeles, in order 
to glimpse the diversity, impact of, and appreciation for animation worldwide. Although it 
has perhaps not quite escaped the trappings of being considered a niche form of film, or a 
medium primarily directed towards children’s entertainment, the understanding of 
animation as both artistic practice and as a form of popular entertainment is generally 
accepted (these two functions need not be dichotomously opposed). However, just as the term 
‘animation’ itself may be thought of as an “imprecise, fuzzy catchall that heaps an enormous 
and historically far-reaching, artistically diverse body of work into one pot” (Buchan 2014 
113), referring to animation simply as ‘art’ does not quite encapsulate the range of art styles, 
techniques, and forms that fall under the banner of the term animation. More often than not 
writings on animation tend to first privilege drawn or digital animation, before considering 
other material forms of animation that draw upon artistic practices including sculpture, 
puppetry, or painting.  
 
Perhaps the strongest association of animation with art is through those animated forms 
that are associated with various fine arts practices, which are themselves often classified as 
abstract animation or experimental film. Maureen Furniss has outlined in detail the links 
between animation and the modern art movements of the early twentieth century, noting 
that animation “grew alongside the other modern arts, creating a rich, imaginative, and 
varied range of films that demonstrated the potential of artistic imagery” (2016 90). Cecile 
Starr, a scholar known for her work on fine art animation, writes that the notion of animation 
as fine art began to emerge in the early twentieth century, when “Futurists, Dadaists and 
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other modern artists were eying the motion picture as the medium that could add movement 
to their paintings and graphic designs” (9). During the same period in which Winsor McCay 
was animating Little Nemo (1911), based on his comic strip of the same name, Leopold 
Survage was creating “sequences of abstract paintings (in Paris) which he called Colored 
Rhythms”; as Max Fleischer was producing the first of the Out of the Inkwell series, Walter 
Ruttman was animating Opus 1 (1921), an abstract work of colour and geometric patterns set 
to music (Starr 9). These are some of the earliest examples of abstract or fine art animation, 
but for a time these works did not receive the same attention from the general public as the 
cartoon animation of Disney, Fleischer, or Pat Sullivan and Otto Messmer. Starr writes that 
while these abstract animations, sometimes called pure cinema, “won the respect of other 
artists” they were still relatively unknown to the general public (9). For Starr, the increasing 
recognition of fine art animation is due in part to the courses, technologies, and equipment 
provided by universities and art schools, as well as recognitions and special awards given to 
such work by film institutes and festivals (10). Evelyn Lambart and Norman McLaren, Len 
Lye, Mary Ellen Bute and Stan Brakhage are now commonly recognised names in the tradition 
of fine art animation and experimental film. However, as noted above by Buchan, the 
distinction between ‘animation’ and ‘avant-garde’ or ‘experimental’ film is often unclear, 
with many artists moving across borders and between mediums. Artists today still turn to 
animation and film to add movement and bring a new or different dynamic to their work. 
Australian visual artist Del Kathryn Barton, for example, turned to animation in her 
collaboration with filmmaker Brendan Fletcher, to create the short animation The 
Nightingale and the Rose (2015), based on the Oscar Wilde story of the same name. Barton, a 
painter coming from a tradition of fine arts, painted all the original artwork and designed the 
characters in the film, which was then created using a combination of paper collage and 
digital techniques. What distinguishes fine art animation from animation of a more industrial 
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nature, according to Starr, is that each film becomes a reflection of “the unique vision and 
skills of a single artist” (10). Fine art animation is usually produced alone or with a small 
team, reflecting the individual vision of a single artist and director. I explored the ways 
commercial or industrial animation, and fine art or independent animation, are often 
positioned as dichotomously opposed in chapter two.  
 
Of course, thinking ‘animation as fine art’ does not (or should not) only refer to 
experimental, abstract, or avant-garde animation. In her book Hollywood Flatlands: 
Animation, Critical Theory and the Avant-garde (2004), Esther Leslie describes how this 
bifurcation is the result of the “phoney war between high culture and popular or low mass 
culture,” as she explores the connections between animated cartoons, the avant-garde and 
modernist critics (v). She points out that Walter Benjamin, in his writings on The Eccentric 
(a name adopted by a group of avant-garde circus performers from Russia), deemed the figure 
of the eccentric a “relation of Chaplin and Mickey Mouse. Circus, Dada, Chaplin, cartoons and 
Disney form an absurd file that bounds and shimmies through modernism” (17). As evidenced 
collectively by this note from Benjamin, Sergei Eisenstein's writings on Disney cartoons, the 
absurdist humour of Koko the Clown, Felix the Cat, Mickey Mouse, and the playfulness of 
trick films, animation has had as much influence on (and been influenced by) the avant-grade 
artists and modernist critics as other forms of ‘high art’:  
 
All sorts of anti-academic and experimenting artists found that cartoons touched on 
many things that they too wished to explore: abstraction, forceful outlines, geometric 
forms and flatness, questioning of space and time and logic — that is to say, a 
consciousness of space that is not geographical but graphic, and time as non-linear 
but convoluted. (Leslie 2004 18-19).  
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In 2016, animation scholar Tom Klein provided further evidence of the animated 
cartoon’s connections with fine art and the avant-garde through the Los Angeles Laband Art 
Gallery exhibition “Woody Woodpecker and the Avant-garde”.11 Klein explores the work of 
Woody Woodpecker animator and director, Shamus Culhane, his connections to the L.A. 
based  ‘American Contemporary Gallery’ of the 1940s, and the avant-garde influences that 
would find expression in these cartoons. In particular, Klein draws out the potential influence 
of avant-garde filmmaker Maya Deren on Culhane’s work, drawing parallels between Meshes 
of the Afternoon (Deren, 1943) and the Woody Woodpecker short The Barber of Seville 
(Culhane 1944). He writes, “There is a deep sense of aggression in both these films that is 
then mitigated by their respective cinematic conceits: Meshes is not real, it’s a dreamlike 
trance, and Barber makes you laugh, it’s just a comedy. One is hypnotically slow and the other 
is rat-a-tat fast” (2015)12. Even without considering the perceived dichotomy between high 
art and low or popular art, animation has always drawn from various methods of artistic 
practice. Norman McLaren’s declaration that, “Animation is not the art of drawings that move 
but rather the art of movements that are drawn,” not only highlights animations privileged 
relationship to the drawn, but takes animations relationship to art as intrinsic to the medium 
(in Wells 1998 10). The techniques that are so fundamental to the creation of animated 
films—drawing, painting, sculpting, composing (of music as well as the composition of 
images and figures within the frame, and of thinking their relation to the next frame) find 
their basis in fine arts practices, and are applicable to both hand-crafted and digital forms. 
Individual animated films take up at least one (but often multiple) of these techniques and 
 
11 Klein, Tom. “Woody Woodpecker & the Avant-Garde” CartoonResearch, 23 July 2016, 
www.cartoonresearch.com/index.php/woody-woodpecker-the-avant-garde/ Accessed 30 August 2017. 
12 Klein, Tom. “Shamus Culhane Makes it Modernism, 1943” CartoonResearch, 8 August 2015, 
www.cartoonresearch.com/index.php/shamus-culhane-makes-it-modernism-1943/ Accessed 30 August 2017. 
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practices in conjunction with movement and duration in order to create dynamic works. Many 
independent animators in particular come from a fine art background, taking advantage of 
animation as a time-based medium in order to “expand their explorations of movement and 
temporality in still paintings and drawings” (Furniss 2007 32).  
 
Art as Animation 
 
If animation is to be considered a form of art, then conversely, can it also be said that art 
is a form of animation? One of Cholodenko’s more recent projects involves what he describes 
as “the theorizing of art as a form of animation” which also necessitates an understanding of 
the animator as artist (2015 n.p). Cholodenko posits that the perception of the animator as 
the author-creator is also “a vision of the animator as total artist, pure origin, pure source”, 
and seeks an elaboration of the animator as artist (what he terms the ‘artist-animator’) as 
well as an elaboration of art as animation or ‘art animation’ (2015 n.p). Surveying and 
reappraising his past writing on the subject of animation, he finds that the spectre of art has 
always haunted his writing from his earliest publications. In The Illusion of Life, for instance, 
Cholodenko finds that he compares the hand of the animator reaching into the drawing to 
the hand of God in Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam, “purveying life at the touch not of 
his finger but of his drawing instrument” (1991 22). Early animations such as ‘lightning 
cartoons’ or lightning sketches, examples of which include J. Stuart Blackton’s The Enchanted 
Drawing (1900) and Emile Cohl’s Fantasmagorie (1908), foreground this notion of the 
animator as artist  by showing the artists hand reaching into the frame to bring the drawing 
to life. There is a moment, for example, within Cohl’s Fantasmagorie where the hands of the 
animator reach in and put back together the figure of the mischievous clown who has literally 
been broken into pieces, bringing him ‘back to life’, or reanimating him. Cholodenko also 
      
      
141 
 
finds that in note fifteen from his introduction to his 1991 anthology, he writes that around 
the same period in which Georges Méliès and Blackton were experimenting with object 
animation, “Picasso and Braque were theorizing the tableau-object, the painting-object 
which, as an object was obedient to its own rules and had its own ‘life’” (32). For Cholodenko, 
animation has a privileged relationship with the life of objects and the nonhuman, and that, 
“The life of the object privileged by animation obviously includes the life of the art object” 
(2015 n.p.) Looking further, Cholodenko finds that his article “The Illusion of the Beginning: 
A Theory of Drawing and Animation” (2000) also evokes the inherent connection between 
animation and art, assuming animation as art, where he writes that, “In the beginning, in 
every beginning, is the drawn” (9). Throughout all of Cholodenko’s writing on animation, 
there is the intrinsic assumption that animation is not only a form art, but that all art is a 
form of animation, and hence, the artist is understood as animator: “that writing on drawing 
I did was laying out the necessary condition of art as animation” (2015 n.p). Cholodenko’s 
claim is that “drawing itself is never not animated, line is never totally inanimate” (ibid). It 
is not just in his own writings that he finds evidence for this declaration—theorists including 
Eisenstein, Henri Focillon, and Paul Barolsky, “all define art as metamorphosis, privileged 
figure and process of animation” (ibid). His project (which he notes is still in the ‘part one’ 
phase), is to seek out anyone, be they art theorists, historians, or philosophers, who claim art 
as animation.  
 
Although we must be careful of positioning animation as the ground or origin of all arts, 
understanding art as animation and, vice versa, animation as art, is the first step in allowing 
us to think feminist theory through animation, rather than simply projecting feminist theory 
onto animation without any critical interrogation (Malpas 65). The Illusion of Life 
anthologies edited by Cholodenko (1991 and 2007) are both collective attempts to think 
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animation through philosophical and critical discourse, to ‘reanimate’ philosophy and film 
theory through animation, the goal being “a rearticulation of film theory and/as animation 
film theory and film animation theory with philosophy” (1991 24). But even Cholodenko 
acknowledges that many of the contemporary figures that are privileged in the theorising of 
animation (prominent on his list are Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Slavoj 
Žižek and Gayatri Spivak) are too often brought up in a “superficial and eclectic manner” 
(2007 47). Cholodenko himself draws a great deal from the works of Jacques Derrida and Jean 
Baudrillard in his own theorising of animation as film/film as animation, his scholarship 
always holding inherent the connection between animation (as idea and practice) and 
philosophy. The project of theorising art as animation highlights the intrinsic connection of 
art and animation—“at once the drawing of animation and the animation of drawing, making 
it impossible to know where drawing ends and animation begins” (2015 n.p). The theorising 
of animation as art/art as animation opens up the possibility of a rearticulation of the 
connections animation(art) and philosophy share. It becomes necessary in this case for an 
expanded understanding of the ontology of art and the conditions for the emergence of art, 
and the connections that art and philosophy share.  
 
Art, and the conditions for art’s emergence, occupy some of Grosz’s more recent works. 
She examines the painting of the Indigenous Australian women of the Western Desert, 
including artistic works by Doreen Reid Nakamarra and the collective work of the Martu 
women. Grosz finds that their work “explodes with colours, forms, narratives, both public and 
secret, but also and above all, with affects, with forces that affect and are affected,” and also 
with sensations that affect and touch living bodies:  
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Art touches living bodies and induces transformations in those bodies which affect 
and move them and change art in the process. If living bodies make art, it is also true 
that bodies are transformed by art. No longer reflective or contemplative bodies, far 
from the action, surveying at a distance the events that don’t touch one but are 
available for one’s observation, bodies are now touched directly by the same forces 
that the art object invokes. Bodies, living bodies, the bodies of objects, bodies of land 
and of water, become the objects of art, what art depicts and transforms.  (2011 188-
189).  
 
Art is the link that allows nature to become culture, history, and narrative; art transforms 
living bodies; art is excess—it arises from and transforms excess—it is expression, rather than 
representation, and it is that which “radically transforms and disrupts life” (189). It helps us 
to see and rethink what precisely is ‘natural’ about nature, and culture. For Grosz, 
contemporary Indigenous Australian art is the pinnacle of this, an art which “brings new 
forces into existence by elaborating natural and social forces” (201). In Chaos, Territory, Art, 
she explores the “shared concerns” and regions of overlap that bind art and philosophy 
together—what it is that makes art possible, and what it shares with philosophy (1). 
Specifically, she examines the conditions that make possible art’s emergence, the material 
and evolutionary forces that are linked to art, and the concepts that art entails. For this 
exploration, Grosz draws from the work of Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari), Darwin, and 
Irigaray, as it is their writing and “opening up of both nature and culture to unrecognized and 
open-ended forces” (2), which allows for an elaboration of art as that which “enables matter 
to become expressive, to not just satisfy but also to intensify - to resonate and become more 
than itself” (4).  
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Art and philosophy differ in the ways they address “the same provocations or incitements 
to creation” - more than simply a tool for assessing, or reflecting upon art, philosophy instead 
“may find itself the twin or sibling of art” (2). These incitements and provocations are the 
forces of chaos, produced by the earth, by living bodies, the “whirling, unpredictable 
movement of forces, vibratory oscillations that constitute the universe” (5). Art and 
philosophy are ways of addressing this chaos, which is defined not as “absolute disorder but 
rather a plethora of orders, forms, wills - forces that cannot be distinguished or differentiated 
from one another” (5). Although art and philosophy share a common beginning, both drawing 
from and addressing chaos, the mode of this address and what they both produce are quite 
different. Philosophy seeks to produce concepts; art does not produce concepts, but instead 
sensations, affects and intensities, “which sometimes align with and link to concepts, the 
object of philosophical production” (1-2). This does not mean that art is entirely without 
concepts, but rather concepts are an effect of art, not the material which produces it.  
 
In order to delineate what it is that art and philosophy each can contribute to an 
understanding of the other, how they interact, and “what common origin they share in the 
forces of the earth and of the living body” (4), Grosz must first outline how it is (and with 
what materials) that art is created. She partly defines art as “the regulation and organization 
of its materials”, whether these materials be paint, canvas, marble, sounds or indeed, bodily 
movements (4). The materials Grosz lists (“indeed any materials” as she clarifies (4)) are 
indeed almost all materials that have been taken up in the creation of various animation 
films. Art is set apart from other forms of cultural production in that art “merges with, 
intensifies and eternalizes or monumentalizes, sensation” (4). It is entrenched as much in 
nature as it is something created with deliberate intent by an artist—as sexual selection and 
sexual difference allows for the constant, unfolding becoming of life and the elaboration of 
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difference, so too do they intensify sensation. There is a becoming-artistic when the excess 
of chaos and sensation produced by life is addressed in the production of “the frivolous, the 
unnecessary, the pleasing, the sensory for their own sake” (7). It is chaos from which art and 
philosophy both draw and what they commonly share—art and philosophy “enframe chaos, 
each in its own way, in order to extract something consistent, composed, immanent, which it 
uses for its own ordering (and deranging) resources” (8-9). Philosophy gives rise to concepts 
which continue on independent of the philosopher through the plane of immanence (that 
fundamental ground of philosophy, that which allows thinking as such to take place). This 
plane of immanence “must be seen as pre-philosophical—not in terms of something pre-
existing before philosophy, but as that which constitutes the unspoken” (Spindler 152). Art 
allows for the intensification of sensations, which continue independent of the artists that 
gave these sensations an expression. In order to give expression to sensations, however, there 
first must be the construction of a frame.  
 
Framing 
 
Grosz declares that art is of the animal, insofar as the impulse towards art does not come 
from a unique, human sensibility, but from that which is excessive and unpredictable; “art is 
of the animal to the extent that creation, the attainment of new goals not directly defined 
through the useful, is at its core” (2008 65). However, as Grosz reiterates in Becoming 
Undone, although the conditions for art’s emergence are of animal preconditions (an 
extension of her thinking of the humanities beyond the human, an attempt to think art 
beyond the human), the animal arts—engendered by the excess and extravagance of sexual 
selection—are of “the matter of art without yet being art” (2011 187). Animals cannot frame 
or deterritorialize, which is the “something else” that art requires, the transformation that 
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generates and intensifies sensation (187). Art requires framing. As Grosz explains, “Framing 
is how chaos becomes territory. Framing is the means by which objects are delimited, 
qualities unleashed and art made possible” (2008 17).   
 
Deleuze and Derrida, in what Grosz calls a “remarkable and rare agreement” describe art’s 
first gesture as “the construction or fabrication of the frame” (10). The framing of chaos is 
what allows for art to intensify sensation and affect, a “metaphysical reconstruction” of chaos 
(10). The frame becomes the condition of all arts—a “territorialization of the uncontrollable 
forces of the art. It is the frame that constitutes painting and cinema just as readily as 
architecture” (11). The frame is also the condition which allows for the plane of composition: 
“the field, the plane, of all artworks, all genres, all types of art, the totality of all the various 
forms of artistic production in no particular order or organization, that which is indirectly 
addressed and transformed through each work of art” (70). The plane of composition as 
conceived by Deleuze and Guattari is the “collective condition of art making” (70). Barbara 
Bolt elaborates on the plane of composition, affirming that this plane is “always a virtual 
construction containing infinite possibilities from which we join series of frames and sections 
and create a territory” (268). All works and art objects are located within this plane, no matter 
the style, technique or quality—the plane of composition contains “all the events in the 
history of art,” which in this shared, common location (an incorporeal context) are able to be 
assessed, referred to, interrogated, and transform each other (Grosz 2008 70-71).  
 
It is the frame, of course, that constitutes animation as much as it does architecture, 
painting, or cinema.  The importance of the frame in animation (and what happens between 
the frames) has been addressed in great detail within animation scholarship, from Norman 
McLaren’s assertion that “what happens between each frame is far more important than what 
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happens on each frame,” to Cholodenko’s essay on “The Framing of Animation” (1991). There 
Cholodenko argues that the title of the film, Who Framed Roger Rabbit (Robert Zemeckis; 
1988), “frames the very nature of the frame as its subject. It frames the frame as its frame” 
(210). Who Framed Roger Rabbit frames animation within the context of live action cinema, 
and live action cinema within animation. Whereas Cholodenko follows Derrida, Grosz follows 
Deleuze and Guattari; animation—the illusion of life, and movement—is made possible 
because of the gap or interval between the frames. As Cholodenko writes, “between must at 
the same time be thought of as within, in this sense sliding onto on”—the in-between also 
frames (235). The frames of animation are frames that create connections, not only allowing 
for the unfolding of the illusion of life and movement, but the intensification of those 
sensations and affects which are produced, the intensification of movement, and the 
transformation of animated figures and bodies. Just as what happens between each frame 
becomes the condition allowing for animation, art too is a project that “focuses on the 
intervals and conjunctions between the frames” (Grosz 2008 18).  
 
Animating Sensation  
 
Using Grosz’s writing as a framework through which to think art as animation, animation 
(and the animation process) becomes “the process of making sensations live, of giving an 
autonomous life to expressive qualities and material forms and through them affecting and 
being affected by life in its other modalities” (2008 103). Grosz takes painting as her primary 
mode through which to explore art, the body and sensation. In Chaos, Territory, Art she 
focuses on the paintings of Australian First Nations artists, Kwementyaye (Kathleen) Petyarre 
and Clifford Possum Tjapaltjarri, whose works she describes as “a living history concerned 
primarily with the past and how its narratives and practices effect the present, like the 
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cinematic reel compressed into a single highly complex frame” (92). She reminds us that 
painting is only one possible response to the random cosmological forces which life “must 
incorporate into its morphology and behaviour” (101). While Cholodenko, as noted above, 
argues for a conception of the artist-animator as pure origin, in Grosz’s understanding the 
(human) artist is not the pure origin or source, but is only responding, framing, 
territorializing, re- and deterritorializing invisible forces and excesses of nature. Art does not 
originate from a reasonable, rational, or unique human sensibility, but is already of the 
animal, generated not from “any of man’s higher accomplishments, but from something 
excessive, unpredictable, lowly” (63). The animator is the person who frames, who creates 
and intensifies sensation, draws from and responds to this something excessive. Sensation is 
another way we can understand the body in animation in excess of representation, as 
sensation impacts the living body directly:  
 
Art is how the body senses most directly, with, ironically, the least representational 
mediation, for art is of the body, for it is only art that draws the body into sensations 
never experienced before, perhaps not capable of being experienced in any other way 
… Sensation draws us, living beings of all kinds, into the artwork in a strange 
becoming in which the living empties itself of its interior to be filled with the 
sensation of that work alone (73).  
 
Art understood as such—as not only representation and expression but the intensification of 
sensation—is then “transformation of the materials from the past into resources for the 
future, the sensations unavailable now but to be unleashed in the future on a people ready to 
perceive and be affected by them” (103).  
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In this chapter, I have attempted to suggest the ways in which feminist philosophy might 
begin to work with and through animation, and not simply provide a reflection on animation. 
This is a project that leaves room for further investigations, and reaches beyond the 
corporeal, but by aligning the ways in which animation has been thought of as art and the 
ways in which philosophy and art mutually address chaos, excess, intensities and sensations, 
hopefully we begin to open up the ways in which animation and feminism may work alongside 
and through each other. In the next chapter, I return to the corporeal, and to a question that 
is inseparable from that of art, animation, and feminist philosophy—the question of 
aesthetics. The following chapter is an attempt at beginning to think animation and feminist 
theory alongside each other, bringing into question the notion of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ in 
animation, situating an analysis of Michèle Cournoyer’s Robes of War (Robe de guerre, 2008) 
within the field of feminist aesthetics.  
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Chapter Six – The Possibility of Feminist Aesthetics  
 
Art might be internally revolutionary, but gender oppression can prevent it from coming into being at all. 
—Ewa Ziarek, Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism  
      
Michèle Cournoyer’s ink on paper animation Robes of War (Robe de guerre; 2008) begins 
with dark screen, where a single un-inked circle emerges, growing larger. Within the circle 
the silhouette of a plane appears, signalling the imminent arrival of violence and destruction. 
The black ink recedes, and the image of a woman’s face is revealed; the blades of a helicopter 
protrude from her head, and her eyes becomes army helmets. The entire image shifts as 
soldiers emerge from the helicopter where her face once was. The soldiers are lost in an 
explosion of ink. The woman weeps, and her tears become the body of a dead son, whose 
dripping blood becomes the body of the woman once more. One woman becomes many, and 
their bodies merge to become an armoured tank, the tank tread a pair of bloody and bandaged 
legs. A cannon rises from her body and fires shots at an unseen, faceless enemy beyond the 
frame. The tank becomes a woman again, whose fingers, as she holds her hands to her face, 
become soldiers at war. Folding her hands together in prayer the fingers become a tangle of 
legs. In the final sequence of the film, her hands become explosives, which quickly transform 
into a crumbling building. The destroyed facade falls away to reveal nothing but bones, the 
paper screen becoming dark and obscured by ink once again.  
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Like all of Cournoyer’s films completed using this ink and paper technique, Robes of 
War is a constantly unfolding metamorphosis, the figure of the woman forever becoming 
something else—a helicopter, a tank, a destroyed building—as she moves through different 
stages of grief and anger. Through these ongoing transformations, Cournoyer makes explicit 
the connections between the violence of war and the violence inflicted upon the bodies of 
women, including the violence committed against her as the mother of a son killed by war. 
Through the shifting lines of ink, one woman’s personal grief becomes collective anger, the 
destruction of her body linked to the destruction of place, as the structure of the building is 
revealed to be her bones, stripped of flesh. Through its animation of the body, forgoing 
language in favour of visual expression, complicating any simple distinction between the self 
and other, personal and public, as well between body and place, Robes of War can perhaps be 
understood through what Paul Wells defines as animation’s ‘feminine aesthetic’ (1998). 
There is, however, something of a contradiction in Wells’ conception of a feminine aesthetic; 
whilst certain of the individual criteria he describes are useful in the project of this thesis for 
evaluating how a particular animated work may undo or refigure particular dichotomous 
relations that continue to be upheld in cultural and artistic works, the notion of a singular 
feminine aesthetic maintains a masculine/feminine binary. This opposition positions the 
feminine as the other of the masculine, only conceived in its relation to the primacy of this 
masculine. The feminine aesthetic leaves little room for any interrelation between this terms, 
or for a transformation of this binary.  
 
The notion of a feminine aesthetic within animation has been a topic of much debate 
within animation scholarship regarding its usefulness as a term for defining animation made 
by women (Furniss 2007; Spark 2016; Roe 2017). Arguments put forward against its suitability 
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for describing animation made by women correctly note that the concept of a singular 
feminine aesthetic risks an essentialising view of animation created by female-identifying 
directors and artists, falling once again into an outdated masculine/feminine hierarchical 
dichotomy. Whilst acknowledging the importance of recognising the contribution of female 
artists and animators, in order to conceptualise how their work may be understood—
stylistically, formally, materially— from a feminist perspective, it may be more constructive 
to shift the concept of a feminine aesthetic towards a framework of feminist aesthetics. 
Although feminist aesthetics is a no less contested area of inquiry (Felski 1989; Ziarek 2012; 
Daley 2015), by rethinking animation’s feminine aesthetic through feminist perspectives on 
aesthetics and theories of art, it may be possible to reconsider the ways in which women in 
animation have actively used animated forms and materials (alongside narrative and content) 
to challenge patriarchal and phallocentric codes and conventions of representation, imbuing 
their work with a feminist consciousness. This chapter will examine the possibilities of 
feminist aesthetics for animation, attempting to move beyond critique of the singular notion 
of a feminine aesthetic. It will move through the current debates around the feminine 
aesthetic, and briefly examine the discourse around feminist aesthetics, before turning to the 
writings of Ewa Ziarek (2012). I focus in particular on Ziarek’s development of a feminist 
aesthetics of potentiality, as well as her rethinking of the form/matter divide, as she suggests 
in her exploration of the possibilities of feminist aesthetics that the interrelation between 
“female embodiment, aesthetic form, and political violence” is always heavily implied in any 
discussion of feminist art (123). This chapter will then return to Cournoyer’s Robes of War in 
order to consider how such notions of embodiment, aesthetic form and political violence 
intersect in her work, demonstrating an open and generative feminist aesthetics.  
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Interrogating the feminine aesthetic  
 
The question of a ‘feminine aesthetic’ has arisen in most forms of art, including 
literature, music and painting. Although Wells outlines the concept of a feminine aesthetic 
for animation in detail in Understanding Animation (1998), it was not the first time the idea 
that there may be a certain aesthetic specific to women in animation had been raised. It was 
touched upon briefly by Jayne Pilling in her introduction to Women and Animation - A 
Compendium (1992), where she writes that female artists and filmmakers have had an impact 
in animation “far greater, proportionately, than in live-action feature films” (5). She notes 
that although there is “no overriding thesis about the specificity of women’s animation … 
there are some persuasive arguments to this effect. Men and women are socialised as children 
in different ways, with the result that women tend to be more able to explore and share 
personal experience” (6). Pilling references animator Susan Young’s suggestion that these 
differences in socialisation mean that boys tend to engage more in hierarchical play, leading 
them to dominate traditional fields of animation filmmaking, whereas women “have been 
more active in developing new styles and forms of animation” (6).  
 
Wells takes up this idea of a specificity of women’s animation, developing it into his 
notion of the feminine aesthetic. He writes that:  
 
If men, in general, have used animation to echo and extend the premises and concerns 
of men in live-action filmmaking, then women have used animation to create a 
specific feminine aesthetic which resists the inherently masculine language of the 
live-action arena, and the most dominant codes of orthodox hyper-realist animation 
which also uses its vocabulary. (1998 198).  
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Like Pilling, Wells suggests that although men, historically, have been considered the greater 
force in the creation of animation (as well as live action cinema), he contends that it is women 
who have “recognised animation as a form in which they can work and achieve significant 
ends that are not available in any other film form” (198). These ends include the creation of 
original design concepts, the address of personal or collective feminist issues, and the 
displacement of “masculine codes of composition and narrational construction,” rejecting 
exaggerated or unnecessarily sexualised designs (199). More than a response or counterpoint 
to such designs or narrative conventions, Wells posits that the turn towards a feminine 
aesthetic is “a recognition of the possibilities available to women once these codes have been 
overturned” (199). He defines his notion of the feminine aesthetic through a set of key 
criteria, as follows: the feminine aesthetic seeks representation of women beyond “erotic 
spectacles or of marginal narrational interest,” shifting representations towards woman as 
subject, rather than object; a preference for visual expression and variety of form over 
masculine language expression; conservative forms are abandoned in favour of texts that 
require a greater level of participation from audiences; above all, the feminine aesthetic seeks 
to explore “a woman’s relationship to her own body,” as well as her interactions with other 
bodies, men and women, her perceptions of, and the interrelations between, her public and 
private roles, her personal and professional existence, as well as female desire, sexuality, and 
creativity (200).  
 
There is something attractive in the notion that women in animation have been able 
to implicitly take up the artform to subvert patriarchal codes and conventions of 
representation. At first glance the above aspects of the feminine aesthetic appear to speak to 
a broadly feminist understanding of the aims and possibilities of female artworks. Wells even 
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goes on to suggest that the feminine aesthetic itself has become “more recognisable, and 
more self-conscious, since the 1970s, when it informed the overt politicisation of female 
artworks per se,” a time when the influence of the second wave feminist movement would 
have been keenly felt (200). However, the criteria are ultimately undermined by their 
categorisation as falling within a singular feminine aesthetic, and the overall 
conceptualisation of the aesthetic is limited at best. The notion of a feminine aesthetic as 
Wells outlines it can only take into account women who create animation independently, 
outside of major studios or production houses. It leaves no room to consider animation by 
women from major studios; for example, an animated film directed by a woman from a major 
studio like DreamWorks Animation, such as Jennifer Yuh Nelson’s Kung Fu Panda 2 (2011), 
falls outside this feminine aesthetic due to its being formally and narratively conventional—
it does not address any of the criteria set out by Wells. He writes that because most of the 
animation created by women is done so outside of commercial sectors, where women have 
full creative control over the production process, “it creates the context in which the personal 
becomes inevitably political” (199). The work itself becomes defined by an already assumed 
gendered aesthetic and production context.  
 
To uncritically adopt the assumption that women who animate independently 
inevitably take up this feminine aesthetic is problematic, and an over-simplification of the 
historical contribution of women in animation. As Annabelle Honess Roe notes, historical 
scholarship on women in animation tends to write about women as the “helpmeet to the 
‘great men’ of animation history” or as “lone artisanal craftswomen” working within a 
feminine aesthetic — “an image of female animators that is at once celebratory and 
essentialist” (2017 n.p.). This celebratory tone is evident in Wells’ description of the works of 
several female animators. For example, Wells argues that the work of female animation 
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pioneers who preceded the more “politically driven” work of the 1970s, such as Lotte Reiniger 
and Mary Ellen Bute, exhibit feminist tendencies in the creation of work distinct from the 
male-dominated evolving cartoon genre (such as the work of the Disney or Fleischer studios). 
Although the work of both Reiniger and Bute can certainly be understood as feminist, and 
lend themselves to feminist interpretations and analysis, the description of their work as 
“lyrical” or exhibiting a “lightness of touch” (in the case of Reiniger), or the work of art as an 
“expression of feeling” (in the case of Bute) is a return (albeit unintentional) to a 
dichotomised conception of female art which associates the feminine with the emotional and 
the irrational in opposition to masculine notions of the conceptual and the rational. This also 
begs the question of whose work may fall within the feminine aesthetic, and who is excluded. 
Wells contends that because women’s animation is “less censored in its concerns” and more 
subjective, it can address topics that male animators could not. Marjut Rimminen and 
Christine Roche’s The Stain (1991) is cited as an example, an animated short film that deals 
with incest, sexual abuse and murder. There is an implication here that male animators could 
not explore similar trauma in their work.  
 
Wells holds up the films of Jane Aaron (A Brand New Day (1974); Interior Designs 
(1980)) and the feminist animation collective, the Leeds Animation Workshop (Give Us a 
Smile (1983); Through the Glass Ceiling (1994)) as exemplifying this feminine aesthetic. 
Paying particularly close attention to Aaron’s film, Interior Designs, in which the hand drawn 
figure of a woman is super-imposed and animated upon a live action background, he writes 
that the film evokes “the liberation afforded to an artist by transforming images through the 
free association of colour and form” (202). Significantly, because it is the female body that 
transforms and metamorphoses, the feminine aesthetic comes to the fore. Wells argues that 
the work embodies a feminine aesthetic because it seeks “to expand the vocabulary of both 
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animation and cinematography,” expressing the views and experiences of woman as artist 
(203). In line with his criteria, the film not only rejects a representation of woman as erotic 
spectacle, but presents the female figure as subject in primarily visual terms. Both Interior 
Designs and A Brand New Day explore the tensions between the domestic spaces in which 
women find themselves, and their creative and artistic drives, a tension revealed in the 
fragmentation and transformation of their bodies. However, Aaron’s films do not arise out of 
an essential feminine subjectivity, although they do speak to female-experience and Aaron’s 
subjectivity.  
 
There have previously been attempts to rework the above understanding of the 
feminine aesthetic in the search to define a term to describe animation by women. Maria 
Lorenzo Hernandez (2010) uses the term ‘animatrices’ as a plural or collective descriptor for 
female animators. Following Hernandez, Andi Spark (2016) extends ‘animatrices’ to the term 
‘animatrix’ in order to reframe the notion of the feminine aesthetic. She writes:  
 
I attempt to extend this notion to use the word animatrix that may work as both noun, 
interchangeable with a plural noun, and an adjective. I suggest that an animatrix work 
incorporates all the key defining factors (themes, techniques, approaches) as outlined 
in my core thesis, which therefore also defines the creator as an Animatrix. (2016 n.p.)  
 
Echoing the key aspects of Wells’ aesthetic, Spark posits that the Animatrix (Animatrix as a 
work that falls within a particular aesthetic) “leans more towards an artist’s method in terms 
of the way they incorporate hybridity and exploration, as opposed to a factory-style process” 
(2016). The Animatrix cannot, or rarely will be, found within the commercial or industrial 
setting, in which female characters are either hyper-sexualised, or denied sexuality, and 
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primarily are written and animated as the supporting character to a male lead. Animated films 
or television series created within this context are driven by narrative, dialogue and language, 
forgoing purely visual expression. Spark contrasts this style of animation production with the 
work of independent female animators, in which can generally be found non-stereotypical 
characters, with primacy given to visual expression over language, and “an earnest truth-
seeking appeal” (2016). Once again following Hernandez, Spark suggests that many female 
animators model these characters on themselves as self-portraits (Hernandez 2010; Spark 
2016).  
 
Spark is careful to note that the set of criteria she outlines “does not necessarily define 
the whole or only approach of female-directed films,” and that there are many male-directed 
independent films that could also fit the same set of criteria. The concept of the Animatrix, 
she suggests, “might transgress biologically determined gender and embrace works that fit 
along the spectrum of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ criteria” (2016). This is revealing of the 
contradictions in the search for a definition of a singular feminine aesthetic; there is no 
totalising feminine or female point of view, when subjective experience cannot be separated 
from the various intersections of (including but not limited to) race, class, and sexuality. 
Maureen Furniss perhaps best sums up the contradictions in the search for a feminine 
aesthetic, considering the concept within the broader issue of representation in animation. 
She asks, “whether or not, for social or biological reasons, women actually tend to express 
themselves differently than men do” (2007 239). She cites female animators, including Faith 
Hubley and Mary Beams, who contend that “women’s experience - or at least ‘feminine’ 
nature - tends to be more cyclical than that of men (or masculinity), which they describe as 
more linear” (240). Furniss then contrasts their work with the animation of women such as 
Joanna Quinn and Candy Guard, who, although also presenting an alternative perspective to 
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the dominant images of “white male culture” through their work, are aesthetically distinct 
from Hubley and Beams. Quinn and Guard employ narrative, dialogue, and humour with a 
representational drawing style, whereas the work of Hubley, Beams, and other female 
animators mentioned, including Karen Aqua and Aleksandra Korejwo, create works that tend 
towards non-linear, symbolic, and dreamlike imagery. For Furniss, this wide range of 
examples is demonstrative of the fact that “there is no such thing as a unified body of 
‘women’s films’ or any best way of representing femininity and issues pertaining to women;” 
rather, it is the personal aesthetic preferences and life experience of the animator that 
necessarily results in such differences (244).  
 
It is true that there is no single, unifying style or aesthetic that can be attributed to 
the vast body of work of women in animation, particularly as a larger number of women 
continue to enter the commercial sector as producers, directors and show-runners (Rebecca 
Sugar, Daron Nefcy, Lisa Hanawalt, and Noelle Stevenson are prominent U.S. examples). 
There are multiple ways for animators to create works that explore female subjectivity and 
experience, femininity, embodiment, as well as feminist issues, ideas and activism. Indeed, 
the search for a feminine aesthetic of animation appears more often than not to be tied up in 
issues of representation, both on screen and behind the scenes. Wells conceives of a feminine 
aesthetic, at least in part, as “a direct response to male representations of women; masculine 
codes of composition and narrational construction” (199); similarly, Andi Spark 
contextualises her musings on the Animatrix within a larger discussion of the number of 
women in animation schools, working in the industry, and the need for girls to have sources 
of inspiration if they wish to forge a career in animation. However, although the notion of a 
feminine aesthetic is problematic, it is also necessary to have a framework for assessing and 
evaluating the feminist qualities of animation outside of narrative content and 
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representation, instead taking into account a dynamic interplay between aesthetic form, 
content and materiality. Rather than the singular feminine aesthetic, it is useful to turn to 
the field of feminist aesthetics, in order to reframe and open up the above aspects of the 
feminine aesthetic to new possibilities.  
 
Feminist Aesthetics  
 
Like the concept of a feminine aesthetic, the field of feminist aesthetics is a no less 
divisive area of inquiry. Scholars who advocate for a feminist conception of aesthetic theory 
write that, just as feminist scholarship “begins with a challenge to the assumption that 
disciplinary inquiry is gender-neutral,” feminist aesthetics challenges the assumption that 
the aesthetic appreciation and qualities of particular artworks are inherently gender neutral 
(Korsmeyer 1993 vii). As Carolyn Korsmeyer writes: 
 
To see how feminist perspectives are developing within philosophical aesthetics we 
need to situate analyses of gender in relation to the traditions and history of this 
discipline and to discover how the mask of universality and gender-neutrality has 
operated in the field of aesthetics. (vii).  
 
The inclusion of ‘philosophical’ is unnecessary here, as aesthetics is that branch of 
philosophy that deals with notions of beauty and taste (amongst other concepts) within art 
and literature. Feminist perspectives on aesthetics then, just as within philosophical 
discourse in general, challenges the assumed gender-neutrality of aesthetic theory and 
inquiry. This challenge occurs through rethinking the notion of a “generic perceiver” or act 
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of perception, as well as reorienting the inquiry “to include consideration of the notable 
absence of women from among the canonical practitioners of the arts” (Korsmeyer viii).  
 
Defining precisely what constitutes a feminist aesthetics is a necessarily open-ended 
task, as feminist aesthetics is already implicitly plural. Unfortunately, the body of literature 
that directly addresses what might constitute a feminist conception of aesthetic theory is 
relatively scant. According Hilde Hein, a scholar of feminist art theory, discourses of feminist 
aesthetics are slow to develop, and tend to be “deconstructionist and piecemeal. We have 
barely begun to consider positively what the prominent features of feminist aesthetics - that 
is, an aesthetic theory that is feminist - would be” (282 - 283). Hein contends that part of the 
problem is precisely that feminist aesthetics is frequently confused with “the quest for a 
feminine aesthetic,” (that is, something universal and essentialist) a term and concept which, 
as has been described above in its relation to animation, is quite distinct from feminist 
aesthetics (283). Feminist aesthetics are not only plural, but acknowledges its implication in 
politics. It is this distinction which this chapter seeks to explicate. The development of a 
feminist approach to aesthetics does not seek to reinforce dualistic understandings of 
essentialist notions of ‘male’ and ‘female’ art. As Korsmeyer also writes, many scholars in 
this area “are on guard against essentialism and the implication that women’s nature is fixed 
in some enduring feminine essence” even as they seek to clarify such terms as feminine, 
female, and feminist (x).  
 
There are certain qualities that we can perhaps ascribe to feminist aesthetics. 
Reflecting on the question, “Is There a Feminist Aesthetic?”, Marilyn French (1993) writes 
that there are at least two marks of a feminist work of art: “first, it approaches reality from a 
feminist perspective; second, it endorses female experience” (69). French acknowledges that 
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both these principles are broad and complicated but offers the definition that to approach 
reality from a feminist perspective is to demystify or challenge patriarchal ideologies, and 
that to endorse women’s experience, feminist art must present this experience “honestly, 
wholly” (70). This notion of a presenting an ‘honest’ and ‘whole’ conception of female 
experience is contradictory, as the nature of female experience is necessarily multiple, 
dependent on various intersections of race, class, and sexuality. But French continues:  
 
      
…in whatever ways the genius of the artist can devise, feminist art suggests that 
things are connected as well as divided, that a person is not always at war with herself 
or her world, that in fact people seek to live harmoniously with themselves and their 
world even though they can’t control either. Feminist work often focuses on groups, 
community, people as part of a context, and helps to remind us of a reality alternative 
to the Western tradition of individualistic, alienated man, lonely in a hostile, 
aggressive world. (73)   
 
French also acknowledges that an endorsement of female experience must necessarily show 
a “pluralistic reality made up of connection, flow, interrelation and therefore equality” (73).  
 
There have always been animators who actively explore female experience through 
animation. Sandra Law (1997) examines how the works of Joanna Quinn, Candy Guard and 
Alison de Vere do so as three animators, who although each are “unique in her choice of form 
and content” use the medium of animation “to explore femininity and the experience of being 
female” (48). Although each animator is stylistically and formally distinct, Law concludes that 
Quinn, Guard and de Vere all “explore the notion of the female form as something that is 
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malleable and whose femaleness can be enhanced or reduced,” and that their work is 
explicitly concerned with the ‘every day’ female experience and identity, seeking alternative 
representations of femininity (66). Importantly, Law also notes that the “work of female 
animators is characterised by variety” (67). Law’s analysis aligns with Sharon Couzin (1997), 
who also examines the way the female voice and point of view manifests in contemporary 
animation. Couzin writes (in her own musings on whether or not a feminine aesthetic exists), 
that “Feminist art is art which acknowledges the difference of being a woman - that is, what 
it is to be a woman — and then integrates that consciousness into the art … Making people 
aware through your art is a political act even if the work of art itself is not directly political” 
(73). For Couzin, the role of the feminist movement in re-articulating the place of women in 
art and art history cannot be underestimated; she is interested in how the visual arts, and in 
particular the animated shorts Asparagus (Suzan Pitt; 1979) and All My Relations (Joanna 
Priestley; 1990), rely on image rather than language to create feminist works. Couzin’s essay 
is primarily a meditation on the question, “[w]hat is female imagery?” (72). Through her 
chosen animations and animators she examines how the artists make use of form, colour, 
composition, texture, language and narrative, or rather, how both Pitt and Priestley, through 
their work, “reinforce, enrich and privilege the opening up of representation, a process which 
affects all of us by building bridges between theory and embodiment” (81).  
 
Much of the writing on feminist animation or the feminine aesthetic places a great 
deal of emphasis on foregrounding female experiences and representation of the self. Hein 
also emphasises that feminist aesthetics arises from female experience, writing that feminist 
theory, which “derives its vitality from feminist practice” and whose “credibility is tested in 
women’s experience” is fundamentally linked to aesthetics (282). Language and theory alone 
are inadequate, and feminist theory and art must incorporate experience, as “theory in its 
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masculinist mold is suspect” (284). According to Hein, feminist aesthetics seeks to challenge 
and reconceptualise the Western aesthetic tradition—philosophies of beauty, the arts, and 
sensory experience—from its own alternative perspective, in much the same way that 
feminist theory more broadly has contributed to the reconceptualisation of mind/body 
dualism and other hierarchies of patriarchal and phallocentric thought. She argues that 
aesthetics are key for feminist theory, and that further development of feminist aesthetic 
theory is needed.  
 
Critics of feminist aesthetics find the pursuit of a feminist aesthetic theory a 
counterintuitive task, as feminist aesthetics is often conflated with the search for a singular 
feminine aesthetic, which leads to a reluctance to take up the inquiry in any meaningful 
manner. As Hein writes, it is difficult to divorce the notion of “a feminine aesthetic” entirely 
from the question of feminist aesthetics. Janet Wolff explains, “the term [feminine] has 
operated consistently as a strategy for the segregation and denigration of women’s work” 
(2000 33). Perceived feminine characteristics in art become the basis for gendered criticisms 
of the work, and sets the work apart as subordinate to the work of other, usually male, artists. 
Because of this association of the feminine with inferior works (or, as Korsmeyer states, works 
outside the ‘canon’ of great works), “a primary task of feminist art criticism has been to 
challenge the ideologies and discourses which underlie the concept” (Wolff 34). As well as 
deconstructing the idea of an essential feminine sensibility, feminist art theorists and critics 
seek to reveal the female artists who have been formerly under-recognised throughout 
history, reappraising the ways in which women in art history have been written. I have 
explored this reappraisal with regards to women in animation history, and the ways in which 
the contribution of women in animation have been considered of lesser import than the work 
of men, in chapter two of this thesis. This project of reappraisal reveals “the possibilities - 
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and choices - for feminist cultural practices.” (Wolff 34). In the case of animation then, while 
the notion of a singular feminine aesthetic is ultimately limiting and reductive, the terms of 
the feminine aesthetic that Wells outlines can instead be taken up to reconsider the ways in 
which certain animators have used the possibilities of animated forms to enact a feminist 
cultural or political perspective.  
 
Firmly addressing the division between art and politics, Rita Felski argues strongly 
against the pursuit of a singular feminist aesthetic. In Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist 
Literature and Social Change (1989), she argues “the impossibility of a feminist aesthetic, 
defined as a normative theory of literary or artistic form that can be derived from a feminist 
politics,” contending that measuring any contemporary feminist writing (and by extension, 
artwork) against “an abstract conception of a “feminine”” inhibits any valuable assessment 
of the aesthetic value or limitations of the writing or artwork (1-2). According to Felski, the 
notion of a distinctive feminine point of view or “female sensibility” continues to hold sway 
over the question of a feminist aesthetic to art’s detriment (26). Rather than privileging the 
aesthetic, she argues that the concept of feminist aesthetics privileges the political value of 
the work, subordinating “all aesthetic categories to the interests of feminist ideology” (181). 
Felski does make the important observation that even though “a particular form is formally 
conventional, or marketed for profit, we may not automatically conclude that it is 
irredeemably compromised and cannot constitute a legitimate medium of oppositional 
cultural activity” (181). However, although Felski argues against any kind of dichotomous, 
hierarchical distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art, she fails to acknowledge that feminist 
aesthetics do not advocate for such a dichotomy either, nor do they seek to define a singular 
feminine essence or aesthetic of art. As has been previously noted by Hein, feminist 
aesthetics are always already inherently plural: “There is no single, totalizing feminist 
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aesthetic theory and none is sought” (Hein 286). Rather than simply privileging the political 
value of the work, feminist aesthetics instead seeks to acknowledge that formally 
conventional art “is equally political, the politics being cast in that “neutral” or masculinist 
mode that appears invisible” (Hein 284).  
 
Acknowledging that feminist aesthetics can never be completely separated from 
political implications, the remainder of this chapter will turn towards the writings of Ewa 
Ziarek, a scholar of feminist philosophy, art, and aesthetic theory, and her meditations on a 
feminist aesthetics of potentiality. Exploring Ziarek’s work is necessary in order to 
understand the ways in which her notion of a feminist aesthetics of potentiality can work 
through animation practice. Her theorisations are an attempt to move beyond feminist 
critique of aesthetics, and seeks a transformative encounter between melancholia and 
revolutionary politics, as well as to think through the interrelations between aesthetic form, 
materiality, and embodiment.  
 
Towards a Feminist Aesthetics of Potentiality  
 
Ziarek’s Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism (2012) came about 
through her reflections on the possibilities of feminist aesthetics. Although noting that 
feminist critique of the field of aesthetics is a necessary starting point, she declares from the 
outset that “critique by itself is insufficient” (1). She investigates the questions raised in her 
text around the possibility of women’s art through the literary works of Virginia Woolf and 
Nella Larsen, seeking to articulate a feminist aesthetics of potentiality through 
transformative praxis. Ziarek follows Giorgio Agamben in her use of the concept of 
potentiality; in this sense, distinguished from notions such as the will to power, moral law, 
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and individual agency, potentiality speaks not only to the ability to act, but to not act (108). 
This is potentiality’s relation to privation: “Since the potential includes the potential not to 
act, it can never be fully actualized because what exceeds its realization is the ambiguous 
capacity of “not-to”” (108). Potentiality is thus not curtailed by actuality. Ziarek points out 
that Agamben’s conception of potentiality speaks primarily to an isolated subject, and does 
not take into account the “relational aspect of potentiality—how is potential related to the 
capacities/incapacities of others” (108)? This question is particularly relevant for Ziarek’s 
consideration of the possibility/impossibility of female art, as she asks how potentiality may 
be liberated from “the most extreme effects of political domination” (109). Although Ziarek 
speaks directly in her work to literary forms, the concepts she articulates are applicable to all 
art forms; as such, it is no great stretch to extend her thoughts to animated forms as well. 
When Ziarek speaks to the relation between potentiality and materiality, she refers to 
materiality in “the double sense of the body of the female artist and of the work of art” (109). 
The materiality of language in literary production is distinct from the materiality of 
animation, which may take as its materials ink, paint, paper, sand, clay, and multiple other 
objects (although animation may also take up language as one of its materials). 
  
I take Ziarek’s notion of a feminist aesthetics of potentiality and examine how it may 
operate alongside and through the creative and transformative possibilities inherent in 
animated forms. Specifically, I examine how this aesthetics of potentiality is evoked through 
the metamorphic qualities of Michèle Cournoyer’s Robes of War. First, it is proper to examine 
precisely how Ziarek conceptualises this aesthetics of potentiality. Ziarek seeks to move 
beyond what she acknowledges are the necessary critiques of the “political conditions of 
literature and of the political implications of seemingly gender-neutral concepts of 
aesthetics”—that is, the historical, political and social conditions under which women’s 
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literature and art emerged, as well as the problematic conception of aesthetic theory as 
gender-neutral, when ‘neutral’ implicitly stands in for the masculine (1). Rather than 
expanding on existing political critiques of the complicity of art and power, Ziarek instead 
asks how we may conceptualise feminist aesthetics beyond such critiques of aesthetic theory. 
Through re-readings of Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929) and the novels of Larsen 
(Quicksand (1928) and Passing (1929)), Ziarek is drawn to the tensions in the encounter 
between the ‘muteness’ of women and the feminine, and literary or aesthetic innovation; in 
other words, “between women’s transformative practice in politics and literature and the 
devastating impact of sexist and racist violence on women’s lives and bodies” (3). This 
transformative practice cannot be separated from the various intersections of race, class, 
sexuality and gender, with a feminist aesthetics of potentiality emerging from the tension 
between revolution and melancholia, the possibility and impossibility of women’s art. This 
takes into account and assumes a complex, non-oppositional relationship between 
(aesthetic) form, materiality, and content. 
 
Ziarek acknowledges the apparent contradiction between the transformative 
possibilities of feminist aesthetics and the “melancholic impasse” to be found in the 
literature she examines—the melancholy of voices muted and violence inflicted upon the 
bodies of women. She seeks to answer the question of “how the haunting destruction and the 
ongoing exclusion of women from politics and literary production can be transformed into 
inaugural possibilities of writing and action” (5). Extending literary production to more 
broadly encompass other forms of artistic and creative production, this question extends, 
once again, to animation, where the ongoing exclusion of women from the canon of 
production and historical texts is a problem that has yet to be fully redressed. Ziarek makes 
clear that her attempt to theorise a feminist aesthetics of potentiality, moving beyond 
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critique, “does not rely on a futile attempt to recover or posit the occluded feminine essence 
in art” (7). Rather than a feminist aesthetics that relies on a singular expression of female 
subjectivity or a ‘feminine essence’, Ziarek contends that a feminist aesthetics relies, at least 
in part, on that which “has been violently erased from history” and from the continuous 
expulsion of women from artistic production and political participation (7). Although 
feminists may rely on that which has been excluded and erased, it “ultimately moves beyond 
the work of the negative toward the creation of new possibilities” (85). This transformative 
outcome not only relies on the encounter between the melancholic and the revolutionary, 
but as will be discussed below, between a complex and active conception of the interplay 
between form and matter. This complex interplay between form and matter is particularly 
relevant regarding the consideration of the transformative potential of animated forms and 
their materials.  
 
For Ziarek, the act of revolution and transformative practice is not only found in 
whether or not the work illustrates a feminist struggle, or whether it inspires the reader to 
take up a political struggle, but must also be “created within the structure of the work of art 
itself” (88). This aligns somewhat with Paul Wells’ assertion that animation which fits into 
the mould of a feminine aesthetic must first “abandon conservative forms, and create radical 
texts which may demand greater participation from the viewing audience” (200). Ziarek 
locates such transformative practice, and hence a feminist aesthetics of potentiality, in 
Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. Her discussion of the ways in which Woolf’s 
experimentation reflects the possibility/impossibility of women’s literature is valuable here, 
as it highlights the ways in which the notion of potentiality can be explored through 
animation. In Woolf’s work, revolution is aesthetically manifested in her transformation of 
and challenge to traditional literary conventions and aesthetic categories. As Ziarek notes, 
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Woolf reminds us that “the history of women’s literary production begins with the utter 
destruction of women’s art and their bodies - a destruction internalized as madness, 
melancholia, and resentment;” it is from these contradictions and encounters between the 
melancholic and the revolutionary that “the promise of a better praxis” emerges for women’s 
art, irrevocably intertwined with political freedom (89).  
 
Ziarek moves beyond the usual understandings of Woolf’s writing as speculation on 
the improbability of women’s art and the conditions required to make it possible—conditions 
which include, but are not limited to, ‘five hundred a year’ and a room of their own (in Ziarek 
88). For Ziarek, Woolf speaks not only to how women’s art is made impossible through 
political and cultural systems of gender, class and racial oppression, but through 
“internalized feelings of pain, inferiority and resentment” (94). She draws out this analysis 
through Woolf’s critique of the aesthetic category of ‘genius’, illustrated through an account 
of Shakespeare’s (fictionalised) dead, forgotten sister, who might have achieved the same 
level of fame as her brother had she not been born a woman. Ziarek writes, “Woolf exposes 
femininity as the unacknowledged antithesis of genius, which, thanks to this opposition can 
become the embodiment of artistic freedom” (91). In this sense, the figure of the genius 
transcends any oppression of gender, race, or class; just as Woman and the feminine emerged 
as the ‘other’ in the crisis of the rational subject (Braidotti 1991; Grosz 1994), here the 
feminine is positioned as the ‘other’ of genius (Ziarek 92). The impossibility of women’s art, 
and the exclusion of women, whose absence from history “implies that the destruction of 
female creativity has the status of a nonevent” manifests as melancholia and internalised, 
private suffering (93).  
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However, Ziarek challenges the generally accepted interpretations of Woolf’s passages on the 
expression of female anger in art, not as “the suppression of Woolf’s own anger” but as 
“Woolf’s feminist revision of the Nietzschean critique of melancholic resentment” (95). 
Resentment is thus understood as a “reactive rather than a creative affect,” and as an effect 
of melancholy that leaves the subject feeling powerless and unable to productively contribute 
to or engage with artistic practice (95-96). Rather than understanding Woolf’s writing as a 
direction for women to let go of or repress this resentment, Ziarek interprets this as a 
challenge to transform it:  
 
This opposition between the reactive force of anger and the creative force of artistic 
freedom does not imply that women should simply repress their anger (and that is 
how Woolf has been more frequently interpreted), but, on the contrary, it means they 
should transform rage into either an artistic practice or a collective struggle for 
freedom. (Ziarek 96).  
 
In order to overcome melancholy, reactive resentment must be transformed into a creative 
and productive force, directed into either artistic excess or political struggles. It is the 
“unmediated expression of female anger” that mirrors the “unmediated expression of 
masculine freedom” (96). Ziarek reminds us that artistic practice and political freedom 
cannot be isolated from each other, since the overcoming—or, more appropriately, 
transformation—of anger and resentment “depends on women’s collective struggle for and 
practice of freedom” (97). Ziarek’s argument here recalls Elizabeth Grosz’s call for feminism 
to return to the notion of ‘freedom to’—to think the concept of freedom not only as freedom 
from patriarchal and phallocentric power structures, politics, and ideologies, but a freedom 
to act, to create, to think and become otherwise (as discussed in chapter four).  
      
      
172 
 
 
This movement from melancholy to revolution, this transformative practice, whilst 
inextricably linked to the struggle for political and economic freedom, is also bound up in the 
struggle to break away from “ossified conventions and ideological phantoms”—to find new 
innovations in art forms and modes of composition and production (97). This is (at least) a 
two part struggle; women’s struggle for political and economic, as well as artistic and literary 
freedom, is perhaps the point in which we can find some connection between Wells’ notion 
of a feminine aesthetic, and Ziarek’s conception of feminist aesthetics. For Wells, in order to 
achieve a feminine aesthetic, “it is necessary to abandon conservative forms, and create 
radical texts which may demand greater participation from the viewing audience” (200). 
However, where Wells seeks to define a singular conception of the feminine, Ziarek’s feminist 
aesthetics seeks to open up multiple possibilities of feminist art—new processes, ideologies, 
and codes and conventions of composition beyond a search for a so-called feminine essence. 
For Ziarek, the fictional figure of Mary Carmichael in A Room of One’s Own demonstrates 
this struggle, as a woman who, “almost liberated from hatred and fear, has a remarkable and 
free sensibility” (97). Ziarek goes on to say:  
 
This freedom allows her to laugh at the peculiarities of the other sex, to ignore the 
admonitions and criticisms of the bishops and the deans, and to focus instead on the 
process of writing itself. She stretches language to its limit in order to find a way of 
expressing “unrecorded gestures” of femininity, to uncover “almost unknown or 
unrecorded things,” and to bring to light that which had been buried: destroyed bodies 
of women, women’s unrecorded lives, sexual and professional relations among 
women, and female political communities. (97-98).  
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As Woolf and Ziarek suggest, through the notion of stretching language (and any system of 
representation) to its limit, animation working within a feminist aesthetics of potentiality is 
not only animation that addresses feminist political, cultural and social issues, but that which 
“stretches” the limits of form and materiality, seeking ways to express those aspects of the 
feminine, of women and their lives that have previously been left unacknowledged or 
unrecorded. It not only acknowledges the “destroyed bodies of women,” but the creative and 
productive bodies of women, seeking to remedy their historical and continuing exclusion 
from various aspects of cultural and political life. Wells approaches something like this in his 
formulation of the feminine aesthetic, when he writes that a feminine aesthetic seeks to 
reveal a woman’s relationship with her own body, as well as “her social and political identity 
within the domestic and professional space” (200).  
 
The need to push and stretch language and form to their limit is a key factor in Ziarek’s 
conceptualisation of feminist aesthetics. In rethinking the form/matter divide, Ziarek 
confronts the relationship between female embodiment, aesthetic form and political 
violence, a relationship implied in her examination of the oppositional narratives of 
revolution and melancholia (123). Like many debates within wider feminist theory, debates 
within feminist aesthetics often focus on the tensions between the discursive and the 
material. The form/matter divide that Ziarek speaks to, she notes, is commonly referred to in 
feminist theory as the binary of the “materiality of the body/discourse;” matter, she remind 
us, is associated with “passivity and receptivity … a site of the exclusion of the feminine” 
(123). Formal experimentation then, is linked with possibilities of political and revolutionary 
change, and refutes the alleged passivity of matter—all animation carries with it the potential 
for refutation, and this is what Cournoyer’s animation in particular demonstrates. Ziarek 
seeks to displace the form/matter binary by formulating an understanding of aesthetics 
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through an interrelation of form/matter/political violence, which “replaces the aesthetic 
form/political content opposition that structures most debates about aesthetics and politics” 
(124). A feminist understanding of materiality is key here; following Butler’s reading of 
Irigaray, Ziarek notes that the notion of matter as “passive and formless” at the expense of 
woman and the feminine is “still contested in feminist theories of embodiment and sexuality 
today” (124). Extending the work of feminist corporeal philosophy examined in chapter three, 
which seeks a non-dichotomous transformation of the mind/body binary, Ziarek calls for a 
“new, interactive model of mediation between matter and form” for feminist aesthetics (124).  
 
First, Ziarek clarifies her use of the term form, as in aesthetics the “multiple uses of 
form are often collapsed under a single term” (124). Sometimes, form is regarded as little 
more than a fixed, stable structure, operating in opposition to content: “form is defined as 
the outer sensible shape of the inner signification” (124). Rather than take form as a static, 
stable structure, however, it is more useful to understand form as an active and dynamic 
principle of the particular work of art, articulating (or animating) “the relations between its 
materials or component parts” (125). This understanding of form is particularly well-suited 
to the conceptualisation of animation and its form(s), as animation itself cannot be limited 
to a singular ‘form’. Animation itself is never static or stable; it is a dynamic medium, a 
process that at its core is inextricably linked with movement. Animation relies upon a tension 
between movement and stillness, the animated and inanimate, encounters that take place in 
a moment of in-between (the frames). Of course, the notion that feminist aesthetics should 
only be concerned with experimental forms, or that feminist works of art should seek ways to 
reinvent or challenge traditional or conventional forms has met with criticism. As noted 
above, Felski argues that, although a form may be “formally conventional, or marketed for 
profit, we may not automatically conclude that it is irredeemably compromised and cannot 
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constitute a legitimate medium of oppositional cultural activity” (1989 181). However, it is 
not Ziarek’s intention to dismiss those works which are formally conventional; rather, she is 
seeking a way to understand literary and artistic works that do not fall back on or continue to 
reassert the familiar form/content or form/matter binary. She acknowledges that there are a 
number of reasons why this binary is continually reasserted, not least of which is “the 
persistence of content-based psychological, philosophical, or political interpretations of 
literary works” (126). Whilst not discounting the importance or usefulness of such 
interpretations, Ziarek seeks to move beyond them; her question for feminist aesthetics 
becomes whether or not “the composition of the work of art can reveal a different model of 
mediation between form, bodies, and materiality:”  
 
In opposition to political formalism, the aesthetic model of mediation I want to 
propose stresses the inseparability and interaction between form and materiality in 
the dynamic structure of the artwork … Such interaction between matter, form, and 
embodiment becomes a source of resistance and creation of new meaning. (127)  
 
Ziarek’s investigation of the interrelations of form/matter/political violence on the bodies of 
women is significant to this thesis, as the transformative possibilities she identifies are key 
to my examination of the ways in which female bodies animate and are animated. The 
possibilities for feminist aesthetics within animation lie in the same tensions between the 
melancholic and the revolutionary, and in the experimentation that explores those 
connections between form, materiality and embodiment.        
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Animating Feminist Aesthetics  
 
Animation’s feminist aesthetics lie in the same tensions between the melancholic and 
the revolutionary, and in animation’s ability to complicate the relation between form, 
materiality and embodiment. In animation, form is more than a stable, static structure that 
contains the narrative and materials of the work, and instead operates as a dynamic, active, 
variable aspect of the work itself. The form the animation takes thus informs the work, 
operating alongside the materials and through the embodied experience of the animator. In 
Jane Aaron’s Interior Designs for instance (analysed by Wells as representative of a feminine 
aesthetic), the pencilled, drawn animation is not merely superimposed upon a live action 
domestic space, but operates in a dynamic interplay with that live action setting. The space 
of the animator’s apartment itself becomes animated through stop-motion, as two modes or 
forms of animation in interaction). When the film ends with a door opening to reveal the 
animator’s workplace (a room of her own) the drawn elements and the animator’s lived, 
material world are brought together, demonstrating that they have never been truly separate. 
Aaron’s film thus explores the relations between the personal and the professional, revealing 
the ways the artistic intertwines with the everyday. That a female animator will express 
feminist aesthetics through her animation is not an inherent given, yet many women in 
animation have engaged with animated forms and materials in order to challenge patriarchal 
and phallocentric viewpoints, imbuing their work with a feminist consciousness. Animation, 
which may take up a variety of techniques, forms, and styles including but not limited to 
drawn, painted, sculpted, stop-motion, claymation, cut-out, collage, direct-on-film, and 
computer generated animation, is in part defined by its ability to impart the illusion of life 
and movement, an illusion which is itself made possible through the order of the in-between; 
in-between in the literal sense of ‘between the frames’, the gap, the absence, and the in-
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between as meeting point, complicating any simple distinction between life and movement, 
movement and stasis, animate and inanimate. Hence, animation’s feminist aesthetics of 
potentiality lie in the potentiality and possibilities inherent in the animated medium.  
 
I return now to Michèle Cournoyer’s Robes of War, first examining the animation in 
context of Wells’s conception of the feminine aesthetic, before shifting my discussion 
towards the framework of feminist aesthetics put forward by Ziarek. If, as Ziarek writes, 
“women’s experience of melancholic muteness is intertwined with violence inflicted upon 
women’s bodies, language and nature,” then Robes of War directly addresses such violence 
and muteness (3). In Robes of War (as in her other films), Cournoyer forgoes language 
entirely; the only sound in the film the haunting, foreboding music of a church organ. Like 
other of Cournoyer’s work, Robes of War demonstrates an entanglement of form, materiality, 
and embodiment, the animation of which is inextricably bound up in the animation process 
itself. This provides a starting point for understanding how a feminist aesthetics of 
potentiality may work through animation.  
 
The official synopsis for Robes of War reads: “This animated short is a lyrical 
exploration of the impact of war on women, their bodies and their families. Bringing a 
feminist sensibility to a contemporary issue, it looks at what happens when war insinuates 
itself inside the very being of a woman—she who once gave life.”13 Cournoyer’s films are at 
once intensely personal yet speak to collective trauma and experience. Although Robes of 
War takes as its subject the women who live in conflict zones, the drive to make the film came 
from what Cournoyer describes as a dreamlike impulse. She recounts seeing images of war 
 
13 “Robes of War” Synopsis, National Film Board of Canada, www.nfb.ca/film/robes_of_war/. Accessed 5 Oct. 2016. 
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zones on television, being struck by the silent images of women in veils (such as the niqab, 
hijab, or chador) and recalling similarities with her own religious upbringing, where she  and 
other girls “wore veils to church”: “We hid behind the veil and always wore black. And 
sacrifice was paramount. On TV, you saw women walking around … the tanks, veiled women 
… It was a whole other world. I wanted to know what lay behind the veil: (Cournoyer 2014). 
Cournoyer goes on to speak of a vision, where her “eyelids seemed like army helmets,” 
compelling her to make a film about war (Cournoyer 2014).  
 
It is notable that Cournoyer speaks of seeing these women on television amidst grim 
imagery of conflict and war zones, but not of hearing them. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian 
(2009) examines the perceived muteness in the representations of women in war zones, and 
the complex hierarchies and systems of power at play in the silencing of their voices. 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian writes that even though the effects of war and violence on the bodies 
and everyday lives of women is readily acknowledged, “the documentation of women’s 
history and frontline activities in war and conflict zones is generally lacking” (13). She speaks 
directly in her work to the experiences of Palestinian women, as well as drawing on her 
experiences working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), teaching, and activism 
in Palestine, Israel and Jordan. Shalhoub-Kevorkian contends that part of the problem that 
these women face is that their voices often suffer from “exclusion and denial to the degree of 
total cancellation” despite the fact that they have long been involved in frontline activities 
and political while facing threats and acts of violence (14). Cournoyer’s choice to forgo 
spoken language in her short animation becomes significant here, emphasising this perceived 
muteness. However, rather than a denial of voice, the focus on the inked line and the 
metamorphic qualities of the image draws out something else, avoiding the presentation of a 
passive subject; the voice(less) is transformed, in this sense quite literally through the 
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transformation of the animated line, undertaking a revolutionary act. The women in 
Cournoyer’s film do not silently grieve, but actively take up arms in an act of resistance, 
echoing, as Shalhoub-Kevorkian writes, the fact that these women “are active resisters and 
fighters with significant personal agency garnered at tremendous personal cost,” rather than 
an image of women who, contrary to popular narratives, passively accept and tolerate such 
violence (79).  
 
Robes of War is not tied to any particular place or specific war zone; as such, it 
becomes difficult to link to the film to any specific literature or individual case study on the 
effects of violence against women in conflict zones. Shalhoub-Kevorkian speaks directly to a 
case study of Palestinian women, and to assume that her text speaks for all women living in 
conflict zones, or all Middle-Eastern women, would be reductive and essentialising. What 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s text provides, however, is a complex and detailed understanding of the 
ways different kinds of violence within a war zone intersect and the resulting effects on the 
women who live through them, whether that violence is inflicted through external forces of 
militarisation and colonisation (as is portrayed in Cournoyer’s film), or through “internal 
patriarchal violence” (79). She also details the contradictions inherent in the totalising 
representation of ‘woman as nation’, an image evoked in the final transformations of Robes 
of War, where a destroyed building crumbles away to reveal the bare bones of a woman’s 
ribcage. Shalhoub-Kevorkian calls for an “elastic feminism” that would allow for such a 
problematic conception of woman and/as nation to exist, as it has been the case that “such a 
deployment in colonized areas has often led to emancipatory movements whereby women’s 
struggle for emancipation has gone hand-in-hand with the national resistance movement” 
(87). And yet, she also acknowledges that in such a conception the violence and abuse 
inflicted on women’s bodies becomes representative of the violence inflicted against the 
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nation itself; “in so doing the female body is denied its pain and agony” (88). Overall, by 
centring such contestations of power on and in the bodies of women, the bodies of women 
are left marginalised:  
 
Questions remain how women’s bodies and lives, how women and nation or as 
imagined nation, and how women’s spaces are situated in between dominant power 
structures (including between the West and the non-West, the modern and 
traditional, public and private, reason and emotion) and thus how women are thereby 
transformed into contested sites that are subsequently used to mark contested 
borders in the wars waged by men. (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 90)  
 
An animated short film such as Robes of War cannot and should not be divorced from the 
political and cultural contexts from which it is drawn. Whilst acknowledging that the political 
and the aesthetic remain intertwined, the following discussion will focus on how the 
animation, in this case, perhaps reveals “a different model of mediation between form, 
bodies, and materiality” (Ziarek 127). Through the trembling instability of the inked line, and 
the constant shifting of entire image and scenario, which never remains fixed, Cournoyer 
interrogates and complicates the representation of woman as, per the film’s synopsis, “she 
who once gave life” alongside the imminent forces of death and violence. Life and death, in 
this case, are not positioned as purely internal/external oppositions; just as animation 
transforms and refigures the mind/body binary, Robes of War complicates and transforms the 
series of oppositions to which the mind/body binary is linked, in doing so opening up 
possibilities for the ‘elastic’ conception of woman and/as nation that Shalhoub-Kevorkian 
calls for. Rather than disavowing the pain and agony of the female body, Cournoyer’s film 
refocuses on this pain, placing woman at the centre and as the source of her metamorphoses, 
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whilst also complicating and opening up mediations between body, form and materiality in 
animation aesthetics.  
 
To briefly address Paul Wells notion of the feminine aesthetic, it would be a simple 
task to classify Cournoyer’s film (and indeed, other of her animations including The Hat and 
Accordion), as exemplifying this aesthetic. Robes of War expresses itself in primarily visual 
terms; in this sense, the film also asks for “a greater participation from the viewing audience,” 
foregoing linear, narrative structure for a lyrical, almost ‘stream-of-consciousness’ mode of 
expression as the metamorphoses conflate and collapse distinctions between bodies, place, 
and machinery of war (Wells 200). Finally, complicating the representation of woman by 
oscillating between woman as subject and object (the woman who grieves and the woman 
who becomes an instrument of war), Cournoyer’s work seeks to “reveal a woman’s 
relationship to her own body” (200), breaking down dichotomised perceptions of private and 
public selves, mother and child, social and political identities (between mother and activist, 
or, in Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s terms, frontliner). The woman in Robes of War becomes a 
helicopter, a tank, the crumbling remains of a building. From a grieving mother, who weeps 
tears that re-form into the body of a dead son, her anger transforms her into the very 
instruments of conflict that likely caused his death. One woman becomes many women, her 
fingers become limbs and legs, personal grief and pain become linked and inseparable from 
collective grief and pain.  
 
Moving beyond a conception of a singular feminine aesthetic however, Cournoyer’s body of 
work—including but not limited to Robes of War—can be understood as demonstrating an 
open and generative feminist aesthetics of potentiality, which is implicitly linked to her own 
practice and process. Describing this process, Julie Roy notes that Cournoyer animates in 
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fragments, often without a storyboard: “Indeed, it is during the writing process, i.e., the 
actual act of drawing, that the subject and narrative develop and metamorphoses appear” 
(26). It is through this process that the emotions of the work arise; rather than working with 
a structured storyboard, the metamorphoses and connections emerge organically, 
unconsciously. Cournoyer’s images flow in a sustained, sometimes disorienting 
metamorphosis, the transformations developing through the act of painting itself. Indeed, 
any attempt to describe the film through text, as I have done above, will almost certainly fail 
to capture the intricacies and nuances of the constantly mutating, shifting lines of ink. 
Working without a clear indication of how a completed sequence of metamorphoses (or, as 
Cournoyer has described them, ellipses) will look when complete, an aesthetics of 
potentiality is embedded in Cournoyer’s process.  
 
Cournoyer’s animation displays what Ziarek describes as the “inseparability and 
interaction between form and materiality in the dynamic structure of the artwork,” the 
animated form shaping, as well as being actively shaped by, the materiality of the work (125). 
Form, materiality and content operate together in a dynamic interplay. Cournoyer’s choice 
of materials—paper and ink—is a deliberate aesthetic choice that she has taken up in all her 
animation work since The Hat (a decision, and transition away from rotoscope, made for 
reasons discussed in chapter eight). Cournoyer’s use of black ink on white paper, more than 
providing a stark visual contrast, allows the animator to articulate and make material her own 
particular connections between form, artistic material and the body. In a 2017 interview with 
Claudie Levesque, when asked if the body in the animation she is seen working on his hers, 
Cournoyer replies: “It’s always mine. It’s an extension of the body.” Cournoyer describes the 
animated body as a “prolongation” of herself, allowing her to directly express explicit 
emotions and unconscious, embodied impulses. Animation allows her to participate in what 
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she describes as “surrealist play” allowing for “all kinds of freedom and games” even as her 
films explores harrowing themes. It is this kind of freedom that allows her to refigure the 
body, and allows us to see the ways animation can be a site for conceiving of the body from a 
feminist corporeal perspective. The materiality of the ink becomes an extension of the body 
of the animator, the final shape of the work a result of embodied practice. In moments of 
violence—the woman-as-tank, battles between faceless soldiers, explosions of ink—the 
brushwork is rough, and the ink smudged and splattered; the movements become jerky and 
uneven, a direct connection between hand, brush, ink and paper. The violence of the situation 
depicted is mirrored in and evoked by the violence of the animation.  
 
To return once more to Ziarek, this interrelation of form, materiality and embodied 
practice at play in Cournoyer’s animation not only emphasises the inseparability of such 
interactions, but also evokes the violence inflicted on the bodies of women. It testifies to “the 
damage and domination inflicted on bodies, feminized matter, and nature,” as well as 
revealing and contesting the split between such materialities and the political/economic 
forms of violence which are part of their cause (174). The violent separation of abstract forms 
of life—human rights, cultural and political values, citizenship, sovereignty—from the 
material body is inherently tied up in the devaluing and oppression of women, female bodies, 
and feminized matter. Ziarek turns towards feminist aesthetics in order to explore the 
possibilities for transforming such divides, the task being “to elaborate a new model of 
interaction between damaged materialities and aesthetic form” (188). 
 
Robes of War elaborates a new model of interaction between damaged materialities 
and aesthetic form quite literally through its unfolding metamorphoses, centring upon and 
emerging from within the expressively animated bodies of women. Cournoyer’s animation 
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not only evokes the transformative encounter between the melancholic and the revolutionary 
in political praxis; “What this juxtaposition of political insurgences and aesthetic innovations 
reveals is that the seemingly neutral form/matter opposition is at stake in both feminist 
political struggles and aesthetic interventions” (Ziarek 187). The women in Cournoyer’s 
animation, always on the brink of becoming-something-else, occupy a state of in-
betweenness, both metaphorically and literally. They are caught between woman and 
machine, one and many, melancholy and revolution, life and death; this in-betweenness 
becomes the very site of potentiality, as it not only complicates and displaces these binary 
distinctions, but is the site in which the transformation of the ink emerges. This 
transformation not only marks the body and the material as in flux, but as an active force in 
a dynamic interplay with form. Such interaction, as Ziarek writes, “marks an openness to what 
is yet to come, the possibility of political transformation, the creation of new, embodied 
forms of life, and the arrival of a more expansive conception of freedom and speech.” (189). 
Cournoyer’s use of metamorphosis suggests just such an openness, animating the 
form/matter divide and eliciting a complex conception of the interactions between form, 
bodies, and materiality.  
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Chapter Seven – The Body Animated 
 
I’m interested in the female body, women’s innermost selves. That’s the unconscious, huh? 
—Michèle Cournoyer 
      
In Michèle Cournoyer’s A Feather Tale (La Basse Cour; 1992), a woman emerges from a 
box delivered to her lover with the body of a chicken, which the man then plucks; The Hat (Le 
Chapeau; 1999) sees a woman dance for a crowd of faceless men in a bar, her body contorting 
in impossible ways as the scenario shifts between her dance and the sexual assault she 
endured as a child; in Accordion (Accordéon; 2006), the body is stripped down to wires and 
cables, as two people experience a sexual encounter through the machine; in Robes of War 
(Robe de guerre; 2008), the body of a grieving mother becomes that of an armoured tank, the 
tread her bandaged and bloody legs; Soif (2013) explores a woman’s addiction to alcohol, her 
body becoming at times a fish, at other times decanting itself into various glasses and bottles, 
her addiction embodied. Unconscious desires, obsessions, traumas, pain and pleasure are 
played out through Cournoyer’s animations through the constantly unfolding 
metamorphosis of the body. The body in animation may undergo any number of surprising 
or subtle transformations, the potentiality inherent to animated forms allowing for suffering 
bodies to be more than their suffering, undergoing any number of playful, subversive, or 
transgressive metamorphoses. It is through such acts of metamorphosis that the in-between 
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is revealed—a moment where the body fluctuates between what it was and what it is 
becoming. As quoted above, Cournoyer is interested in “the female body, women’s innermost 
selves,” a statement which implies that for Cournoyer, to animate the female body is also to 
animate the mind, woman’s unconscious thoughts, feelings, and desires. And yet the body 
does not become subordinate to mind in her animations—rather, the interrelation between 
body and mind is revealed and explored in its various complexities. Through Cournoyer’s use 
of metamorphosis, the implicit connection between body and mind, inside and outside is 
made explicit. In the previous chapter I argued that Cournoyer’s animation demonstrates the 
possibilities of an open and generative feminist aesthetics, her use of metamorphosis 
illustrating the complex interaction between form, bodies, and materiality. In this chapter 
and the next, I intend to further examine how this use of metamorphosis refigures the 
mind/body binary, revealing the relationship between mind and body as non-hierarchical. 
 
Cournoyer’s representation of the female form in her animated films is surrealistic, 
experimental, and deeply personal, but her animation of the body turns to matters other than 
representation. An examination of the issue of representation of the body in animation is 
first required in order to understand why Cournoyer’s (re)animation of the body is so 
significant. In Understanding Animation, Paul Wells argues that, “[t]he idea of animation as 
an innocent medium, ostensibly for children, and largely dismissed in film histories, has done 
much to inhibit the proper discussion of issues concerning representation” (187). Building 
upon this statement, I argue that this perceived innocence has also hindered any rigorous 
feminist inquiry into the nature of animated bodies. Innocent here may also be understood 
to mean neutral, that which denies difference, and implicitly takes the masculine as its norm. 
As argued in chapter six of this thesis, animation is never passive or neutral, but an art form 
that leaves itself open to dynamic interplay between materiality, form and embodiment. 
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There is a potential inherent in animated forms to evoke and play with the notion of a body 
that is not neutral, that is not containable, a body that may “testify to the permeability or 
incompleteness of the notion of nature” (Grosz 1994 187). The very phrase ‘body in 
animation’ and its variants — the body animated, the animated body — suggests an 
ontological dimension to the question of how the human body is not only represented in 
animated films, but how it is figuratively and materially animated (or re-animated). To 
animate and be animated suggests the impartation of life and of movement. An animated 
body implies a body that is lively, alive, in motion, active, and becoming. How we understand 
and think through this animation of the body necessarily changes according to the specificity 
of the material, form, and narrative of the animated work in question, as animation is itself a 
medium that is marked by multiplicity.  
 
Any discussion of bodies in animation inevitably turns to issues of representation, and in 
particular the ways in which female characters are drawn, rendered, or otherwise animated. 
Rebecca Coleman writes that representation is “the prevailing way in which feminist theory 
has tracked the relationships between the body and images (of transformation, and also 
images more generally)” (32). This discourse on representation is often framed through 
social-constructionist discourse on gender, diversity of body types, and inevitably linked to 
the representation of women in the animation industry in creative roles (with the expectation 
being that more women working in animation behind the scenes will lead to greater diversity 
and representation on screen). Such debates and critiques of representation are a necessary 
starting point, as animation allows for almost limitless diversity of representations, reflecting 
the very real multiplicity of bodies and female experiences. However, it is the intention of 
this thesis to think in excess of representation; the potentiality of animation provides the 
perfect site for exploring and animating feminist perspectives of the body and becoming. It 
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is easy to see the temptation of delineating the works of an animator such as Cournoyer 
(whose films do contain identifiably human figures) in purely representational terms. 
However, Cournoyer’s animation also evokes the potential of bodies to become-other and to 
overcome themselves, an inherent potential that is prior to representation without yet being 
the foundation of representation. Following chapter six, in which I examined the possibility 
of a feminist aesthetics for animation, this chapter will consider the how the dynamic 
interplay of form, materiality, and embodiment in animation may transform the mind/body, 
male/female dichotomy that underlies Western thought. After a brief examination of the key 
literature around bodies and representation, I will draw on the feminist frameworks of 
corporeality and materiality established in chapters three and four to examine how this 
feminist refiguration of the body may inform, and operate through, animation.  
 
Representing Bodies  
 
In 2014, Alison Loader offered a reappraisal of The Animator’s Survival Kit by Richard 
Williams (2001). The Survival Kit is often cited as something of an animator’s bible, or as a 
must-have text in an animator’s toolkit. Loader, an animation filmmaker and scholar, 
critiques some of Williams’ more “troublingly normative views on gender,” including an 
anecdote about a ‘gay walk’ that begins the text’s section on walk cycles (2014 n.p.) In 
Williams’ anecdote, he describes being able to recognise a man as gay due to his “effeminate 
walk … He was walking as if on a tightrope and gliding along” (105). Loader also contrasts the 
neutrality (that is, ‘masculinity’) of his stick figure examples with his illustrations of more 
‘feminine’ walk cycles, represented alternately via the figures of a ballerina, a fashion model, 
and a stripper, although as she also points out, “Williams does not sexualize all of his female 
characters, for he also animates an old crone.” Williams, as Loader notes, is the creator of the 
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overtly-sexualised Jessica Rabbit, from Robert Zemeckis’ hybrid animation/live action film 
Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988). Jessica Rabbit’s hyper-feminised figure and bombshell 
persona, drawn in stark (yet humorous) contrast to her anthropomorphised rabbit husband, 
Roger Rabbit, has come to stand in for the ways in which certain animated texts overly 
exaggerate and caricature perceived feminine characteristics and female bodies. Jessica 
Rabbit’s famous catchphrase, “I’m not bad, I’m just drawn that way” would appear in this 
sense both self-reflexive acknowledgement of her design, and further reference to the femme 
fatale archetype she both plays into and subverts. Loader does not dismiss The Survival Kit 
outright, nor does she argue that it should not be used as a teaching resource. Indeed, she 
praises the text for its “wonderful advice on animating weight, timing and breaking joints, 
while engaging readers in a first person account of cartoon history.” What she does suggest 
is that the more problematic sections of the text serve as an opportunity to engage students 
in a discussion about representation and stereotypes in animation, and that the Survival Kit 
should only be one resource of many when it comes to offering students templates for walk 
cycles and practical guides to the craft of animation.  
 
  Loader’s critique is especially pertinent because, even as animation would seem to be 
the ideal site to transform or overturn dominant patriarchal modes of representation, the 
illustrations in Williams’ texts presume narrow, stereotypical images of women, positioning 
the female figure in animation as the ‘other’ to a neutral masculine. Indeed, some of the 
responses to Loader’s blog post suggest that the need for critique of such representations is 
still very much required. Discussions of representation in animation must necessarily begin 
in the classroom and with students — if animation is to be understand as an artform that can 
provide a multiplicity and diversity of representation, counteracting both sexist and racist 
caricature and stereotypes, then that counteraction begins in the initial animation and 
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character design process. However, this undertaking must not come at the cost of making 
only a superficially positive change. As King, Lugo-Lugo, and Bloodsworth-Lugo argue in 
their book Animating Difference (2010), notions of race and gender in Western culture “have 
shifted, taking on superficially positive qualities, which seemingly affirm and empower 
difference and retain signification force as a means of projecting fantasies, policing deviation, 
arranging hierarchies, grounding identities, and reinforcing exclusions” (5). Animation’s 
openness, and its aesthetics of potentiality, should allow animation to represent and work 
through intersections of race, gender, and sexuality in complex, meaningful, and non-
reductive ways. When speaking of the representation of bodies then, we must move beyond 
critiquing representation of body types, and examine the various factors that contribute to 
the way these bodies are drawn, rendered, constructed and animated.  
 
It must be acknowledged that Disney have dominated much of the discourse around 
representation, particularly when it comes to issues of body image. Beyond the portrayal of 
stereotypically feminine behaviours relying on socially constructed gender roles, the ‘Disney 
Princess’ movies and related merchandise in particular have raised concerns around possible 
negative effects on body esteem in young girls. Sarah M. Coyne et.al. (2016) have noted that 
the Princess characters are often perceived as embodying a thin-ideal, and that “emphasis on 
the princess’ beauty may be an early context in which girls are taught that attractiveness is a 
necessary component of female identity” (4). Coyne’s study on the effects of young girls 
engagement with the Disney Princess media finds that although engagement with this media 
(films, television series and merchandise) led to “higher levels of female gender-stereotypical 
behaviour for both boys and girls,” more research is needed on the long-term effect and 
connection between Princess engagement and body esteem (13-14). The perceived negative 
effects of the thin-ideal these characters represent have taken hold of popular imagination, 
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however, and there have been various attempts to refigure these bodies and reimagine more 
‘realistic’ Disney Princesses. In 2014 author and illustrator Loryn Brantz redrew the 
waistlines of several Disney princess characters, with an article proclaiming, “[h]ealthier 
waistlines for them and healthier self-esteem for us growing up.”14 Brantz reimagines various 
princess characters, including Ariel from The Little Mermaid (1989), Jasmine from Aladdin 
(1992), and Elsa from Frozen (2013) with waistlines that are noticeably less slim than their 
original design. Brantz’s point — that the depiction of these female characters with 
‘unhealthy’ waistlines may lead to poor body esteem in young girls — is clear, however, her 
work should be contextualised within a broader understanding of how ‘realism’ operates in 
Disney animation.  
 
Wells suggests that to define ‘realism’ or reality “as it operates within any image-making 
practice is open to interpretation,” and that this is particularly relevant with regards to 
animation practice (1998 24). Far from being confined to the narrative based fantasy, science-
fiction, or fairytale genres (with which it is commonly associated), animation also has a long-
held association with documentary and non-fiction filmmaking practice. Animation also 
frequently finds itself utilised within scientific or medical visualisations. To consider 
animation as it relates to the ‘real’ is not, in most cases, based on the indexicality of the image 
or its relationship to any kind of indexical reality, but rather on a subjective understanding 
of the world as it is perceived or experienced, without making claims to objectivism. 
Animation can range from the abstract to the ‘photo-real’, on a scale of that Maureen Furniss 
describes as a continuum, ranging from ‘mimesis’ to ‘abstraction’ (2007 5). According to 
Wells, the ‘hyper-realism’ of the Disney films have become the relative measure for realism 
 
14 Brantz, Loryn. “If Disney Princesses Had Realistic Waistlines” BuzzFeed, 30 Oct. 2014, 
www.buzzfeed.com/lorynbrantz/if-disney-princesses-had-realistic-waistlines. Accessed 5 Nov. 2016. 
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in animation. Wells follows Umberto Eco, who writes that “To speak of things that one wants 
to connote as real, these things must seem real. The “completely real” becomes identified 
with the “completely fake”” (1986 7). For Wells, this notion of the completely fake defines 
animation in general, and he argues that Disney animation in particular is defined by its 
hyper-realism, an aspiration towards “the creation of a realistic image system which echoes 
the ‘realism’ of the live-action film” (1998 25). This realism is not measured in terms of 
whether the animation is ‘photorealistic’ but via other certain key codes and conventions. 
These include whether or not characters, objects, and environments operate in subject to the 
laws of physical reality, the use of sound and its “diegetic appropriateness,” and whether or 
not the “construction, movement and behavioural tendencies of ‘the body’ in the hyper-
realist animated film will correspond to the orthodox physical aspects of human beings and 
creatures in the ‘real’ world” (25-26). Whether or not an animated film can be understood as 
hyper-realist does not depend on the subject matter, style or animation techniques, but only 
on how closely it corresponds to the above codes and conventions. As such, for Wells, a film 
may be hyper-realist if it is “Disneyesque in construction or like the subjective-documentary 
‘lip-sinc’ series made by the Aardman studios” (26). This hyper-realism, however, is “neither 
a completely accurate version of the real world nor a radical vindication of the animated 
form;” on the continuum of realism in animation, it sits between abstraction and mimesis, 
and does not fully explore the potentialities of the animated form with regards to either 
representation, or the mutability of the body (27). Following Andy Darley, Wells suggests that 
another way to understand this hyper-realism in animation is as over-illusionism: a realism 
that is over-determined, that which is “simultaneously realistic but beyond the orthodoxies 
of realism” (27). This over-determination can also be seen in the principle of ‘squash and 
stretch’ animation. The implications of squash and stretch for the representation and 
animation of ‘real’, fleshed bodies will be examined later in this chapter.  
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Disney and other major Western studios producing animated feature films such as Pixar, 
DreamWorks, and Twentieth Century Fox dominate commercial animation markets, and 
hence much of the discourse regarding animation, bodies, and representation. However, 
there have always been alternative modes of representation available, and women in 
animation in particular have used the animated medium to draw on personal and collective 
female experience in representing the body, interrogating dominant modes of representation 
and complicating understandings of the body as either purely ‘natural’ or purely ‘socially 
constructed’. Wells claims such animation made by women falls within a ‘feminine aesthetic’, 
a concept which has been closely discussed in chapter six of this thesis. Whilst the concept of 
a feminine aesthetic itself is problematic, there have been a number of female animators 
throughout history that have either deliberately or implicitly set themselves against hyper-
realist representational paradigms. Evelyn Lambart, for instance, well known for her cut-out 
animation and experimental collaborations with Norman McLaren, foregrounded the 
exploratory nature of the work she and her and her colleagues performed at the National Film 
Board of Canada (NFB), emphasising that “originality was valued tremendously. Derivative 
work was absolutely hated. We didn’t do any cel work at all, in fact we were highly 
contemptuous of Disney…” (1992, 31). As Sandra Law writes in her analysis of the works of 
animators Joanna Quinn, Candy Guard, and Alison de Vere, animation can be a means to 
explore “the notion of the female form as something that is malleable and whose femaleness 
can be enhanced or reduced” (1997 66). Whilst not every female animator can be classified as 
a feminist filmmaker, a number of women in animation deliberately take up feminist 
perspectives in their work. Joanna Quinn, as Law notes, is a prominent example. 
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Joanna Quinn is a British artist and filmmaker who uses humour in her animation as a 
means to critique the dominant animated representations of women and female bodies. 
Regarding her feminist point of view, Quinn states “…I get angry, but I think humour’s a great 
weapon. I like using humour to say things” (1992 86). Her critique of the dominant modes of 
representation and the narrow portrayal of female body types in film and animation (and in 
the media more broadly) can be seen most clearly through the creation of the character 
Beryl—a middle-aged, Welsh house-wife who first appeared in the animated short Girls’ 
Night Out (1987), followed by Body Beautiful (1991), and Dreams & and Desires — Family 
Ties (2006). The first of these, Girls’ Night Out, sees Beryl taken out for her birthday by her 
friends to see a male stripper. In this short, Beryl works on a production line at a factory that 
produces various baked goods, whilst also performing the duties of a housewife (cleaning, 
doing the dishes) as her husband sits in an armchair in front of the television. After Beryl’s 
friends have convinced her to go with them to see the stripper, Beryl fantasises about 
escaping her day-to-day mundane housework and uninterested husband. Later at the pub 
with her friends, she stands out in her bright pink dress against dull colour of the rest of the 
crowd. At first embarrassed and made awkward by the individual attention of the stripper, 
Beryl soon begins to enjoy herself, taking pleasure in looking, and even snatching away the 
man’s G-string. Wells argues that Beryl and Girls’ Night Out are still located in realist modes 
of representation, due in large part to the “very ordinariness of Beryl and her environment, 
exemplified in the design of the film” (1998 52). Beryl and her environments are drawn in a 
rough, pencil sketch style, which allows certain aspects of the animation to stand out — the 
bold colours of Beryl’s outfit, the liveliness of objects such as a ringing telephone, a cake on 
a production line, bouncing glasses of beer, and the lines of Beryl’s body. This, according to 
Wells, is Quinn’s way of manipulating the “accepted notions of orthodox animation and the 
hyper-realist text” (52). As Beryl laughs on the phone with her friends, the lines of her face 
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become frenetic scribbles; carrying a tray of drinks to her friends, each line of her body seems 
to shake and the drinks bounce in an overly-pronounced manner reminiscent of squash and 
stretch. Beryl is not young, slim, or representative of so-called conventional societal notions 
of beauty or attractiveness, but she stands out thanks to her pink dress and the ‘imperfect’ 
jerkiness and liveliness of the animated lines and contours of her body. Once asked whether 
a Beryl TV series may be a possibility, Quinn replied that she feared she may ‘lose’ Beryl: 
“She’ll end up all horrible…banana fingers with stripes on… Mickey Mouse hands done by 
loads of in-betweeners,” implying that the rough, sketchiness of the way Beryl is animated is 
intrinsic to her character, and that something of this liveliness would be lost in a cleaner, 
more fluid animation (1992 86).  
 
Part of Beryl’s significance to this thesis lies precisely in the ways her body is 
foregrounded, and in Quinn’s approach to female forms. Law, in her exploration of the works 
female animators who choose to explore femininity and the lived experience of being female, 
remarks that Quinn’s humour is “distinct from that seen in the comic tradition of male 
artists,” in that it is not predicated on the humiliation of women (1997 48). Beryl’s physical 
form is not idealised, and Law notes that Quinn “creates identification, in part, by making 
Beryl into a character who is a very ‘ordinary’ person” (49). Where Girls Night Out 
foregrounds taking pleasure in the female gaze, Body Beautiful (1991) takes the body as its 
central focus, the action and narrative primarily taking place through the figure of Beryl: 
“Beryl’s person, which, at certain moments, is her literal body, becomes the battleground of 
what constitutes appropriate femininity” (Law 49). Body Beautiful sees Beryl now working at 
an electronics company, where she is taunted and continually objectified by Vince, a co-
worker and self-professed ‘ladies man’ at the factory. We see Beryl first through a still image, 
a photograph where she looks caught by surprise, as Vince describes her in voice over: “Look 
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at the love handles on that, now. Go on, come on be fair. You couldn’t, could you? You 
couldn’t!” Vince repeatedly describes Beryl as fat in a derogatory manner, dehumanises her 
by referring to her as ‘that’ (she is only an object not worthy of being desired), all the while 
presuming that Beryl still ‘wants’ him (as he assumes all the women at the factory want him). 
He encourages the other men to ‘play the game’. The first scene in the film sees Vince leading 
the women at the factory in an exercise routine, where Beryl struggles to keep up with the 
others as Vince continues to harass her (“Hey, when was the last time you saw your toes, 
love?”). Although her friends encourage her to complain to a manager, they also question 
whether or not Beryl is on a diet, or attempting to lose any weight. They intend to perform 
together in a cabaret at a company social night, and she needs to fit into the costume. At one 
point, Vince sneaks up on Beryl and physically grabs her, causing Beryl to metamorphose very 
quickly into a large whale and back again — Vince holds the power in their relationship, and 
triggers her sudden transformation. Caught cheating on her diet by her friends, Beryl 
transforms into a little girl, fingers pointing at her and her mother scolding her, before 
transforming into a pig, then back into her usual self. She bashfully throws away her 
sandwich. Beryl’s body changes without warning and against her will, triggered by the 
judgement, perceptions, and even the unwanted physical contact of others.  
 
When Beryl looks at diet and weight loss magazines at the newsagents, she sees 
depictions of the ‘ideal’ female form on the covers. As the newsagent calls out to her not to 
look, that those women must survive on ‘thin air’, Beryl, horrified, sees herself on the cover 
growing slimmer and disappearing into nothingness. Then her eyes are caught by magazines 
devoted to sumo wrestling, rugby, and ice hockey, sports where strength and larger physical 
presences are highly valued, and she becomes excited. Her enthusiasm for exercise is 
reignited, and she joins a fitness class at a gym. When she exercises at home, her body causes 
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her environment to shift and warp around her, as she vigorously jogs on the spot. Her 
physicality is front and centre: whenever we see her exercise there is a sense of weight and 
gravity to the drawings and her movements. Rather than the cabaret performance, Beryl 
chooses to enter the ‘Body Beautiful’ body building contest, competing against Vince and the 
other men. She shocks everyone with her strength, whilst rapping lyrics that include lines 
such as, “My body is mine, so let me be” and that she’s “proud of every pound and don’t want 
to shrink”. This time, Beryl is in control of her metamorphoses and contorts not only her own 
body, but wrests power from Vince as well. At one point she slaps the smile off Vince’s face 
and holds it in her hand; when posing next to Vince, her muscles bulge and vastly overshadow 
his performance. Beryl easily picks Vince up and throws him around as if he weighs nothing, 
rolls him up like a towel, and tosses him aside. She concludes her rap by declaring, “So come 
on all you women you’ve got nothing to fear,” urging them to reject outdated, patriarchal 
notions of an ‘ideal’ female body and confidently proclaims her own body beautiful. As she 
says this, she appears in the form of the conventionally attractive blonde, the type seen on a 
magazine cover, whose skin she unzips from the inside to emerge as her usual self. Body 
Beautiful remains a sharp and effective critique of the narrow understanding of what 
constitutes an acceptable female form; rather than fighting to ‘control’ her body weight, Beryl 
instead chooses to play to her body’s (literal) strengths. However, this is slightly undercut by 
the level of control Beryl holds over her own metamorphoses during the Body Beautiful 
contest — her body has ceased to become unruly.  
 
 Dreams & Desires — Family Ties (2006) provides yet another perspective on the female 
body. This time, Beryl has acquired a new digital video camera, and uses it to record her video 
diaries. The film begins with a voice over from Beryl, as she records something of a 
confessional:   
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Ever since my sister Beverley sent me this digicam, things have started to get out of 
hand - I mean, I talk to it every day, you know, like a diary. I use it whenever I want, I 
can’t stop! Everybody wants me to video something for them! I got lumbered with 
videoing Mandy’s bloody wedding, now, tomorrow! The thing is, I can’t say no, well 
you can’t, can you? I think I’m addicted. I can’t stop reading about film now, see, oh I 
love it! Oh it takes me places I’ve never been, like in my dreams…  
 
At this point the voice over fades, and we are offered a glimpse of one of her dreams. 
Beryl, naked, climbs on a pile of naked, male bodies, and dances atop them with a pair of 
cherub-like angels. She snaps out of her dream abruptly as her husband calls out to her to ask 
how the wedding video went; Beryl reviews the footage. From here on, everything we see is 
through the lens of the digicam, as Beryl rather inexpertly attempts to film Mandy’s wedding 
video. Beryl’s new found cinephilia sees her attempt to emulate the tracking shots of ‘Loni 
Reifenstein’ and reference “that Russian bloke Vertov” and his film Man With a Movie 
Camera. She (incorrectly) quotes Sergei Eisenstein: “Remember what Eisenstein said: We’re 
all in the shit, it’s just the depth that buries.” Beryl dutifully states the time and location of 
each new scene she records (“3.15, outside church”; “3.30, reception”), but her efforts 
produce less than desirable results — she captures the bride’s wardrobe malfunction, pushes 
a wheelchair-bound man with a broken leg into the bridal party during the ceremony, films 
herself drinking a glass of wine while sitting on the toilet, and, as she gets steadily more drunk 
at the reception, straps the camera to the bride’s dog which then promptly runs into the 
wedding cake table, causing it all to go flying. Beryl frequently turns the camera on herself, 
peering into the lens as she films herself from a low-angle, providing a running commentary 
on the events, or at times questioning her own abilities to successfully film a wedding video. 
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The film ends with Beryl, the day after the wedding (feeling the worse for wear), speaking 
once again to the camera, clothed only in her underwear with her body on display: “Oh god, 
what an ordeal — I’m a bag o’nerves!” The phone rings and it’s her sister, Beverley. Her head 
in her hands, Beryl sadly declares to her sister that she was “too ambitious,” to which Beverley 
responds not to worry about it, that “you gotta have ambition, you gotta have dreams.” Beryl 
replies that she is always dreaming, and as she does, begins to rise off the bed, floating and 
weightless. The cherubs return, and Beryl, naked again tries to catch them, but they ‘pop’ and 
disappear. Beryl drops out of the frame with a shriek, as her sisters voice re-emerges, breaking 
through the dream and calling her back to reality.  
 
Law refers primarily to Body Beautiful when she writes that Joanna Quinn “provides us 
with a glimpse of the possibilities animated films offer in terms of representation of women 
and the experience of being female” (52). As previously stated, it is the ‘ordinariness’ of Beryl 
and her everyday life that creates an identification with the viewer, and Quinn’s pointed use 
of humour which explicitly critiques dominant patriarchal codes of representation. In Dreams 
& Desires, we hear Beryl before we see her, and when we do see her it is first within her own 
dream, where she is completely naked. Beryl equates this dream state to the vision afforded 
her by her new digicam, but her attempts to recreate the dreamlike images of her favourite 
filmmakers at the wedding utterly fail. Throughout the animation, we only ever see Beryl 
when she chooses to turn the camera on herself, or through her ‘dreams’ — her fantasies and 
desires (and at one point from Digger the dog’s ‘point of view’ as she straps the camera to his 
back and drunkenly urges him to “film truth”). Beryl cannot help but capture the authentic 
(or unedited) goings on of the day, even moments that would ordinarily be deemed 
inappropriate or unflattering for a standard wedding video. In contrast to Body Beautiful, 
Beryl’s figure and weight is not the focus of the narrative (even when Vince makes a cameo 
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appearance as a wedding guest, he only teases Beryl that she looks a little under the weather). 
Beryl is perfectly comfortably exposing herself on camera, filming herself sitting on the toilet 
and sitting on the bed in only her underwear. Her body within the dream sequences is the 
same body as in her waking life, it is only attributed a certain weightlessness as she dances 
through the air. Neither does Beryl undergo metamorphosis as she did in Body Beautiful; her 
frequent metamorphosis there is at first caused by others, but ultimately Beryl takes control 
of her own transformations. Beryl’s control of her own transformations and her own body can 
be understood as an act of empowerment. Law describes this as a “personal deconstruction 
and eventual reconstruction” which “becomes an affirmative sequence for the film’s female 
characters” as they watch her stand up to Vince (53). There is a pleasure to be derived from 
the sudden transformations, and the messy, unruly lines of Beryl’s body. In her article 
“Drawing Animation” (2010), Brigitta Hosea notes that the drawings Quinn uses for her in-
between sections in the Beryl animations “are often almost unrecognizable, yet they are 
representations of pure movement”:  
 
The lines of Quinn dance and fly. They do not delineate movement; they are 
movement: a sumptuous celebration of the curvilinear, of the movement of flesh, of 
the wobble, of the wiggle, a celebration of the follow-through of fat. (362-363).  
 
Although there is a tension between the glorious unruliness of the animated lines of 
Beryl’s body and the control she exhibits over her own metamorphoses (and hence, her body), 
the celebration of movement communicated through the in-betweens and the 
metamorphosis (itself a collapsing of bodies into states of in-betweeness) is a representation 
of a female body that takes pleasure in excess.  
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Excessive Bodies  
 
In his article “Explosive, Expulsive, Extraordinary: The Dimensional Excess of Animated 
Bodies” (2008), Christian McCrea examines the sensation of viewing the exceptionally violent 
and physically impossible in animation. Discussing the sensation of viewing such violent 
moments with regards to Katsuhiro Ôtomo’s 1988 Akira, and the spectacularly violent death 
of the characters Kaori and Tetsuo, he writes, “Animation’s excursions into the impossible 
allow bodies to erupt and explode, fly and roar” (10). During the climactic final scenes of 
Akira, Tetsuo is losing control of his psycho-kinetic powers, which leads to a violent and gross 
bodily mutation. Tetsuo’s body rapidly expands and grows into a fleshy, pulsating mass, 
filling Tokyo’s Olympic stadium, enveloping his girlfriend Kaori and friend Kaneda. As he 
cries out, “My body’s not doing what I tell it to!” Kaori is killed, crushed by the mass of 
Tetsuo’s flesh, the ultimate act of unruliness. As McCrea writes, this becomes “the trigger for 
Tetsuo’s final ascendancy into pure narrative” (10). McCrea’s focus is on violent anime, the 
“sensation of impossible action” (10), and visual excess, but the excess of animated bodies 
may also be marked in more subtle ways, such as through the over-exaggeration of the body’s 
movement and physicality, as discussed above regarding the energetic lines of Beryl’s body. 
The body in animation is not bound by the physical laws of reality, and as such we may 
observe it perform impossible tasks or undergo unreal transformations. It is not bound by any 
strict distinctions between the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’; rather, it moves between and 
displaces such binary distinctions.  
 
Wells notes that it is in the “design or narrational use of the body” that even the most 
orthodox animation, forever concerned with the construction and expression of the body, 
“moves towards the condition of the experimental”: “the figurative aspects of the body 
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substantially collapse into the abstract. Bodies merely become forms subject to manipulation, 
exaggeration and reconfiguration” (188). Wells sets out eight conditions by which the 
capabilities and capacities of the body in animation may be defined. Before examining Wells’ 
claim that these conditions describe only “the form the body may take in any animated 
scenario and ignore the social or political implications of the body’s formation as character,” 
it is useful to briefly denote what each of these capabilities entails (189). The body in 
animation does not necessarily take up, perform or exhibit all eight capabilities at once, 
although between them there will inevitably be some overlap, as the distinctions between 
each condition is porous. Three of these conditions, for example, are that the body in 
animation is malleable (it may “be stretched over long distances, be compressed or 
extended”), is fragmentary (it “can be broken into parts, reassembled and conjoined with 
other objects and materials”), and that it has impossible abilities (it may fly, shrink, lift 
inordinately heavy objects, and “experience violence without pain”)(188-189). That the body 
in animation may be one or all of these things is fairly self-evident. Both its malleability and 
its fragmentary nature are often directly entwined with the animated body’s ability to express 
explicit emotion — that is, it “fragments in surprise, contorts in terror” (189). This kind of 
fragmentation and malleability is particularly recognisable in American cartoon animation, 
such as the Looney Tunes and Merrie Melodies short films. In the Pixar animated features 
The Incredibles (2004) and Incredibles 2 (2018), the characters Mr. Incredible and Elastigirl 
have superpowers predicated on impossible strength (the former) and the ability to stretch, 
extend and contort the body in a variety of (ordinarily) impossible ways (the latter). 
 
Sometimes the body in animation may be represented as mechanism, or “as if it was a 
machine” (189). Perhaps the most famous portrayal of the body as mechanism comes from 
Oshii Mamoru’s 1995 film, Ghost in the Shell (based on the manga of the same name by 
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Masamune Shirow). The films opening credits portrays the making of a cyborg body in a 
mesmerising sequence (described in chapter three of this thesis). The films main character, 
Major Motoko Kusanagi displays impossible physical strength, at one point ripping her own 
body apart as she attempts to force open the hatch of an armoured tank. Many animated 
works also play with the condition that Wells terms the body as a contextual space; that is, a 
body that “can be a physical environment in itself, which may be entered into and used as if 
it were ostensibly hollow” (189). This condition can be taken up in animation quite literally, 
seen in films such as Osmosis Jones (Bob Farelly, Peter Farelly; 2001) a live action/animation 
hybrid in which an animated, anthropomorphised white blood cell is portrayed as a 
‘policeman’ within a live action body, who must fight off an infecting virus. In the season one 
episode of Adult Swim’s Rick and Morty, “Anatomy Park” (2013), mad scientist Rick Sanchez 
shrinks his grandson Morty down to a microscopic level and injects him into the body of a 
dying homeless man, within whom he has created the titular ‘Anatomy Park’ (itself a parody 
of the 1993 film Jurassic Park, complete with attractions such as “Pirates of the Pancreas”). 
The 2018 anime series Cells at Work! (Hataraku Saibou) focuses on ‘the life of cells’, and 
follows an anthropomorphic Red Blood Cell as she performs her daily task of delivering 
oxygen throughout the body, and the various dangers she faces (such as invading bacteria). 
In these portrayals, the human body becomes ‘macroscopic’ in scale, the physical interior 
treated as the mise-en-scène on which all action and narrative takes place. However, 
sometimes this notion of the body as contextual space is less literal — in Michèle Cournoyer’s 
A Feather Tale (La Basse Cour, 1992), the body of a sleeping woman briefly becomes the road 
or landscape, as a taxi drives along a quiet road (the body), delivering the same woman to the 
house of her lover.  
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Wells’ second to last condition for the capabilities of the body in animation is that, 
“[b]odies of humans/animals/creatures which are apparently incompatible are rendered 
equable in size, strength, ability etc.” (189). The notion that the bodies of humans and 
animals (or non-human others) may be rendered equable when they are in reality 
incompatible is a common trope within animation that has been played out from its earliest 
days. Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, two animals that are in reality vastly different in terms 
of size, strength and ability, are anthropomorphised with abilities rendered equable in their 
animated world. In a more contemporary example, the animated series BoJack Horseman 
(2014) populates its world with human characters as well as human/animal hybrids such as 
the titular BoJack Horseman, a sitcom actor who happens to be a horse, his publicist Princess 
Carolyn (a cat), and friend/nemesis Mr. Peanutbutter (a Labrador Retriever). Humans and 
animals in this world interact freely, carrying on romantic and sexual relationships, with little 
commentary or narrative acknowledgement that several of the main characters (and 
background characters) inhabit bodies that are neither human nor completely animal (they 
are in-between — BoJack, while having a horse head, does not have hooves, but hands and 
feet, and walks upright).  
 
This leads to the final condition Wells describes, which is that in animation, “[b]odies may 
redetermine the physical orthodoxies of gender and species” (189). This is particularly 
pertinent for this thesis, and has a number of implications with regards to thinking the body 
in animation through a feminist perspective. Wells limits his discussion of this 
redetermination to a brief examination of contextual gendering and identity in American 
animated cartoons, with a focus on the Hanna-Barbera Tom and Jerry series, as well as various 
examples from Mickey Mouse and Looney Tunes cartoons. He observes that “the cartoon 
female, as defined through the assumed traits of femininity, is designed in relation to the 
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primary representation of the male character” (204). He offers Mickey and Minnie Mouse as 
an example of this; setting aside the clothes they wear, the key physical differentiation 
between the two is in the design of Minnie’s face (she has eyelids, eyelashes, and a smaller 
mouth). Although Wells argues that it is the body in animation which “constitutes the basic 
vocabulary by which particular aspects of masculinity and femininity may be expressed,” this 
claim is complicated here by the blurred distinctions between the body, sexuality, gender and 
performativity. For example, in describing Bugs Bunny’s performance as Brunnhilde in the 
Chuck Jones short What’s Opera, Doc? (1957), Wells describes Bugs cross-dressing — that is, 
taking on “the overt signifiers of femininity like eyelashes, lip-stick and long blonde plaits” 
— as the putting on of appendages and accessories which allows him to pose and gesture in a 
feminine manner, whilst still retaining his masculinity (205-206). Bugs’ body does not 
change, he simply changes his outfit, and performs in an overly-determined, feminised 
manner while his sexuality is rendered ambiguous as he flirts with Elmer Fudd.  
 
It is of course impossible to clearly demarcate the boundaries between gender, sexuality, 
and the body, particularly in animation where Wells rightly notes the body is “constantly in 
flux, always subject to redetermination and reconstruction” (213). Just as the body in 
animation is in a constant state of flux, so too are the “social or political implications of the 
body’s formation as character, or interaction with other characters and the environment”:  
 
The animated body frequently becomes a fluid form which, even when it closely 
adheres to the codes of realism defined earlier, still exhibits an instability when 
scrutinised at the level of ideological coherence. Significantly, Eisenstein has 
suggested that this level of mobility cannot wholly be recognised as the pure domain 
of form, and inevitably extends to subject matter and theme. (Wells 189)  
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Wells refers here to Eisenstein’s writing on the early animated short films of Walt Disney, 
where he declares that the inherent freedom of the animated form is “always rejecting, 
pushing aside logic” (1988 23). I would suggest that beyond the domain of form, subject 
matter, and theme, the body in animation is  also materially unstable, and following 
Eisenstein, the mobility of the body in animation, far from being the “pure domain” of form, 
relies on a complex interplay between form, matter, and theme. Nowhere is this instability 
made more apparent than through the act of metamorphosis, through which forms break 
down and re-form, boundaries collapse, and bodies (and scenarios) are refigured and 
transformed. As Eisenstein also writes: “Metamorphoses is a direct protest against the 
standardly immutable” (1988 43). Rather than understanding the physical, human body as 
‘standardly immutable’ however, the fragmented, distorted, malleable, and fluctuating body 
in animation is an acknowledgement of those bodies as neither purely natural nor purely 
culturally inscribed; the body is mutable, active, and becoming.  
 
Somatic Traces 
 
In her essay entitled, “The Animated Body and Its Material Nature” (2012), Ruth Hayes 
reminds us that it is through our bodies that we interact with those around us and through 
which we experience the world: “the raw data of experience comes first to our senses, 
unmediated” (208). This recalls Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his notion that the body is “much 
more than an instrument or means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our 
intentions” (1964 5). Merleau-Ponty’s challenge to binary and dichotomous  
conceptualisations of the subject have often been taken up by feminist scholars, although 
some (including Grosz) remain wary of Merleau-Ponty’s “avoidance of the question of sexual 
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difference and specificity” and of his “apparent generalizations regarding subjectivity which 
in fact tend to take men’s experiences for human ones” (1994 103). However, his notion of 
the body as the instrument through which we first receive knowledge and information of the 
world, and through which experience and meaning is generated, raises the question of how 
animators might attempt to communicate and replicate this unmediated sensory experience. 
Hayes argues that it is through the material nature of animated films (and thus, the material 
nature of animated bodies) that the animator may communicate or evoke different emotional 
or even physical responses. The use of different materials is far from an arbitrary choice, not 
only evoking an emotional and visceral response in the viewer, but allowing the animator to 
imbue the work with a trace of their physical and emotional efforts. This effort is embedded 
into the structure of the work, frames and objects designed and crafted by the animator, 
which the audience is reminded of as the “artefacts of this process flicker in front of the 
viewers continuously” (209). Hayes contends that it is this evidence of the hand of the 
animator at work, an indexical (and material) trace, that “communicates states of mind and 
evoke similar states and emotions in viewers” (209):  
 
Animators can use an infinite variety of materials to tell stories, comment on social 
and psychological realities or explore their own personal experiences. Voice and 
image may carry literal content, but the physical qualities of the materials from which 
the imagery is made, processed by the animator’s frame-by-frame construction of a 
separate temporal reality, can help viewers access a sense of the original experience 
and/or story that inspired the work. (217).  
 
This infinite variety of materials may include, but is not limited to, paper and ink, thread 
and cloth, sand and glass, watercolours, paints, charcoal, and clay. Hayes, through discussion 
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and analysis of the materiality of several animated works, including Michèle Cournoyer’s The 
Hat (1999), contends that is the material basis of the works which may help the viewer engage 
with the subjective viewpoint of the work, through the emotional and visceral reactions these 
material qualities provoke.  
 
Vicky Smith (2015) also discusses the material and physical presence that the artist’s 
animated body may leave in “performed direct-on-film animated mark making” (222). Smith 
argues that the material basis of film and animation is often unacknowledged by an industry 
which emphasises “the illusory film image” and that direct-on-film animation — whether by 
scratching, painting, or sewing — reveals the tactility of that process, certain aspects of which 
are only achievable through direct contact with the body: “the visible physical trace on film 
makes plain the anti-industrial, artisanal method of its creation” (223). Reading Smith 
alongside Hayes, I argue that this sense of tactility and physical trace is also left in the various 
materials animators may take up, whether these traces are lines in the sand left by an 
animator’s hands, or impressions left in clay. Smith is primarily concerned with explorations 
of embodied animated practices in expanded cinema and expanded animation — live 
performances of animation practice in which the process of the artist or animator is revealed 
to, and shaped by, the presence of the audience. Smith examines her own embodied 
animation practice in direct-on-film animation in two of her animated performances: Bicycle 
Tyre Track (2012-2014) and 33 Frames per Foot (2013). The first sees Smith ride her bike 
through paint, before riding the bike over a line of 16 mm film, leaving paint from the tyre 
treads on the celluloid, which is then projected for the audience. The latter sees Smith walk 
across the film strip in various movements, patterns and directions with painted feet. In both 
cases the film is different every time. With regards to 33 Frames per Foot in particular, Smith 
describes the physical effort involved, as walking on tiptoe and sometimes hopping on the 
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film strip is made difficult by the slipperiness of the paint, making her feel “ungainly and 
discomposed,” the exertion of maintaining balance causing her to emit “involuntary audible 
gasps” (233). This animated performance of direct-on-film animation served to emphasise 
for Smith the “irregularities of bodies in terms of the diversity of human sizes and shapes and 
the way they move,” as she found her foot corresponded to 22 frames of 16 mm, rather than 
the industry standard of 40 frames — a standard based on the ‘normal’ male form (234).  
 
The animator may leave a corporeal trace through the materials of their work, but real, 
fleshed bodies may also leave a somatic trace or echo without direct tactile interaction with 
the animating or animated materials. Elizabeth Bell (1995) sheds light on this as she explores 
both the semiotic and somatic layering that informs the design, sketching, construction and 
animation of the bodies of Disney’s female characters. For Bell, Disney female characters are 
pentimentos —“paintings layered upon paintings, images drawn on images, in a cultural 
accumulation of representations of good girls, bad woman, and doting servants” (108). From 
the Grimm, Andersen and Perrault fairytales, to the live action models used as character 
inspiration and movement reference, as well as the social and cultural ideals of what a good 
girl or wicked woman might be, the bodies of these characters are always culturally (and 
physically) inscribed. Key to this pentimentos are the live action models from which the 
animators make reference; more than a cultural inscription, such referents leave a lingering 
somatic trace, their movements translated indirectly to the screen. For instance, the bodies 
of the “Dancing Girls” (or teenage heroines), as Bell terms them, are pentimenti of the 
characters as described in the original fairytale texts, sketched alongside “contemporaneous 
popular images of feminine beauty and youth, their sources ranging from the silent screen to 
glossy pin-ups,” dependent, of course, on the period in which the animated films were 
produced (109). The bodies of the princesses from the three earliest princess-led films, for 
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instance—Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937), Cinderella (1950), and Sleeping Beauty 
(1959)—are drawn from the bodies of classical dancers; “Royal lineage and bearing are 
personified in the erect, ceremonial carriage of ballet and manifested not only in the dance 
sequences, but in the heroines’ graceful solitude and poised interactions with others” (110-
111). When Aurora (Sleeping Beauty) walks, she steps forward with her toe en pointe, her 
body the slim, graceful body of a ballet dancer. The animation of these heroines as dancers 
serves another purpose — any hint of sexuality is repressed by the elegant, upright, controlled 
bearing of the dancer, “the seamless quality of the dance at once representing and replacing 
the sexual act” (113). The restrained, non-threatening, desexualised bodies of the princesses 
are contrasted with the overtly sexualised, ‘femme fatale’ bodies of the wicked Queens, step-
mothers, and witches, as well as the coded maternal, nurturing, ‘goodness’ of the 
grandmothers and fairy godmothers. The princesses, villainesses, and guiding maternal 
figures of Disney animation today are also pentimenti drawn over the layers of the animated 
female figures past, drawn from and culturally inscribed by current popular notions of 
femininity.   
 
Here it is useful to return to the notion of an ‘over-determined’ realism, discussed above 
with regards to hyper-realist aesthetics in animation, understood as an order of realism that 
is “necessarily over-enunciated” (Wells 27). This over-determinism, as noted above, can be 
seen through the principles of ‘squash and stretch’, in which the movement of an animated 
figure or object is compressed (squashed) and stretched. The principle of squash and stretch, 
however, is not necessarily confined to bodies or objects in animated films, and the 
relationship between the animated body and the corporeal body is revealing. In Disney 
Animation: The Illusion of Life (1981), veteran Disney animators Frank Thomas and Ollie 
Johnston detail the usefulness animators found in studying human and animal movement, 
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drawing from live action footage to create more believable, or ‘realistic, animated figures. 
The use of live action models as a referent was far from an unusual practice. Thomas and 
Johnston write:  
      
The human form in movement displayed far more overall activity than anyone had 
supposed. It was not just the chest working against the hips, or the backbone bending 
around it, it was the very bulk of the body pulling in, pushing out, stretching, 
protruding. (Thomas and Johnston, p.321)  
 
By filming scenes with actors, then printing the film and flipping through the footage frame 
by frame, the animators garnered a better understanding of the more subtle gestures, 
movements and expressions that helped them better impart the ‘illusion of life’ that Walt 
Disney so desired in his animated films. This also meant that the animators had “living 
examples of the “squash and stretch” principles that had only been theories before,” proving 
this key principle of Disney animation was not only confined to the art and process of 
animation, but the corporeal human body in motion (Thomas and Johnston 321). These 
‘living examples’ of squash and stretch echo that which feminist scholars of corporeality have 
long argued, that “the body is a pliable entity whose determinate form is provided not simply 
by biology but through the interaction of modes of psychical and physical inscription” (Grosz 
1994 187). The physical body may indeed be constrained by some biological limits — human 
bodies cannot float or fly through the air, breath underwater (without mechanical or 
prosthetic aid), and require various environmental supports in order to survive, however 
these are limits whose “framework or ‘stretchability’ we cannot yet know, we cannot 
presume, even if we must presume some limits” (Grosz 187, emphasis in original). The true 
‘stretchability’ of the human body may be exaggerated, extended or even surpassed, however, 
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in animation. The human body in animation can fly in the air and breathe underwater 
unaided; in animated worlds, the body can go anywhere and do anything. And yet, while 
animation may venture into the realm of the fantastical and the impossible, animation’s 
treatment of the body evokes what Grosz describes as the human body’s ability to “open itself 
up”:  
 
…while there must be some kinds of biological limit or constraint, these constraints 
are perpetually capable of being superseded, overcome, through the human body’s 
capacity to open itself up to prosthetic synthesis, to transform or rewrite its 
environment, to continually augment its powers and capacities through the 
incorporation into the body’s own spaces and modalities of objects that, while 
external, are internalized, added to, supplementing and supplemented by the 
“organic body” (or what culturally passes for it), surpassing the body, not “beyond” 
nature but in collusion with a “nature” that never really lived up to its name, that 
represents always the most blatant cultural anxieties and projections. (187-188)  
 
Sometimes bodies in animated films transform themselves and their environments, colluding 
with nature in surprising and subversive ways. Nature in this context can be taken to mean 
not only the body’s environment, but the nature of the animated form, and its potential for 
transformation.  
 
Of course, the live action body may find itself (re)animated directly through the technique 
of rotoscoping which sees an animator project live action footage on a screen, then trace the 
movement or figure frame-by-frame, capturing the original motion in an attempt to replicate 
a sense of realism traditionally associated with the indexicality of the photograph or live 
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action footage. Joanna Bouldin (2004) examines the relationship between animated bodies 
and lived bodies through rotoscoping, arguing that the rotoscope “facilitates an indexical 
transference of reality and materiality from an original body into its filmic copy, and then 
again into its animated incarnation” (13). Importantly, Bouldin notes that although the 
rotoscope was designed to ‘capture’ so-called natural movement, animators still maintain the 
ability to stretch, distort, transform, abstract, or change the original movement, in order to 
“create more plasmatic and cartoony figures” as well as to “make interesting and unusual 
combinations and substitutions” (15).15 The rotoscopic image is mimetic, drawing on the 
power of the original body, and at the same time haunted by this original — there is a “dual 
presence” where the “original body insinuates a kind of ontological ambiguity and 
uncertainty into the animated body” (13). In exploring this ontological ambiguity, Bouldin 
finds that this sense of uncanniness can perhaps be explained as “evidence of social anxiety 
about the dissolution of supposedly natural identity categories such as male/female, 
white/non-white, or human/non-human” (16). However she also finds, and favours the point, 
that the hybrid, doubled nature of the rotoscoped body eschews “easy viewer identification 
with the rotoscoped characters, forging a kind of psychic or emotional distance between the 
two” (16). She argues that this distance opens up space for critical reflection on the nature of 
animated, rotoscoped bodies, and bodies more generally. This subversive potential however, 
is dependent on whether or not the studio chooses to accentuate the presence of the original, 
lived body, or to obscure it. To illustrate this point Bouldin contrasts the Fleischer brothers 
use of rotoscope for several of its key characters (including Koko the Clown and Betty Boop), 
and Disney’s use of live models for Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937). Regarding the 
latter, she argues that the “unprecedented realism and the suppression of the ambiguous 
 
15 This has also been noted by Vicky Smith (2015) and Lisa Cartwright (2012). 
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ontology of the animated body” both enhances and reinforces the fantasy of a human body 
that is “apparently stable, unified, natural” (18). It is here that Bouldin turns briefly to 
Elizabeth Grosz (whom she describes as a social constructionist scholar), Michel Foucault and 
Judith Butler, as she rightly points out that real bodies are not simply “natural entities, but 
rather are the product of complex social processes;” not a passive entity, but “actively and 
continually constructed through social interaction” (18). However, it must be pointed out 
that to classify Grosz as a social constructionist scholar does not accurately describe the scope 
of her work and her continuing investigations into corporeal and incorporeal becomings. 
Bouldin declares that in Volatile Bodies (1994), Grosz “examines the wide range of techniques 
of social inscription that our culture uses to bind subjects to specific social positions and 
relations,” but this is only part of what Grosz achieves in that text (19). In examining these 
techniques of social inscription, Grosz seeks to address the failure of anti-Cartesian accounts 
of the body to take up or address feminist frameworks or sexual difference; Grosz seeks an 
understanding of the body that is neither purely ‘natural’ nor purely culturally or socially 
constructed. A necessary part of this project is the undoing of binary conceptions of the 
relationship between mind and body.  
 
It is for this reason I would like to turn to Bouldin’s first conjecture regarding the cause 
of the sense of uncanniness the rotoscoped body may generate: that the uneasiness provoked 
by the “hybridity” and unnaturalness of the rotoscoped body may evidence a broader social 
anxiety around the “dissolution of supposedly natural identity categories such as 
male/female” — a binary opposition which always implies its parallel associations of 
masculine/feminine, inside/outside, and mind/body (16). Bouldin focuses her analysis on the 
Fleischer Studio short Betty Boop’s Bamboo Isle (1932), in which Betty performs a dance 
which is rotoscoped from the body and live action footage of a female Samoan dancer: there 
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is an indexical, material connection between the dancer (whose name, Bouldin tells us, was 
Miri) and Betty, which collapses clear distinctions between the ‘real’ body and the copy: “The 
ontology of Betty’s animated body shifts, haunted by the supplemental materiality of her 
rotoscoped original” (22). This haunting is made more pronounced by the inclusion of live 
action footage at the beginning of Bamboo Isle of Miri dancing. As Bouldin rightly points out, 
the animated form of Betty Boop does not simply merge with a “neutral, natural, pre-existing 
reality” — it draws from and on top of the already gendered, racialized, sexualised body of 
Miri, who is presented as an ‘exotic’ object to be consumed by a white gaze (22).  
 
To further explore how the rotoscoped body might evoke the dissolution of 
dichotomously opposed terms such as male/female and human/non-human, I will briefly 
examine Michèle Cournoyer’s A Feather (La Basse Cour; 1992), which I have briefly 
introduced above. A Feather Tale was Cournoyer’s first film completed using rotoscope; a 
woman, weeping in bed, receives a phone call from her lover. As she answers the phone, it 
transforms into the body of her lover who whispers and beckons directly into her ear. A car 
travels along an empty landscape which, as the frame expands, is revealed to be the woman’s 
naked, sleeping body. A box is delivered to the man, which when opened, reveals the woman-
as-chicken. She still has her human face, and human legs. The man strokes the chicken body 
as she looks back at him, almost seductively. He lifts her out of the box, and his touches 
become more aggressive and rough. The woman-chicken flaps her wings and resits being held 
for too long. Eventually, the man forcefully grabs her and plucks her feathers, leaving her 
naked and bare before lifting her to his mouth as if to consume her. The scenario transitions, 
and the woman is once again in human form, with the man asleep in bed next to her. She sits 
up, naked and cold, and looks to the scattered feathers on the floor. A Feather Tale was 
produced after Cournoyer won the ninth edition of the Cinéaste Recharché competition, 
      
      
216 
 
1989-1990.16 It is one of two films Cournoyer completed using rotoscope (a technique she 
loved, as stated in a 2014 interview with Denys Desjardins), the second being An Artist (Une 
Artiste, 1994). Cournoyer shot the required live action footage, then projected this footage 
on the underside of a piece of glass. She then placed acetate on top of the glass and drew over 
it, using a small device to play the footage frame by frame: “I took all the elements and 
sometimes moved four frames forward. I loved this technique” (Cournoyer 2014). Behind the 
scenes stills in the Desjardins interview show Cournoyer drawing over the live action frames 
of the female actor, as a hand reaches in moving a small toy car along her body.  
 
The female body in A Feather Tale is not haunted in the same way Betty Boop is haunted, 
as described above by Bouldin, but Cournoyer’s use of the rotoscope in this film does shift 
the ontology of both the animated body and the lived body. The figure Cournoyer draws from 
and on top of is an actor, performing a role. The film is also personal, as Cournoyer has noted 
the autobiographical nature of the toxic relationship which is depicted:  
 
She becomes a taxi. She closes her eyes but turns on the headlights to see what’s going 
to happen. She knows what’s going to happen. And she is determined to play it out to 
the end, in order to be able to finish it. This is the last time she’s going to get hurt. 
(Cournoyer in Roy 23).  
 
Rather than simply tracing over and re-animating the movements and actions of the actor, 
Cournoyer uses the rotoscope to play with and break down the distinctions between 
human/non-human bodies, as well as between the body and landscape. Distance between the 
 
16 National Film Board of Canada, http://onf-nfb.gc.ca/en/produce-with-the-nfb/filmmaker-support-
programs/cineaste-recherche-e/ Accessed 3 Dec. 2018 
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woman and her lover is reduced as she picks up the phone and the receiver becomes the body 
of the man, cradled against her face, whispering into her ear. The woman’s body becomes the 
road upon which the taxi travels. Woman and chicken merge as the chicken body distinctly 
has the woman’s face. This woman-chicken blurs the distinction between woman as human 
subject, woman as object, non-human other, and object of consumption. When the man 
plucks her feathers, he is cruel, rough and violent. As Roy also notes, it is in this form of 
woman-chicken that “the power between her and the man plays out” (27).  
 
It is also useful to consider the ways in which A Feather Tale blurs the distinction and 
interaction between inside and outside. If one is to think of the body as inscriptive surface, 
for example, it can indeed be thought so here quite literally, as Cournoyer traces over the 
image of the surface of a body, inscribing and transforming that image. Grosz notes that in 
this understanding of the body from the outside in, the body is understood as “a text to be 
marked, traced, written upon by various regimes of institutional (discursive and 
nondiscursive) power, as a series of linkages (or possibly activities) which form superficial or 
provisional connections with other objects and processes” (1994 116). The body is also 
understood as a receptive surface, which forms linkages and connections with other surfaces, 
while psychical effects (or interiors) are produced from the outside in, as an effect of this 
surface phenomena. Grosz describes this as tracing the outside surface of the Möbius strip, 
where the effects of depth “are thus generated purely through the manipulation, rotation, 
and inscription of the flat plane—an apposite metaphor for the undoing of dualism” (117). 
Whilst the body in A Feather Tale can be understood as surface phenomenon, both receptive 
and inscribed, this is complicated by the use of the rotoscope, the very device Cournoyer uses 
to draw from and on top of the body. The body of the actor herself cannot be thought of as 
pure exterior, purely surface. Hers is a body with depth, with a complex interaction between 
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inside/outside. There is a discursive and material interaction taking place between the body 
as it is filmed, the body that is traced and reanimated, and the materials used by the animator. 
Reading the body as a blank, neutral page on which to write, “cannot explain what it is that 
produces the blank page, what the stuff of this page may be” (1994 119). It is also problematic 
to read the body as blank page or receptive surface here, as neutrality has traditionally been 
taken as the masculine. The woman’s transformation in A Feather Tale, particularly into the 
figure of the woman-chicken, serves to underscore the ways in which she is perceived both in 
relation to and by the figure of the man, for whom she is little more than an object of 
consumption and desire, to be caressed and plucked, fulfilling his own needs and pleasures.  
 
After A Feather Tale and An Artist Cournoyer would forgo the use rotoscope in the 
production of her animation films, and would turn instead to the direct use of ink and paper. 
In the following chapter, I will continue my discussion of bodies in animation through 
feminist perspectives, Cournoyer’s animated films, and the ways in which they complicate 
the mind/body opposition. 
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Chapter Eight – Animating Bodies  
 
With the pen, I made my drawings suffer, with the character, I was breaking my pens. When there was 
violence, I was very hard with my brushes, I was wearing them out. 
—Michèle Cournoyer, Animating the Unconscious 
 
Michèle Cournoyer’s 1999 animated short film, The Hat (Le Chapeau) is perhaps the most 
harrowing film of her body of work. As the film begins, the chatter and music of a nightclub 
are heard, and we watch as a young woman moves her hands slowly up her naked body. We 
linger a few moments on her face, then as she closes her eyes, the sounds of the club fade 
away and the scene transitions as the woman’s memories of a childhood sexual assault come 
flooding back to her. A man in a dark trench coat and distinctive hat climbs a set of stairs, 
footsteps echoing. As the man reaches the little girl’s bedroom, he reaches towards her to 
pull her blanket away. As he does so, the girl’s nightdress becomes a ballerina’s tutu as she 
innocently dances for him—the tutu at the same moment reforms to become the man’s hat. 
In another instant, as the hat is drawn away, we are in the nightclub once again, the woman 
now performing an erotic dance for an audience of faceless, hatted men. As she dances, past 
and present become ever more indistinguishable as her body becomes the site for a series of 
unfolding, enveloping metamorphoses. She slips between child, ballet dancer, and adult 
dancer in quick succession, the changing music echoing the shifts in time and place. At one 
moment her body is covered in eyes, the eyes of the men watching her, which travel down her 
body towards her genitals. The eyes become hands, covering her completely. Her body begins 
to contort in impossible ways, and becomes a phallus, a hat, and a rolled cigarette that the 
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man takes a drag from. The shifts in music no longer distinguish between girl and woman, as 
she is caught in a moment between memory and present. At last the music disappears 
altogether, and is replaced by a visceral, almost inhuman screaming, clanging and crashing. 
The image of the girl’s face becomes distorted and broken as the brush strokes become harsh 
and violent, the ink splattered and staining the paper as Cournoyer, as she describes above, 
is hard with her brushes and makes her drawings suffer. This metamorphosis between girl 
and woman is not smooth or fluid, but fragmented and jarring, shocking the audience as we, 
like the men in the film, gaze at her body, unwilling participants in her abuse. The film ends 
with the woman once again gazing silently back at the audience, her hands moving down her 
body once more as the sounds of the nightclub re-emerge.  
 
Key to The Hat is the focus on the female body, which not only becomes the site of 
physical transformation through the contortions of the dancer, as well as the transformation 
from woman to little girl and back again, but the threshold between inside and outside, mind 
and body, matter and memory. Memories, pain, and physical trauma arise from and are felt 
through the body of the dancer. The transformations the body undertakes here are not within 
the realm of physical possibility for human bodies, but through her bodies of paper and ink 
and her sometimes jarring, sometimes fluid metamorphoses, Cournoyer destabilises the 
mind/body dualism, transforms it, and provides a way for us to transform our understanding 
of the interrelation between mind and body. Psychical trauma and physical trauma are not 
self-contained, but feed into and effect each other in a complex interrelation of psycho-
somatic pain. Cournoyer presents a body that is unruly, unstable, and unpredictable, an 
unruliness which is emphasised through her animation techniques and the way the 
construction of her films unfold. As Julie Roy (2012) writes, it is the co-implication of the 
body, her animation technique, and the physical connection forged between the artist and 
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her materials “that allow for a real, literal inscribing of the body into her work” (27). In the 
following chapter I continue my critique begun in the previous chapter of the ways in which 
the body in animation has been previously conceived, framing my analysis through feminist 
perspectives. I will undertake a close discussion of the films of Michèle Cournoyer (with a 
primary focus on The Hat) using the feminist corporeal frameworks established in previous 
chapters to show the ways in which Cournoyer’s films allow us to reframe and rethink the 
mind/body dualism that underpins Western thought. Cournoyer’s films serve as a starting 
point — a means to begin to examine the myriad of ways in which animation can provide a 
way to open up feminist philosophy of the body and becoming.  
 
Writing Animated Bodies  
 
In chapter one of this thesis, I considered Stanley Cavell’s writing on animation and the 
ways he distinguished animated worlds from the cinema’s succession of automatic world 
projections. Cavell makes an ontological distinction between the worlds of cartoons 
(animation) and movies (live action cinema), suggesting that while the material basis of 
movies may be considered a series of automatic world projections, cartoons (which he 
understands as a subset of film in general) should instead be called successions of animated 
world projections. He finds the world of cartoons not stable, but animistic (169). Cavell 
describes animation’s tendency towards metamorphosis and the “touching movements” of 
animated creatures as they “trace their arabesques in the air or climb upon a friendly petal” 
(perhaps a reference to Disney’s Silly Symphonies or the 1940 feature Fantasia) as evidence 
of their distinction from the automatic world projections of live action cinema (170). One of 
the key points of difference he finds between cinema and animation is the ways in they treat 
the nature of corporeality:  
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…what is abrogated is not gravity (things and creatures do fall, and petals are 
sometimes charmingly difficult to climb up to) but corporeality. The bodies of these 
creatures never get in their way. Their bodies are indestructible, one might say almost 
immortal; they are totally subject to will, and perfectly expressive … They are 
animations, disembodiments, pure spirits. (170)  
 
For Cavell, it is the corporeality, or incorporeality, of animated bodies that demarcates the 
clearest difference between cartoons and movies. He finds that “it is natural for animation to 
be of small animals” (a sweeping claim), and that as the bodies of animated creatures are 
rather ‘disembodiments’ and ‘pure spirits,’ they “avoid, or deny, the metaphysical fact of 
human beings, that they are condemned to both souls and bodies”—a Cartesian separation 
(170-171). That animation, and particularly the cartoon and cel animation to which Cavell 
specifically refers to, is different from a (photo-indexical) cinema is not a matter of dispute, 
but Cavell’s claims as to the nature or ontology of animated bodies is one which requires 
closer attention. For instance, the notion that “Cartoon terror is absolute, because since the 
body is not destructible, the threat is to the soul itself” implies a separation of body and mind, 
or body and soul (171). Cavell’s claim here that the threat of cartoon terror is absolute because 
it is a threat to the soul is predicated upon the pervasive tradition of mind/body dualism in 
Western thought. I argue instead that rather than relying on and upholding this dualism, 
animation has the potential to reveal the interaction between body and mind through one of 
the very devices which Cavell cites as evidence of animation’s abrogation of the physical 
world’s limits and laws—metamorphosis.  
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While Cavell contends that the bodies of animated creatures can only be disembodiments, 
his argument fails to take into account the multiplicity of animated bodies and figures. In 
particular, he refers specifically to cartoon bodies—bodies of animated animals such as Bambi 
and Dumbo, as well as human figures such as Popeye. He gives little to no thought given to 
animation outside of 2D, planar, cel animation techniques, such as clay animation, puppet 
animation, or object and stop-motion animation. Cavell declares the incorporeality of 
animated figures, figures of ‘pure spirit’, without giving thought to the various potential 
materialities of animated forms. The notion that animated figures are totally subject to the 
will of the animator, and thus ‘perfectly expressive’ also requires some interrogation. As 
Suzanne Buchan writes, one of the problems of animated figures is that they “pose 
ontological puzzles; writing within film studies on animation often discusses animated 
figures with the same terms and descriptors as for human actors” (2014 119). Buchan turns 
to Jean Mitry’s The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema (1997) and, following Mitry, 
writes that the figure in animation may be defined “entirely by the conceptual, stylistic, and 
technical processes of its design, construction, and animation” (2014 119). She points out 
that if, as Mitry finds, the psychology of a character is located within the living actor, then 
the psychology of an animated figure would then necessarily be located within the animator 
(120). I will return to this in relation to the films of Cournoyer shortly. Buchan goes on to 
describe the physical impossibilities that some animated figures possess:  
      
A defining feature of many animation films is that figures are often composed of a 
combination of physically incompatible elements, and in projection they and the 
spaces they are in can visually defy physical, optical, and natural laws of gravity, 
electromagnetism, perspective, and entropy (an obvious example is Chuck Jones’s 
1953 Duck Amuck). While we can say the same for live-action films that employ 
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profilmic special effects (I am not considering digital or in-camera effects) to create 
impossible figures, worlds, and events, these retain an indexicality that represents the 
physical world and the materials that the effects are created in and of. (2014 120)  
 
Here, Buchan references Noël Carroll (1996) and his terms ‘physical noncompossibility’ and 
‘homospatiality’; the first refers to an image or figure on screen we engage with that is not 
physically compossible with the phenomenal world as we experience it, which Carroll uses in 
reference to drawn animation works like Popeye. Homospatiality refers to how we understand 
that which is physically noncompossible, allowing us to “link disparate categories in visual 
metaphors in ways that are functionally equivalent to the ways that disparate categories are 
linked grammatically in verbal metaphors” (Carroll in Buchan 2014, 121). Physical 
noncompossibility and homospatiality recall Paul Wells’ descriptions of the capabilities of 
the body in animation, including the notion that bodies which would ordinarily be 
incompatible are rendered equable in size, strength and ability, and that animated bodies 
may take on impossible abilities (1998 189). Buchan finds that Carroll’s concepts work for a 
wide variety of animation techniques outside of drawn or 2D animation. In terms of 
conceiving of an ontology of animated figures, she finds the term noncompossibility 
particular useful, as it “interanimates between disciplines and categories of fine arts and 
commodity culture and disciplines of film theory, philosophy of perception, and literary 
theory” (2014 121). In this sense, noncompossibility may also provide a means to 
interanimate between the disciplines of feminist corporeal theory and animation—that is, a 
means to understand the ways animated bodies may open up the subject to the possibility of 
becoming-more. 
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Buchan muses on the ‘ontological puzzles’ presented by animated figures within a 
broader chapter on what a theory of animation might look like, where she makes clear is that 
an interdisciplinary approach is not only helpful but necessary—animation studies must not 
only take up and ‘borrow’ from wider film theory, but from literary theory, critical theory, 
semiotics, queer theory, and gender studies. This list is not exhaustive and as this thesis has 
considered, feminism is one discipline among many which should be considered in 
approaching the theorisation of animation. As previously explored in chapter two, where 
animation and feminism have previously intersected, it has been primarily to consider the 
impact women have had in the animation industry or the art of animation, or to provide 
feminist critiques and analyses of animated texts. These are important and necessary 
considerations, and intersect in many ways with the concerns of this thesis. In particular, as 
explored in chapter six, the development or possibility of a feminist aesthetics of animation 
aligns closely with the concerns of feminist artistic practice and feminist art history. The 
possibility of feminist aesthetics for animation (rather than a singular feminine aesthetic) is 
one such possibility offered by feminist theory for opening up animation to new questions 
regarding animated bodies, their (in)corporeality, and the ways they relate to, effect, and 
connect with real bodies, be they the bodies of animators or the bodies of spectators.  
 
A thorough critical engagement with feminist theory in the approach of animation 
necessarily opens up the ways in which the body in animation is addressed. In the previous 
chapter I analysed what Paul Wells (1998) sets out as the capabilities of the animated body, 
including its malleability, its fragmentary nature, and its impossible abilities. Wells has also 
previously discussed the materiality of the animated body through an examination of the 
films of Jan Švankmajer, finding that he “defines the body materially, playing out its 
corporeality in clay,” addressing the body in transition, as mechanism, and under threat (1997 
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177). According to Wells, Švankmajer’s treatment of the body—which he analyses primarily 
through the films Dimensions of Dialogue (1982), Darkness, Light, Darkness (1990), and The 
Death of Stalinism in Bohemia (1990)—provides a way to redefine how the body is conceived 
of both aesthetically and politically. Dimensions of Dialogue is a film in three parts—Eternal 
Conversation, Passionate Discourse, and Exhaustive Discussion—and it is Wells’ analysis of 
the second part that is of particular relevance here. Passionate Discourse sees two clay 
figures, a man and woman, sitting opposite each other at a table. They reach out first to touch 
each other, before kissing, and finally engaging in a sexual act. As they do, the clay of their 
bodies begins to merge and the two forms become indistinguishable. The two clay figures 
become one individual mass of clay, formless, before they separate and reemerge, leaving 
behind a single lump of formless clay on the table top between them. According to Wells, the 
clay bodies and the act of their merging can be interpreted in a number of different ways. The 
sexual act, for instance, liberates the body from its ideologically determined roles: “Its state 
of impersonality, half-formed, malleable, echoes the theme of body consciousness in 
Svankmajer’s films as it expressed as a relationship between childhood polymorphous 
perversity and adult determinacy” (179). The metamorphosis, which makes the union of the 
two bodies possible, destabilises any notions of gendered or sexual difference, “destabilising 
the phallic emphasis of patriarchal social structures” (180). Following Foucault, Wells 
suggests that the sexual act in Passionate Discourse expresses contradictions regarding how 
“the pleasure of re-determining the body is inevitably tempered by historically determined 
socio-cultural power relations which have colonised its very physiognomy” (180). Wells 
argues that this is demonstrated in the manner in which the clay bodies separate once more 
after their sexual encounter, leaving only a lump of clay between them. It is implied that the 
lump of clay has been birthed as a result of the intercourse, an unwanted offspring as both 
the male and female clay figures reject the anthropomorphised, formless lump and refuse to 
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acknowledge it. Wells suggests that the lump is not gendered (it has no specific shape), and 
indeed, can possibly be considered as more than a baby, writing that it “could represent a 
fatal and unaddressed flaw in the relationship; the refusal to take responsibility for actions 
which have cause and effect; the essential difference between men and women” (180). Wells 
argues that Švankmajer is asking the viewer to interpret the lump of clay as they will: 
 
Svankmajer has suggested that ‘to revive the general impoverishment of sensibility in 
our civilisation, the sense of touch may play a very important part’. His view is clearly 
endorsed in Passionate Discourse, yet refuted by the ways in which the body has 
become a contradictory vehicle of expression and identity, half-positively driven to 
express its nature and half naturalised by the historically determined, political 
functions that have shaped biological imperatives. (181)  
 
A contradiction here which remains unaddressed is that when the two bodies merge and 
become one mass of shuddering clay, the clay itself occupies a state somewhere between 
neutrality and femaleness. From within the clay the opening of a vulva emerges, which Wells 
calls “a synecdoche for the female form, as it experiences labial pleasure”; yet this 
synecdoche emerges from what Wells also describes as the “breakdown of a gendered order” 
(180). This breakdown denies sexual difference. One of the great problems of the various 
accounts of the human body, Grosz finds, is that the body is taken as ‘neutral’ or 
‘indeterminate’, a neutrality which “has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and 
projection of a masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm” (188). The female 
figure that briefly emerges from the neutral clay mass in Passionate Discourse experiences 
sexual pleasure, but only through the connection with the male. As Wells notes, the piece of 
clay left behind, whilst a product of the act, is not necessarily an infant, and could either be 
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an unaddressed flaw in the relationship, or represent “the essential difference between men 
and women” (180). The small lump of clay is itself formless, neutral and projects a sense of 
‘innocence’, as it attempts to approach the woman as mother. As Wells argues, Passionate 
Discourse does indeed present a model of the body (and of male and female bodies) in a 
contradictory manner, but it is rather the contradiction between neutrality and sexual 
specificity. As Grosz writes, a framework of the body for feminist theory should insist upon 
“(at least) two surfaces which cannot be collapsed into one and which do not always 
harmoniously blend with and support each other,” yet also a model where “the join, the 
interaction of the two surfaces, is always a question of power” (189).  
 
A feminist refiguration of the body in animation should not rely upon or assume the 
neutrality of human bodies, nor rely on accounts of the body (and differences between bodies) 
as purely biologically given, static and inert. A feminist account of the body in animation 
must avoid dualism that positions female corporeality as secondary or complementary to 
male corporeality; neither must corporeality be associated one sex, as women “can no longer 
take on the function of being the body for men” (Grosz 1994 22). Acknowledging the 
multiplicity of female embodiment and experience, no one animation can encapsulate a 
single model of the body. However, animation can begin to counter such dualistic 
conceptions that posit the body as purely natural, static given, subjugated to mind, and 
instead take into consideration the complexity of their interrelation. Such a model of the 
body may be problematised by considering the body as “the threshold or borderline concept 
that hovers perilously and undecidably at the pivotal point of binary pairs” (1994 23). Women 
in animation may begin to conceive of a body that is outside of traditional patriarchal 
frameworks of representation. I return now to the animation of Michèle Cournoyer, who takes 
the female body as the central focus of her work, to examine the ways in which she explores 
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female embodiment, the interplay between the psychical and the physical, and a female 
subjectivity that cannot be thought of as self-contained and separate from the corporeal.  
 
Ink and Paper Bodies  
 
Chris Robinson (2001) describes Cournoyer’s animation as taking audiences “to places we 
do not want to see, to a darkness that lurks behind our scared small-talk smiles” (n.p). 
Working as an independent filmmaker in the 1970s and 1980s, Cournoyer directed a number 
of films that would make use of live action footage, photography and collage (Old Orchard 
Beach, P.Q. (1981) for example is noted for its use of cut-outs in combination with live action 
footage17). These films also dealt with such topics as female desires, fantasies, and sexuality, 
and were “perceived by specialist critics as neo-Dadaist” (Roy 19). Cournoyer is what Cecile 
Starr might describe as a fine-art animator, as each of her films reflects her unique vision, 
skills, and subconscious impulses “in concept and form, in style and substance” (2009 10). In 
an interview with Denys Desjardins as part of the National Film Board of Canada’s (NFB) 
‘Making Movie History’ series, Cournoyer cites fellow animation filmmakers Jacques Drouin, 
Pierre Hébert, and Co Hoedeman as influences on her work, noting that Drouin also helped 
edit a lot of her films (2014). As discussed in the previous chapter, Cournoyer’s first two films 
with the NFB, A Feather Tale (1992) and An Artist (1994), were made using rotoscope, a 
technique Cournoyer loved; live action footage was played frame by frame, allowing 
Cournoyer to paint over photo-indexical frames and transform them. In A Feather Tale 
(analysed in the previous chapter), a woman’s body becomes a landscape that a car travels 
along, before she becomes a woman-chicken, plucked by her lover (a physical 
 
17 Annecy Festival, https://www.annecy.org/programme:en/index:film_pps-819740 Accessed 12 December 2018 
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noncompossibility, making use of surrealist imagery). In An Artist, a young girl’s body 
literally overflows with music, as Cournoyer paints musical symbols and notations over the 
live action footage. It was with the making of The Hat, however, that Cournoyer became 
primarily associated with the ink-on-paper technique. The stark contrast of the black ink on 
white paper brings Cournoyer’s animated figures into sharp relief, the contours and 
movements of their bodies and details of their metamorphosis clearly defined. Cournoyer 
paints each individual frame by hand, in a process which is deceptively simple; it is a 
technique that recalls the earliest animation techniques, before the introduction and 
popularisation of cel animation. Before cels became commonly available material, “drawing 
and inking on paper was an alternative used by industrial studios in large measure because 
the cost of the cel or the fees to use the patented technique was too high” (Furniss 2007 33). 
Today, ink and paper remains a technique often utilised by visual artists who come to 
animation through painting or similar practice, and as Furniss goes on to note, appeals to 
many independent animators for aesthetic reasons. For Cournoyer, the reasons for her shift 
in practice from rotoscope to paper and ink was more complicated. She had initially begun 
working on The Hat using digital techniques, including Photoshop, and had been working 
this way for close to two years. The subject matter was difficult (and one that she had taken 
up at the suggestion of NFB producer Therese Descary), and Cournoyer felt that she was 
struggling:  
      
I worked, for eighteen months, with Photoshop, trying to come up with something 
very realistic. Then Pierre Hébert was appointed head of the studio … He said, ‘This is 
crazy.’ I had 56 layers of colour, superimposed … It was too much for me. And such a 
difficult subject. I become so immersed in a subject and come to identify with the 
character. I made myself sick. (2014) 
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Pierre Hébert, appointed head of the animation unit at the NFB whilst Cournoyer was in 
production on The Hat, suggested she take up the brush to complete the film: “She had been 
a painter. I suggested she should rediscover the paintbrush, and trust her savour-faire and 
skills” (in Roy 21). According to Hébert, it was necessary for her to let go of any kind of 
straightforward conception of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ animation; her work was never going to 
approach a “fluid, Disney-style animation, it would not have been appropriate. Whether it 
was well or badly animated was simply a non-issue! She just had to shake off those fixed, 
traditional ideas about animation” (in Roy 21). Cournoyer admits to finding the transition 
difficult (“I had nothing but paper and ink”) but it allowed her to complete the film 
(Cournoyer 2014). The Hat took four years to complete, and approximately eight thousand 
individual drawings. In order to complete the film, Cournoyer had to abandon the layers she 
had built up in Photoshop, and connect directly with her materials through her brushes (I will 
return to this connection with her materials below). She has since continued to use the same 
technique for all her films that have come after The Hat, including Accordion (Accordéon, 
2004), Robes of War (Robes de guerre; 2008), and Soif (2013).  
 
I have described The Hat above, and focused on Robes of War in chapter six. Accordion 
begins with the sounds of an old, internet dial-up tone, layered with the sounds of an 
accordion’s bellows, like breathing. A small box opens, and several more box like shapes 
emerge which reform into fingers, then two hands interlinked. The image of a woman’s face 
unfolds and is enveloped by reams of paper. A sheet of paper folded and twisted like the 
contours of a recognisably female form falls away to reveal an inside of electrical wires and 
cables. As we travel down this wired body, we see the cables are attached to (or emerge from) 
another person. Papers are seemingly printed from their eyes and mouth (we hear the sound 
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of an office printer), and we travel further down this body again to see hands typing at a 
keyboard. A gasp, and one of the keys seems to grow, an erect phallus. Papers spill out of 
boxes, which become more boxes and keys, which then spill forth more paper. We observe a 
sexual encounter take place within (and between) the machines, as two machine-figures are 
connected. Finally, the two are violently ripped apart, as wires are stretched and broken. The 
soundtrack is a textured soundscape of rustling papers, keys typing, electrical buzzing, an 
almost wooden creaking, electrical humming, camera shutters, the ticking of a film reel, the 
sound of a photocopier, and soft, human breaths and sighs. Composed by Jean Derome, the 
soundtrack contributes a further dimension of materiality and physicality to the works, that 
is, “a tactile dimension to what appears on screen by evoking its materiality” (Roy 28).  
 
Soif (2013) also makes use of this musique concrete soundtrack, as the film explores the 
influence of alcoholic addiction on a woman’s life. As the film’s synopsis describes, “Alcohol 
is the essence of her being. She imbibes her youth and becomes completely absorbed by her 
desire to satisfy her thirst.”18 Soif opens with the sound of a film reel and the image of a movie 
theatre; as the curtains are drawn back the screen becomes a woman’s face. As she takes a 
long, gulping drink, her face becomes a wine glass. She tips her head forward and wine spills 
out. Just as in The Hat, the body in Soif becomes the stage or site through which all 
transformations occur, and through which all the memories and experiences of the woman 
must pass through as the experience of addiction is played out for the audience. At several 
points the woman becomes a fish, her body reforming into scales and a tail. She swims in 
alcohol, constantly consuming, pouring out, and re-consuming. The soundtrack is permeated 
with the sounds of liquid being slurped, sucked, sipped, spilled, bottles and glasses clinking, 
 
18 Soif Synopsis National Film Board of Canada, https://www.nfb.ca/film/soif_en/ Accessed 13 December 2018 
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and corks popping. The lines of her body, which through constant metamorphosis become 
wine glasses, bottles, and liquid, take on an almost slurred, unsteady quality the more she 
drinks. In the film’s climactic series of metamorphoses, the woman undergoes a series of 
transformations that feel almost forced, as the woman-fish desperately swims upwards, the 
contents of a bottle of wine poured out; a fish emerges from the woman’s mouth and the 
clamour of the soundtrack fades away. Bubbles emerge from the woman-fish’s mouth and 
drift peacefully upward. The last sound we hear is of the woman breaking through water’s 
surface, and taking a deep gasp of air.  
 
Each of these films explores and takes the point of view of women. According to Julie Roy, 
Cournoyer’s work “speaks in a female voice, in turn strong, gentle, vulnerable, rebellious” 
(19-20). Her animation delves into women’s desires, women as objects of desire, women as 
perceived by the male gaze, female rage and despair, pain and pleasure (and the ambiguities 
contained within this distinction), addiction, sexuality, trauma and memory. At the centre of 
all of this is the body—that which Roy calls the mise-en-scène of her films: “the body is the 
stage on which all the action takes place” (27). But the action does not just take place on the 
bodies in Cournoyer’s films, but through them, and within them. The female body is not only 
a central theme in her work, nor does she simply imagine all the effects the above thematic 
concerns and unconscious inner-workings have upon the body; Cournoyer explores how the 
so-called unruliness of bodies can express these thoughts and feelings, contribute to notions 
of self-hood, and inform our phenomenological experience of the world. Cournoyer’s bodies 
resist dualisms, and complicate the relationship between mind and body., inside and outside. 
In a 2017 interview with Claudie Levesque, Cournoyer is asked about the body in the film she 
is currently drawing:  
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Levesque: Is it yours?  
Cournoyer: The body?  
Levesque: Mm-hmm.  
Cournoyer: It’s always mine. It’s an extension of the body.  
 
Cournoyer describes the animated body as a ‘prolongation’ of herself, allowing her to 
directly express explicit emotions and unconscious impulses. Animation allows her to 
participate in what she describes as “surrealist play,” even if the subject matter of her films 
delves into harrowing topics. It is this kind of freedom that allows her to refigure the body, 
thus allowing us to see the ways animation can be a site for conceiving the body from a 
feminist corporeal perspective.  
 
Rebecca Coleman argues, “[o]ne of the most prevalent themes within contemporary visual 
culture is the idea that transformation—of the self and the body—is important and desirable” 
(30). However, the bodily transformations in Cournoyer’s films are ambivalent about the 
nature and desirability of the transformations the body undergoes. Pleasure and pain are not 
self-contained, and the effects of the psychical trauma inflicted are often played out through 
Cournoyer’s use of metamorphosis. Cournoyer cites other animators at the NFB who are 
noted for their use of metamorphosis, including Jacques Drouin, Caroline Leaf, and Peter 
Foldes. She describes metamorphosis as “Shortcuts, ellipses … The art of shortcuts. A simple 
editing transition … Doorknobs aren’t necessary, as they say.” (2014). This is a reminder that, 
whatever else animated metamorphosis may reveal or signify, one of its key uses as an 
animation device is as a moment of transition. However, in Cournoyer’s films, 
metamorphosis operates as far more than a ‘simple editing transition’. As Cournoyer directly 
goes on to state, “[e]verything’s connected. I’m interested in the female body, women’s 
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innermost selves. That’s the unconscious, huh?” (2014). Cournoyer’s films, including The 
Hat, Accordion, and Soif, achieve through their use of metamorphosis a representation of the 
interplay and implicit connection between mind and body, the incorporeal and the corporeal. 
Cournoyer’s use of the ink, paper, and brush allows her to connect with her materials, and 
directly express her emotions and unconscious impulses. The metamorphoses and 
connections between figures, images, and drawings sometimes reveal themselves in the 
repetition of cycles and sequences. Of making The Hat, Cournoyer states that, “I was 
repeating myself, sometimes it just works: I’d do two hundred drawings and it just works” 
(2012). Working without a typical storyboard, the metamorphoses and are unplanned; the 
transformation and connections emerge through the animation and repetition of individual 
fragments. Working with an editor, the fragments are moved around as connections and 
linkages are sought and revealed. The process itself is non-linear, fragmented, and lyrical. As 
Roy describes, it is through this process of shifting these fragments around and linking them 
together that “an emotion, a guiding line, maybe even a narrative, emerges. Cournoyer then 
returns to her drawing board to fill in gaps between sequences of metamorphoses” (27). 
Cournoyer’s animation process then, is a one of animating materials and animating a body 
which is already fragmented, a body which was never whole or complete to begin with. It is 
through the linking together of these fragments, forging connections between individual 
frames, that a movement and becoming of the animated body emerges. In The Hat, the 
metamorphosis of the body serves to draw connections between past and present; in 
Accordion, it is a connection forged between bodies across distances and through technology; 
in Soif, the body becomes the very thing to which the woman has become addicted. All three 
of these films highlight the connections between bodies and materialities as, through her ink 
and paper bodies, Cournoyer demonstrates what Grosz describes as the “fragmentations, 
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fracturing, dislocations that orient bodies and body parts toward other bodies and body parts” 
(1994 13).  
 
Here I would like to return to Grosz’s conditions for a feminist refiguration of the body 
which I discussed in chapter three. Key to this refiguration is an avoidance of dichotomous, 
hierarchical thinking; a consideration of the multiplicity of bodies (that is, the 
acknowledgement that there is no singular or neutral model of the body), and the avoidance 
of essentialism; the acknowledgement that cultural, political, and geographical inscriptions 
of the body cannot be separated from the body’s own corporeal, material nature, a nature 
which is yet mutable, open to intervention, transformation, and change. Grosz also argues 
that accounts of the body must articulate the interaction between inside and outside, the 
psychical and the physical: “Any adequate model must include a psychical representation of 
the subject’s lived body as well as of the relations between body gestures, posture, and 
movement in the constitution of processes of psychical representations” (1994 23). This is 
the kind of model of the body that Cournoyer achieves: in Soif, for instance, the interaction 
between the interior, psychical experience of the addiction is represented, as is the relation 
between the psychical and the physical. The physical effects of the addiction are felt in the 
wavering, unstable lines of ink on paper, the transforming body which at once embodies her 
addiction and moves us through the lived experience of it. The interactions between inside 
and outside, mind and body, are also prominent in The Hat. Here the body as the site of 
transformation brings forth a series of painful and traumatic memories. The film itself is the 
result of research undertaken by Cournoyer (“I went to see exotic dancers, I took photos, and 
photos of people in bars … I interviewed a lot of girls, and an adult, who had been abused”) 
and fragments of her own memories (“a female cousin who became an exotic dancer … I had 
taken photos of her when she was little as a ballet dancer”) (Cournoyer 2012 31). Perhaps the 
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most prominent sequence drawn from Cournoyer’s own memories is the figure of the man in 
a dark coat and hat climbing the stairs to the young girls room. Cournoyer writes that it relates 
to a memory of her father:  
 
I was in a convent, my father was often away, we never saw him. Once he came in the 
evening to see me, with lots of presents, but the nuns didn’t want him to come up, but 
they couldn’t stop him, they said he was jumping up the stairs, so that’s where the 
stairs came from. When I woke up in the morning I found he had left me a book, a 
storybook, I know he had been there, he was wearing a hat, so that’s where that comes 
from. (2012 31).    
 
Cournoyer writes that she did about thirty versions of the staircase sequence, continually 
repeating, and that once she had finally completed it she threw it out; a producer picking it 
out of the garbage saved the sequence and without that, Cournoyer writes, it would not be in 
the film (2012 33). The sequence that follows is equally striking as it is haunting. When the 
man in the hat reaches the top of the stairs, his hat becomes the young girl’s blanket as she 
lies in bed. A hand reaches in to draw the blanket away and reach under her night dress, which 
becomes the hat again. As the girl seems to wear the hat, it becomes a ballet dress; she raises 
her arms over her head, reminiscent of a girl dancing on stage, and as she does so the image 
of the man returns, his hat obscuring her from view. As he withdraws, the young girl is gone 
and the adult dancer is in her place. The crown of the hat becomes her legs. Completely naked, 
the woman opens her legs for an audience of voyeurs, and we are drawn inside her. As she 
dances for a group of men, her body contorts, moves and gestures in ways that are physically 
impossible. Here perhaps, we can see the prolongation or extension of the body that 
Cournoyer describes to Levesque — Cournoyer describes becoming physically sick while 
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making The Hat: “I become so immersed in a subject and come to identify with the character. 
I made myself sick” (2014). This extension of herself and of her body is felt and expressed 
through the use of her materials, through (as quoted above) the violence of her pens, the 
harshness of her brushes, and the stained, smattered, visceral stains of the ink on the paper, 
which Ruth Hayes describes “evidence of the passion with which she [Cournoyer] approaches 
her subject” (2012 209). This coarseness peaks in the final metamorphic sequence of the film 
in which the line between girl and woman is effaced.  
 
Cournoyer’s bodies of paper and ink do not provide a concrete a model of the myriad 
interactions between mind and body, but instead speaks to the complexities of their 
interrelations. Mind and body are not reduced to singular substance, but rather the body is 
animated as the threshold in-between the dichotomised pairing of inside and outside. The 
body hovers between such points as natural and cultural, self and other, as Grosz finds 
throughout her exploration of the body that neither psychoanalytical, phenomenological, or 
accounts of the body as socially inscribed will completely suffice on their own to account for 
the multiplicities and specificities of bodies.  
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Conclusion  
 
The question of the body for feminism and for animation is one that should provoke a 
multiplicity of responses, for there is no one model of the body that can stand in for all bodies. 
This thesis has been a response to one of the key questions of feminist corporeal and material 
theory: how can feminism reclaim or refigure the body for its own purposes, conceptualising 
it outside of a dichotomous order where it becomes subjugated and secondary to mind? To 
explore this, I have posed the question: how may animation help to undo and displace the 
mind/body opposition and its insidious parallel associations, allowing a reconceptualisation 
of the body and its myriad complexities on feminist terms? To recall the words of Elizabeth 
Grosz, from the introduction to this thesis: 
 
The body is a most peculiar “thing,” for it is never quite reducible to being merely a 
thing; nor does it ever quite manage to rise above the status of a thing. Thus it is both 
a thing and a nothing, an object, but an object which somehow contains or coexists 
with an interiority, an object able to take itself and others as subjects, a unique kind 
of object not reducible to other objects. (1994 xi)  
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All bodies are animate—they are active, reactive, productive, material and excessive. In order 
to refigure the body for feminist purposes, the body must be understood as mutable, as both 
naturally and culturally produced and inscribed, not subjugated to mind but neither 
privileged and elevated above mind. A corporeal feminist account of the body resists dualism 
by taking into account the generative and productive interrelation between body and mind, 
refusing singular accounts of the body and of the subject, and by acknowledging the 
specificity and multiplicity of different bodies. A corporeal feminist account of the body 
should problematise binary distinctions between mind/body, inside/outside, 
masculine/feminine by conceiving of the body as a “threshold or borderline concept that 
hovers perilously and undecidably at the pivotal point of binary pairs,” while also 
acknowledging the irreducible materiality of bodies (23). This thesis has investigated how 
animation, with the potentiality inherent in its multiplicities of form and materiality, may 
problematise these distinctions.  
 
I have explored in this thesis the various encounters between animation and feminism, 
including the historical contribution of women in animation, as well as their material and 
embodied presence and contribution to the development of the medium. I have examined the 
ways animation studies has drawn from feminist thought in order to provide necessary and 
useful critiques of animated texts through critical readings of theorists and practitioners.  I 
have discussed matters of representation, both on and off screen, and why we need to think 
women in animation, and the body in animation, in excess of representation. Within the 
recent scholarship, in which is found a welcome renewed focus on women in animation, there 
is still a lack of rigorous feminist, theoretical inquiry into the nature of animation and 
animated bodies that seeks to understand how this feminist theory may work through and 
alongside animation. This thesis aims to redress that lack of critical interrogation by 
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examining how animation may operate as a site to explore these feminist refigurations of the 
body, problematising the body as threshold. Animation also offer feminism new modes and 
models through which to conceive of the female body, as animated and animating.  
 
Questioning the ontology of the animated body through feminist corporeal perspectives 
necessarily begets questions regarding the potential (in)corporeality and the (im)materiality 
of these bodies. The analysis I have undertaken in the preceding chapters is only one possible 
perspective and approach towards the body in animation, guided by feminist frameworks 
which attempt to account for both the irreducible corporeality of bodies, and the incorporeal 
conditions, cultural inscriptions, and psychical impulses by which they are constituted. It 
becomes clear that a feminist conceptualisation of the body does not ‘end’ with the human 
body, but requires a further rethinking of ontologies of nature, of matter, of life and 
difference. Through her examinations of the corporeal, Grosz’s framework assists this 
ontological, ethical, and aesthetic mission in conceptualising the turns to those excesses 
within and outside the corporeal.  By exploring the imperceptible movements and becomings 
that constitute the living and nonliving things, we can further understand the ways the 
human subject is constituted as unfixed and unstable. Animation allows us to think and work 
through these processes of becoming and unbecoming, underscoring feminist theory’s 
provocation to make us think anew what the subject is capable of doing and becoming—the 
subject’s ability to become-more and become-otherwise.  
 
 Through her considerations of the various intersections of life, the body, politics and art, 
Grosz argues for feminism’s return to questions of ontology, to the creation of concepts, and 
the invention of the new—new concepts, new practices, and new understandings. This is 
feminist theory at its best, its most generative, and most productive. This call for the 
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invention of the new—of a shift from the concept of ‘freedom from’ towards a notion of 
‘freedom to—has been echoed in this thesis’ exploration of the body in animation. It takes 
seriously Grosz’s call to understand freedom as “primarily of the body … linked to the body’s 
capacity for movement and thus its multiple possibilities of action” (2011 72). Like Grosz, 
Ewa Ziarek’s conception of a feminist aesthetics of potentiality calls for new 
conceptualisations of the dynamic interplay between form, matter and embodiment. This has 
further enabled an examination of the material entanglement and the ontology of the in-
between for animation.  The capacity to think through the ontological dimensions of the 
notion of freedom is aesthetically and materially evoked through Michèle Cournoyer’s use of 
the animated form. Her use of ink, brushes and paper—those materials which allows her the 
freedom to play, experiment, and blur the boundaries between inside and outside, body and 
mind—demonstrates the capacity and the potentiality of animation to express active 
interplay between form, matter and embodiment. Cournoyer’s bodies of paper and ink, bodies 
which are at once materially constituted, unfixed, unstable, fluctuating at the threshold 
between inside and outside, allow us to understand the body’s capacity for action, and of the 
subject’s potential to become-more and become-other. Animation is a practice, process, 
technique, which allows us to conceptualise a means to become -more, and perpetually so, as 
becoming is not goal-oriented but open-ended. It allows us to refigure the nature of the body 
in excess of representation alone, and indeed, allows us to begin to rethink the nature of 
nature, of materiality, of human and nonhuman becomings.  
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